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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the relationship between blockbuster cinematic violence and its 
historical context in the period surrounding the events of September 11, 2001.  It 
charts the trajectory of violence by showing that screen violence in successful 
blockbuster cinema responds to historical developments.  Violence in this thesis is 
defined according to the tripartite definition of violence articulated by peace 
studies theorist Johan Galtung.  In order to analyse the historical positioning of the 
violence in the blockbusters being analysed, tripartite violence has been fused with 
the diagnostic critique of cultural theorist Douglas Kellner, which “uses history to 
read texts and texts to read history” (Media 116).  By synthesising the two 
theoretical frameworks in this way, the diagnostic critique becomes violence-
calibrated, and can be readily deployed to discern the ways in which blockbuster 
screen violence engages with the historical context of the text.  The texts analysed 
represent the top grossing film from each year from 1996 to 2003, a period selected 
for its political relationship to 9/11.  The eight films analysed are: Independence 
Day, Titanic, Saving Private Ryan, Star Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace, Dr. 
Seuss’ How the Grinch Stole Christmas, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, 
Spider-Man, and The Lord of the Rings: Return of the King.  This thesis shows that 
the films from the pre-9/11 period articulate a clear “dream” of a world that is 
defined in binary terms with a good Self in opposition to an evil Other that is always 
external.  The trends found in the violent dreams begin to shift with The Grinch as 
the relationship between the Self and Other changes, but the transformation does 
not fully manifest itself until the post-9/11 period when the films are marked by 
paranoia stemming from the repeated appearance of an Other than can pass as the 
Self, and ultimately a Self that behaves like the Other.  While the violence that is 
found in the pre-9/11 films “dreams” of the Bush response to 9/11, the post-9/11 
films ultimate envision a future that the War on Terror could not deliver.  In the 
end, this thesis will develop a methodology that can be used to explore blockbuster 
cinematic violence in terms of the nuances that exist between the three types of 
violence Galtung articulates: direct, structural, and cultural. 
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Introduction 
Wishing for “A New Day of Infamy” 
On the evening of September 11, 2001, homes across the United States were 
bathed in a phantasmagorical glow as people watched the continual coverage of 
the terrorist attacks that had occurred that morning.  The attacks themselves—the 
hijacking of four commercial airliners, three of which were then intentionally 
crashed into iconic buildings in New York City and Washington, D.C.—brought the 
nation to a standstill.  On that day, on television, on the radio, on the Internet, and 
in print, images and sounds of the planes striking the World Trade Center towers in 
New York City were presented again and again; all regular programming was 
cancelled.  The only footage that rivalled the initial attacks in terms of airtime was 
that of the twin towers, with smoke billowing across the skyline, ultimately 
collapsing again and again.  These images and the nearly endless media attention 
and analysis that accompanied it seemed to signal the vulnerability of the United 
States, but did so in a way that made it seem entirely unpredictable; the attacks 
seemed to come out of nowhere. 
In the days after the attacks of September 11, 2001, newspapers across the United 
States were emblazoned with headlines that spoke of the shock that resonated 
throughout the nation.  Newsday, for instance, bore the headline “America 
Attacked” (“Extra” n. pag.), whilst The San Francisco Chronicle read “War Against 
America” (“War” n. pag.), and wrote about “gut-punch effect on this country's 
sense of security” (“War” n. pag.).  The shock evident in US headlines and stories 
stemmed largely from the fact that the attacks were not committed abroad, but on 
US soil.  For decades the wars of the United States were external.  Although images 
of those wars could be seen across all media, the familiar forms of the US military 
and its soldiers were dislocated geographically; the locales were always foreign—
the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, Europe, Asia and more.  The shock of 
September 11 came from the collapse of that safe distance.  The backdrop of war 
was suddenly the hallowed New York City skyline with the absence of the twin 
towers standing as a testament to the wound the nation suffered in the attack.   
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In the days and months following September 11, 2001, many discussed how the 
attacks of that day could not have been foreseen.  On September 12, 2001, for 
instance, The Boston Globe bore a headline reading “A New Day of Infamy” (Zukoff 
& Brellis), linking 9/11 to the attack on Pearl Harbor in World War II.  President 
George W. Bush reinforced the point on September 20, 2001, when he referred to 
the events of 9/11 as “surprise attacks” (“Transcript” n. pag.).  A similarly forceful 
statement regarding the surprising nature of the attacks came over a year later on 
October 1, 2002, when Paul Wolfowitz, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, made the 
following remarks: 
“Although September 11th has taken its place alongside December 
7th as a date that will live in infamy, the larger lesson we may draw 
from these attacks, remains unchanged and clear: we must be 
prepared for surprise—from wherever it may appear and however it 
may threaten” (n. pag.). 
However, as many, such as Chalmers Johnson and Noam Chomsky (Hegemony), 
have subsequently shown, a review of American foreign policy suggests an event 
such as 9/11 was not only possible, but was quite probable—the spectre of US 
foreign policy inevitably returning to home soil.  Such authors argue that the attacks 
were not as surprising as they seemed.  For some, such as Bill Schaffer and Jean 
Baudrillard, the visual imagery of the attacks was not unfamiliar either. 
In the immediate wake of 9/11, Bill Schaffer suggested that the experience of 
watching the disaster was “like a movie” (n.pag.) linking the destruction of the 
attacks to countless cinematic antecedents ranging from First Blood to Charlie’s 
Angels.  Schaffer even draws direct connections between the falling towers and the 
collapsing buildings that populate so many blockbuster films.  He takes these 
parallels further, though, when he suggests that  
“It seems very possible that the shape of the act itself, if not the 
desire to commit it, may have been inspired at least partly by such 
conspicuously destructive, internationally distributed American 
films as Independence Day, and Fight Club” (n. pag.). 
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This “video causality” (n.pag.), as Shaffer refers to it, points to the fact that film 
violence potentially had a part to play in terrorists formulating the attacks in the 
first place.  In that way, Schaffer suggests that Hollywood can be seen as having 
indirectly foreseen the events of 9/11 through its rampant destruction of urban 
landscapes, even if it did not cause them outright.  It is the images of the collapsed 
cityscapes, however, that theorist Jean Baudrillard draws together in his 
formulation of a more provocative connection between cinema and 9/11. 
Writing about the attacks of 9/11, Baudrillard argues that before 9/11, the 
American system was reaching a state of omnipotence.  The closer it came to this 
supreme state, the more its death was desired by the world, including its own 
population.  For him, “the increase in the power of power heightens the will to 
destroy it” (6-7), and the “The West, in the position of God (divine omnipotence 
and absolute moral legitimacy), has become suicidal, and declared war on itself” 
(7).  Thus, even though he, as a French writer, observes that “we can say that they 
did it, but we wished for it” (emphasis in original) (5), the fact that he inscribes it 
within the matrix of suicide suggests that the United States “wished for” its own 
demise.  Returning to images of cities destroyed, Baudrillard supports his point by 
drawing on the disaster films of the 1990s, writing that “the countless disaster 
movies bear witness to this fantasy” (7) suggesting that in those films are dreams of 
the destruction that arrived on September 11, 2001.  Yet by building upon the work 
of Baudrillard and looking at the wishes found in the larger body of films that draw 
upon the aesthetic of blockbuster American cinema, which all the disaster films 
Baudrillard alludes to do, the details of the connections between US cinema from 
that period and 9/11 are revealed to be far more nuanced than a simple wish for 
(suicidal) destruction.  This can be seen in an examination of the central conflicts 
found in blockbuster American cinema, which pit good versus evil; the Self is 
positioned against the Other.  It is in the ways that this opposition is constructed 
that the wishes of the films can be found.  Thus, while Baudrillard develops the 
concept of the “spirit of terrorism,” as he calls it, this thesis will look instead at the 
ways in which inflections of the Self/Other binary in films preceding and following 
9/11 wished not just for destruction, but for the return of an heroic identity for the 
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United States itself, an identity which had vanished in the wake of the Cold War.  In 
order to chart this relationship, the Self and Other will be examined in much greater 
detail, and this will be accomplished through an analysis of the violence that exists 
between them.  This will necessarily involve using a comprehensive definition of 
violence that extends beyond the physical. 
Accordingly, this thesis sets out to achieve two tasks.  The first is to analyse the 
violence in blockbuster cinema surrounding 9/11 to see how it articulates wishes 
and anxieties from both the pre- and post-9/11 periods.   Specifically, it will use an 
expanded definition of violence articulated by peace studies theorist Johan Galtung 
to explore the ways in which the violence of blockbuster cinema, both leading up to 
and following 9/11, functioned to legitimise the violence inherent in the response 
articulated by the Bush administration.  Following the definition of violence Galtung 
creates, this analysis will necessarily involve different types of violence, both visible 
and invisible.  It is important to note, however, that this process will not suggest 
causality between media representations of violence and acts of violence.  Instead, 
this analysis will show how a major act of real-world violence—the attacks of 
9/11—harmonised with the wishes and dreams articulated in blockbuster cinematic 
violence that preceded it.  At the same time, though, the analysis will show how the 
response to 9/11 ultimately diverged from the dreams spelled out by violence in 
post-9/11 blockbuster cinema.  Building upon this, the second task this thesis will 
accomplish is the establishment of a methodology that permits the elucidation of 
the relationship between blockbuster cinema, violence as defined by Galtung, and 
historical context.  Otherwise stated, this thesis will develop a method that permits 
blockbuster cinema to serve as a type of barometer that can be utilised to gauge 
the violence that is sanctioned in blockbuster cinema at a larger cultural level.  The 
first task, then, serves as a case study of sorts for the second.  The first will be 
explored in the main body of the thesis, while the second will be implicitly 
developed throughout, and overtly in the Conclusion.  To begin to understand how 
the thesis will accomplish this work, it is necessary to first define violence, and for 
that, a broader understanding of the ways in which violence has previously been 
treated in various disciplines is needed. 
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Defining Violence 
The traditional understanding of violence is that it is a physical phenomenon.  
Violence is often understood as the domain of the fist fight or open warfare, but 
that understanding of violence excludes a number of important factors.  For 
instance, prejudice and violence frequently accompany one another, yet prejudice 
itself usually falls outside the definition of violence.  For this thesis, a definition of 
violence is needed that not only links those two in an explicit fashion, but also 
clearly defines both, and so moves away from theories that frame it as a physical 
phenomenon, or that address it implicitly as part of larger treatises.  This can be 
seen in the works of both Machiavelli and Hobbes, whose writings heavily engage 
with violence, but rarely, if ever, explore it on its own.  What engagement with 
violence there is, however, treats it as a physical concept through either 
interpersonal conflict or large-scale warfare.  As violence became a discrete object 
of study, its depth was slowly probed, and the notion of it as a solely physical act 
began to diminish.  This can be seen in the distinct shift towards direct engagement 
with violence in the twentieth century with authors such as Walter Benjamin and 
Hannah Arendt who entered into a dialogue with previous authors.  Arendt, for 
instance, responded to previous writing by authors such as Georg Wilhelm Friedrich 
Hegel, who saw violence legitimised by “social station” (80), Karl Marx, who Bhikhu 
Parekh observes has two positions on violence, one from the “moral or 
conventional point of view, and regrets it,” and one “from the historical or species 
point of view, and fully approves of it,” (113), and Frantz Fanon, whose positions 
Jean-Paul Sartre summed up in the preface to Wretched of the Earth, “In the first 
days of the revolt you must kill” (233).  From this dialogue, Arendt was able to 
explore violence more fully as an individual subject.  Her investigation 
supplemented violence with a variety of other concepts such as power and force, 
and showed that a discrete study of violence revealed a multi-facted, multi-layered 
concept that could not be easily explained or simply defined.  Research in other 
disciplines has yielded similar findings. 
In the field of psychology, for instance, while violence is often seen as a physical 
action, it is frequently paired with the concept of aggression, which spans non-
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physical actions and threats.  Curt R. Bartol and Anne M. Bartol, for example, use 
psychology in criminological settings to describe violence as “destructive physical 
aggression intentionally directed at harming other persons or things” (emphasis in 
original) (146) with aggression defined as “behaviour perpetrated or attempted with 
the intention of harming another individual physically or psychologically (as 
opposed to socially) or to destroy an object” (emphasis in original) (145).  Although 
violence is physical here, it is part of a larger matrix of harm.   
 
In the field of peace studies, a definition of violence has been developed by Galtung 
that expands the nature of violence.  It incorporates elements that Arendt 
introduces, such as power and force, and positions them within a much more 
robust formulation that simultaneously focuses on violence at multiple levels of 
society, essentially theorising violence into macro- and micro-levels (“Cultural”; 
Peace).  For Galtung, this definition of violence provides a lens through which one 
can view the world; relationships of violence and peace connect everything.  It is 
the definition of violence offered by Galtung that will form one of the key 
methodological elements of this thesis, and will necessarily need to be explored in 
much greater detail. 
For Galtung, violence is a tripartite structure.  As shown in Figure 1 (Peace), violence 
is divided into three types: direct, structural, and cultural.  The three function as a 
dynamic set, with each vertex of the triangle feeding into the other two such that 
cultural violence informs direct and structural violence while direct violence can 
shape structural and cultural violence.  What is more, Galtung argues that the 
absence of one or two points of the triangle but the presence of the remainder will 
result in the remanifestation of the absent forms of violence.  As he terms it, 
“violence breeds violence” (Peace 7).  Thus, if structural violence is present, but 
direct and cultural violence are absent, the structures of violence will ultimately 
reproduce direct and cultural violence.  The triangle, though, reflects the argument 
that Galtung makes which is that violence, which he generally defines as “harming 
and/or hurting” (Peace 2), is not simply a matter of physical actions.  
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Figure 1 - Tripartite Violence 
 
Direct violence is violence which transpires between what Galtung calls a “sender” 
or “actor” who intentionally directs violence at a receiver or receivers.  So if a 
person physically strikes another, it would be direct violence.  If there is no direct 
relationship between the sender and receiver, then it is indirect or structural 
violence, terms which Galtung uses synonymously.  Structural violence “comes 
from the social structure itself” (Peace 2), and describes constructs which privilege 
some at the expense of others, such as racism or sexism.  In this thesis, this violence 
will largely be explored in depictions of ethnicity, class, and gender.  Lastly, cultural 
violence is “symbolic” violence “in religion and ideology, in language and art, in 
science and law, in media and education” that functions “to legitimize direct and 
structural violence” (Peace 2).  A religious crusade, for instance, legitimises 
discrimination against a certain group (structural violence) which in turn legitimises 
physical attacks and war (direct violence).  Violence, then, becomes the actions of 
one against another, directly or indirectly.  Otherwise stated, violence is predicated 
upon the creation of a Self in opposition to an Other.  To understand the 
relationship between the two, it is useful to consider another construction of 
violence that Galtung presents to accompany the triangle of violence, which is a 
“violence strata image” (“Cultural” 294), shown in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2 - The Strata of Violence 
 
At the bottom of this image is cultural violence, “a substratum from which the 
other two can derive their nutrients” (“Cultural” 294).  Above that is a stratum of 
structural violence where “patterns of exploitation are building up, wearing out, or 
torn down, with the protective accompaniment of penetration-segmentation 
preventing consciousness formation, and fragmentation-marginalisation preventing 
organization against exploitation and repression” (“Cultural” 294).  Lastly, the 
highest stratum is direct violence which is plainly evident “to the unguided eye and 
to barefoot empiricism” (“Cultural” 294-295).  As Galtung notes, “a causal flow from 
cultural via structural to direct violence can be identified” (“Cultural” 295).  
Borrowing from Hans Reudi Weber, he expands, writing: 
“The culture preaches, teaches, admonishes, eggs on, and dulls us 
into seeing exploitation and/or repression as normal and natural, or 
into not seeing them (particularly not exploitation) at all.  Then 
come the eruptions, the efforts to use direct violence to get out of 
the structural iron cage, and counter-violence to keep the cage 
intact” (“Cultural” 294). 
In terms of Self and Other, structural and cultural violence essentially reinforce the 
separation of the two, while they both ultimately inform more immediate 
interactions between them in the form of direct violence.  In looking at film, this 
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thesis will primarily be dealing with “invisible” cultural violence, but it will focus on 
representations of all three types of violence in the films.  Although other theorists 
have developed models of violence very similar to that which Galtung articulates, 
they are not as useful in this analysis as they are not as methodologically 
reproducible, and focus less on violence embedded within cultural artefacts. 
Slavoj Ẑiẑek, for instance, constructed a framework of violence that closely 
resembles that of Galtung.  As with the tripartite form of violence Galtung defines, 
Ẑiẑek extends violence beyond physicality, and separates it in binary terms such 
that there is subjective and objective violence (1-7).  For him, subjective violence is 
violence that is visible while objective violence is invisible, and can be either 
symbolic or systemic.  As he expounds upon this definition, it is clear that subjective 
violence correlates to direct violence while objective violence encompasses 
structural and cultural violence through its two subcategories.  However, unlike 
Galtung, Ẑiẑek approaches the subject in a less scientific fashion, which does allow 
him to shift between media representations of violence and real world violence 
with ease—a considerable strength—but the reasoning behind those transitions is 
not always clear.  The result is an inconsistent methodological framework.  More 
importantly, his analysis of the categories of violence he delineates does not 
develop symbolic violence as fully as it does other forms of violence.  This is 
partially because his use of the term derives from the work of Pierre Bourdieu, who 
defines the term as “the gentle, invisible violence, which is never recognized as 
such, and is not so much undergone as chosen” (192).  Interestingly, this is one of 
the forms of violence that Baudrillard discusses in relation to 9/11 (22).  In a 
comparative analysis of Galtung and Bourdieu, Peter Imbusch observes the 
similarities between cultural violence and symbolic violence, but notes that while 
the former “is aimed at making other forms of violence appear just—or at least not 
unjust—and thus making them acceptable for society” (25), the latter is “the 
violence embodied in concepts, language, and systems of symbols aimed at 
obscuring, veiling and glossing over unspoken conditions of rule” (25).  Thus while 
cultural violence has strong connections to other forms of violence, symbolic 
violence is viewed as an alternative to physical violence.  As Bourdieu notes, 
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“Gentle, hidden exploitation is the form taken by man’s exploitation of man 
whenever overt, brutal exploitation is impossible” (192).  Since this is an analysis of 
the culturally violence blockbuster cinema before and after 9/11, it will necessarily 
connect that violence with both structural and direct violence, a connection that 
would not be present were symbolic violence to be used on its own.   
Of course, this connection to the work of Bourdieu can easily be extended to the 
work of Louis Althusser on the ideological state apparatus and the repressive state 
apparatus, the latter of which he argues “functions by violence” (79), which can in 
turn be connected to later theories of violence which build on those concepts.  
While it is important to consider the various trajectories that can be traced from 
this discussion of Galtung and violence, it is important to not deviate too far from 
tripartite violence as it is that definition of violence which forms the key structural 
component of this thesis in its exploration of representations of blockbuster 
cinematic violence.  Thus while Althusser builds upon Bourdieu, the concept of the 
state apparatuses is not useful in the present analysis.  That having been said, a 
closer examination of cultural violence, as Galtung defines it, does bring it into 
direct engagement with other theorists that must be considered. 
Violence and Power 
To discuss the dimensions within which cultural violence works, Galtung suggests 
that “a concept broader than violence, and also broader than peace” (Peace 2) is 
needed, and argues that “Power is that concept” (emphasis in original) (Peace 2).  
For him, power, which he also refers to as discourse, can exist as one of four types: 
“cultural, economic, military, and political” (emphasis in original) (Peace 2).  Galtung 
is clear that each of these “realms” affects the other three.  He argues, though, that  
“single acts of direct violence come out of structures of political 
decisions and economic transactions; and the latter cause each 
other.  But underneath it all lurks culture; legitimizing some 
structures and acts, delegitimizing others” (Peace 2) 
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Following that logic, while this thesis will be exploring representations of violence in 
all four dimensions, the grounding of the analysis in the cultural artefacts of cinema 
places it, at a meta-level, firmly within the cultural realm.  Such a focus can help to 
address the ways in which culture makes violence of any type appear to be 
legitimate.  However, the larger discussion that must be addressed at this point is 
the fact that Galtung sees violence as being subsumed within power. 
As noted above, Arendt established connections between power and violence.  For 
her,  
“Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in 
concert.  Power is never the property of an individual; it belongs to 
a group and remains in existence only so long as the group keeps 
together” (44) 
While there are certainly some parallels to the work of Galtung here in that his 
definition of violence largely focuses on power relations, his precise use of that 
concept is more closely aligned with the work of Michel Foucault.  In fact, because 
of the many parallels between the works of Foucault and Galtung, a discussion of 
Foucault is necessary here. 
Despite the different lexicons Foucault and Galtung utilise, it is clear that what both 
write about with regard to power is dispersed mechanisms which are not located in 
any one central body.  For Foucault, power “brings into play relations between 
individuals (or between groups)” (“The Subject” 337).  Accordingly, it describes and 
permits the ways in which one acts towards another (or an Other) (“The Subject” 
344).  As he observes, “a relationship of confrontation reaches its term, its final 
moment (and the victory of one of the two adversaries) when stable mechanisms 
replace the free play of antagonistic reactions” (“The Subject” 346-347).  Thus, “For 
a relationship of confrontation, from the moment it is not a struggle to the death, 
the fixing of a power relationship becomes a target” (“The Subject” 347).  Galtung 
addresses the same concept, but by locating it within his tripartite definition of 
violence. 
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For instance, in discussing slavery, Galtung notes that: 
“Africans are captured, forced across the Atlantic to work as slaves; 
millions are killed in the process—in Africa, on board, in the 
Americas.  This massive direct violence seeps down and sediments 
as massive structural violence, with whites as the master topdogs 
and blacks as the slave underdogs, producing and reproducing 
massive cultural violence with racist ideas everywhere.  After some 
time, direct violence is forgotten, slavery is forgotten, and only two 
labels show up, pale enough for college textbooks: ‘discrimination’ 
for massive structural violence and ‘prejudice’ for massive cultural 
violence” (“Cultural” 295). 
Thus while violence in Foucauldian terms would correspond to direct violence, 
power correlates to cultural and structural violence, as it is within those domains 
that discourse is formed.  Given the broader similarities, though, it is unsurprising 
that Galtung, along with Richard C. Vincent, uses a definition of discourse—“a 
construct that accommodates thoughts” (US Glasnost 99)—that seems to largely 
derive from the work of Foucault. 
For Foucault, discourse is formed through statements which themselves do not 
carry meaning, but function to produce meaning.  When patterns of meaning 
emerge, dispersed, so to speak, across various sites, a “system of dispersion” 
emerges.  Of this, Foucault remarks that  
“Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, 
such a system of dispersion, whenever, between objects, types of 
statement, concepts, or thematic choices, one can define a 
regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, 
transformations), we will say, for the sake of convenience, that we 
are dealing with a discursive formation” (Archaeology 41).” 
A discursive formation, then, is essentially a collection of discourses that, in a way, 
define the production of truth (“Truth” 119); for Foucault, this is related to power.  
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It is important because in terms of tripartite violence, an analysis of cultural 
violence—assessing cinematic texts in terms of their representations of violence—is 
essentially the same as an elucidation of their power structures, in the Foucauldian 
sense.  It is useful here to consider the notion of bio-power developed by Foucault 
and extended by Giorgio Agamben. 
For Foucault, bio-power refers to “the administration of bodies and the calculated 
management of life” (History 140).  While his observation that bio-power replaced the 
“old power of death” (History 139) indicates that bio-power could function in much 
the same way as the three types of violence Galtung identifies, the work by 
Agamben both extends and moves away from the more comprehensive definition 
of violence elucidated by Galtung.  For Agamben, bio-power describes the essential 
politicisation of “bare life.”  As Agamben argues, ‘it can even be said that the 
production of a biopolitical body is the original activity of sovereign power,’ (Homo 
6).  Yet in this formulation of bio-power in relation to the sovereign, Agamben 
situates it within, to draw on Galtung, the political.  Thus two impediments arise 
with regard to the use of the works of both Foucault and Agamben in this thesis.  
The first, particularly with regard to Agamben, is that his thinking analyses the 
political rather than the cultural.  While they are intertwined with one another, the 
focus Agamben places on the political makes his methodology considerably less 
useful for an analysis of cultural artefacts.  The second relates more directly to 
Foucault and can be seen in the writing of Galtung and Vincent, who deviate from 
the work of Foucault is when they suggest that a more complete study of discourse 
would involve real-world contexts (US Glasnost 136).1  Again, Agamben does offer 
such real-world contextual analysis, as he showed in his application of his theories 
of homo sacer and “bare life” to the policies of the Bush Administration, observing 
that they produced “a legally unnamable and unclassifiable being” (State 3).  
However, while Galtung and Vincent offer a medium between Foucault and 
Agamben—a discourse analysis that can focus on cultural discourses in addition to 
political—it is not tailored to specifically examine violence in entertainment media 
such as film.  Since the aim of this thesis is to examine the violence in blockbuster 
                                                             
1
 For more on the way in which Galtung and Vincent define discourse, see US Glasnost. 
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films as it relates to the historical moment of the films, it is useful to consider here 
the ways in which screen violence has previously been analysed with regard to 
history. 
Screen Violence and History 
For this thesis, a methodological framework is needed that engages with history 
and either uses the more robust definition of violence Galtung articulates or is able 
to accommodate his work.  In many traditional studies of screen violence, historical 
connections are made, but they are frequently predicated upon violence as a 
physical phenomenon.  This is often a good thing, though, as some of the most 
useful studies of screen violence focus predominantly on the term as a physical 
concept, despite their vastly different approaches to the subject.  For instance, J. 
David Slocum, in his insightful analysis of film violence and its connection to New 
Hollywood and the historical moment of “the Sixties” ( “The Film” 15-17), reaches 
his conclusions using a definition of film violence that sees it as “images of bodily 
harm, pain and death, and the deployment of rough or injurious physical force” 
(“The Film” 28).  Similarly, in a thorough study that draws connections between 
violence and narrative, Nick Brown et al define film violence as “an interpersonal, 
aggressive physical act that impacts another character, committed by a human 
agent in the course of a conflict” (352).  This emphasis on the physical is even seen 
in more personal approaches to the subject, such as the one conducted by Vivian 
Sobchack, where she observes that film violence in the 1970s 
“literally satisfied an intensified cultural desire for ‘close-up’ 
knowledge about the material fragility of bodies, but also—and 
more important—made increasingly senseless violence in the ‘civil’ 
sphere sensible and meaningful by stylizing and aestheticizing it” 
(“The Violent” 119). 
While she somewhat revises her opinion in her afterword to the original article 
(“The Violent” 124), her discussion of violence remains grounded in the physical act 
of harm.  Even studies which specifically focus on the historical period this thesis 
examines—9/11—look at physical violence, as is the case with the excellent analysis 
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of screen violence Gabrielle Murray has conducted which shows how images of 
torture in film relate to post-9/11 events such as the Abu Ghraib scandal (3-4).  
James Kendrick observes that screen violence research has also focused on the 
aesthetic dimensions of violence, with Stephen Prince being a key figure here as he 
created a relationship between “stylistic and behavioral components of film 
violence” (33).  For Prince, though, it is “graphic violence”—direct violence—which 
remains his focus (1-4).  While studies such as these provide diverse insights into the 
relationship between direct violence and history, they do not engage with all the 
types of violence that Galtung identifies and the Self/Other relationships they 
articulate.  Some studies, do, however, probe beyond direct violence. 
In constructing a history of screen violence research, James Kendrick observes that 
many definitions of violence are quite broad (8-10).  For instance, Kendrick notes of 
the Cultural Indicators project developed by George Gerbner, Larry Gross, Marilyn 
Jackson-Beeck, Suzanne Jeffries-Fox and Nancy Signorielli that it “has used the 
broadest of definitions” for violence (Kendrick 9).  In one of the most recent 
iterations of the project, the authors define violence as “a social relationship” (5) 
although they still tie this directly a more physical notion of “hurting or killing” (5).  
Kendrick also draws attention to the fact that Slocum defines violence in a complex 
fashion in other writing (9-10).  In the Introduction to Violence and American 
Cinema, Slocum equates violence with harm, and even introduces the concept of 
structural violence (“Introduction” 2).  Ultimately, though, his discussion of violence 
does not fully integrate concepts that resemble those found in the work of Galtung.  
Despite the delicate probing of the boundaries of violence that Kendrick conducts, 
arguing that violence is very much a negotiated social construct, he ultimately 
engages with violence as a physical concept (6-13).  Thus, while these explorations 
of screen violence establish valuable connections between history and 
representations of violence, they are either immersed in the study of direct 
violence or bound by it.  The result is that such methodological frameworks do not 
mesh with the aims of this thesis.  Conversely, studies which introduce more 
expansive definitions of violence often focus less on the historical implications.   
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For instance Albert Bandura approaches violence in media using a definition that 
appears to incorporate wider concepts, such as aggression, a concept largely 
developed in the field of psychology which represents violence that does not 
manifest itself as physical force (2-3).  Similarly, Dale Kunkel et al., have attempted 
to situate physical violence within a larger contextual framework, writing that “each 
act should be considered as part of an ongoing exchange between characters, and 
each exchange must also be situated within the larger setting of the program as a 
whole” (288).  What studies such as these do is establish connections between 
viewers and the onscreen representations of violence.  What is missing is a larger 
historical context.  While there is some resemblance to the aim of this thesis, the 
frequent privileging of violence at the macro level is at odds with the micro/macro 
approach of this work.  There have been some studies that focus more on that 
double-tiered approach, but they have been conducted outside the realm of media 
studies.  For instance, The End of Victory Culture by Tom Engelhardt and Gunfighter 
Nation by Richard Slotkin both extensively look at the way culture and violence in 
the United States interact.  However, since their focuses are primarily on history 
and society, they do not explore media texts as incisively as other studies which 
take those texts as their primary object of study.  Thus while films feature 
prominently in some of their discussions, their approach to the films, which are 
engaging, are again not sufficient for this thesis. 
Incorporating the Diagnostic Critique 
A methodological framework is needed that can explore blockbuster cinematic 
violence in terms of history, and history in terms of blockbuster cinematic violence.  
While violence is not the focus of his work, Douglas Kellner has developed what he 
terms the diagnostic critique.  He asserts that it “uses history to read texts and texts 
to read history” (Media 116).  To accomplish this, Kellner draws on the work of 
sociologist Robert Wuthnow and the three categories he developed to conduct 
discourse analysis: social horizon, discursive field, and figural action (12-14). 
For Wuthnow, these terms are strongly connected to ideology, which he sees as “an 
identifiable constellation of discourse that in fact stands in some degree of 
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articulation with its social context” (16).  At the same time, though, he observes 
that “it is that aspect of discourse that pertains in some special way to its social 
surroundings” (16).  While not directly connected with discourse or discursive 
formations as defined by Foucault, the parallels are clear.  Returning to the three 
terms, then, social horizon “refers to features of the real, experienced social 
context in which ideology is produced, selected, and institutionalised” (12); 
discursive field “refers to a symbolic space or structure within the ideology itself” 
(13); and figural action “refers to representative behaviours, modes of thinking, or 
characters that occupy space within a discursive field and are defined by the 
structural features of that field” (14). 
Kellner adapts these categories directly to media analysis, including the reading of 
film texts, noting that the diagnostic critique  
“*utilises+ the categories of social horizon, discursive field, and 
figural action to describe some of the ways that cultural texts 
transcode and articulate social images, discourses, and conditions 
and in turn operate within their social field” (Media 104). 
Perhaps most importantly, the diagnostic critique permits an examination of the 
ways in which cultural artefacts articulate neither a hegemonic nor a counter-
hegemonic position, but exist instead as a site of struggle between the two 
oppositional sides.  Directing his critique of an individual cinematic text, such as 
Poltergeist, he connects the film with anxieties active in the United States at the 
time the film was released, class concerns and gender issues in that particular case.  
The diagnostic critique, then, “uses history and social theory to analyze cultural 
texts and uses cultural texts in turn to illuminate historical trends, conflicts, 
possibilities, and anxieties” (Media 125).  This offers a level of engagement with 
historical context not found in the previously discussed analyses of screen violence.  
The problem remains, though, that while the historical context of the texts can be 
discerned via the critique, it is not calibrated to analyse violence.   
To that end, the diagnostic critique will be fused with the work of Galtung, 
particularly his concept of tripartite violence.  This will be accomplished by 
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refocusing the categories Kellner adapts from Wuthnow so that violence is the 
primary object of study.  In so doing, the diagnostic critique becomes violence-
calibrated so that the critique is placed firmly on cinematic violence and its 
relationship to the historical context of the films.  Additionally, the synthesis of the 
diagnostic critique with tripartite violence will permit the elucidation of the 
ideological discourses with which the various types of violence engage.  This fusion 
will result in a more accurate gauge of the relationships between violence in 
blockbuster cinema and the historical violence of 9/11, ultimately serving as a novel 
methodology which can be utilised to study blockbuster screen violence and its 
historical context. 
Returning to Baudrillard, then, the use of the modified diagnostic critique will 
permit an articulation of the wishes and dreams of these films.  For instance, if the 
film exhibits strong structures of violence which privilege patriarchal authority, that 
finding will be read within the context of the historical trajectory both leading up to 
and following the events of 9/11.  However, given the dramatic historical shifts 
those events catalysed, the analyses of films from different periods will aid in 
constructing an historical trajectory.  It is important to note, however, that Kellner 
designed his process to explore popular media texts.  While blockbuster cinema, 
the area of inquiry for this thesis, is popular media, it is a very particular type of 
popular media.  To that end, additional considerations need to be made regarding 
how the violence-calibrated diagnostic critique will be modified even further to 
ensure that it is even better suited to look at blockbuster cinema. 
Blockbuster Cinema and the Modified Diagnostic Critique 
In deploying his diagnostic critique, Kellner intentionally selected texts that had 
been successful in the marketplace.  One reason for this is that, as he notes, 
“popular media culture taps into existing fears, hopes, fantasies, and other 
concerns of the day” (Media 105).  For instance, in a diagnostic critique of The X-
Files, Kellner connects the popular television show with prevalent socio-cultural 
issues at the time, such as paranoia (“The X-Files” 205).  As that example shows, 
however, Kellner is focused on a much broader set of texts ranging from cinema to 
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television to music.  Given the focus on blockbuster film in this thesis, it is useful to 
supplement the work of Kellner with a more cinema-specific approach.  This can be 
found in the work of Mike Chopra-Gant. 
In his exploration of popular film in post-World War II America, Chopra-Gant states 
his objective as creating 
“an account that privileges neither the films nor the materials used 
to establish a cultural context for those films, but rather sees both 
the movies and the wider cultural context as being involved in a 
dialogic, discursive relationship and which sees in the dialogue 
between these different cultural artifacts an expression of the 
cultural climate in the early postwar period of the United States” (1-
2). 
In outlining his approach to the films he is analysing, Chopra-Gant discusses how 
previous analyses of film noir have treated it as representative of their era despite 
the fact that they only comprised a small number of the total films produced during 
that period.  In short, film noir is often thought to represent all of Hollywood, and 
indeed the underbelly of American culture, during the post-war period when in fact 
it can be argued it did not (Chopra-Gant 16).  Viewed that way, it is a case of 
synecdoche and, as Chopra-Gant notes,  
“the idea of zeitgeist as the spirit of the age demands a unanimity 
that is inconsistent with the fragmentation and contradiction that 
characterised American society and culture during the early post-
war years” (emphasis in original) (11). 
By studying films which better reflect the tastes of the audiences of the time, then, 
Chopra-Gant suggests that a more accurate sense of culture and society can be 
gleaned.  Again, this is not to argue that all audiences respond to each film in the 
same way, but instead to suggest that popular cinema better captures “the spirit of 
the age,” so to speak, and can help to compensate for smaller sample sizes.  The 
solution that Chopra-Gant offers is to focus on popular films as determined by their 
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performance at the box office.  The goal of this selection is “to obtain an objective 
set of movies which was very clearly not chosen by me for the films’ consistency 
with any preconceived notions [he] held about the movies and culture of the 
period” (12).  Thus, a selection of films which would better reflect the broader 
trends in society would be one that is composed of the most popular films from a 
particular historical period.  Since the historical period of this thesis surrounds 9/11, 
it is important to consider the fact that the films which dominated the box offices 
during that time were blockbusters.  However, there is not a consensus on the 
precise definition of a blockbuster.   
For instance, while Justin Wyatt roughly defines the blockbuster as a film which has 
“a pre-sold property...within a traditional film genre, usually supported by bankable 
stars (operating within their particular genre) and director” (78), Julian Stringer 
suggests a much more nebulous concept of the blockbuster.  He states that the 
blockbuster “has no essential characteristics” (10), and aligns it with an idea rather 
than a specific type of film.  Additionally, citing a discussion of film noir by James 
Naremore, Stringer describes the blockbuster as “a loose, evolving system of claims 
and counterclaims” (3).  At the core of that evolution is box-office revenues.  
Along those lines, Geoff King sees the blockbuster format “as part of an effort to 
create a much wider audience for certain films” and observes that “*gaining+ the 
resonance of a broader cultural event” (“Spectacle” 9) is the ultimate goal.  To 
accomplish this, King contends that studios producing blockbusters utilize market 
research to identify key issues that will appeal to the viewers that do not often view 
movies theatrically.  In short, the blockbuster is intentionally positioned as a 
cultural phenomenon.  It is unsurprising, then, to find that some blockbusters are 
hits while others are not since predicting the interests of any culture is intensely 
imperfect.  However, with the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to determine which 
films truly were cultural events by considering the fact that only a select few 
number of films earned phenomenal amounts of money.  To successfully analyse 
these films and their violence, then, avenues of exploration are needed that can 
reliably provide access to the deeper issues of the films, particularly with regard to 
the representations of violence.  Accordingly, it is useful to look for similarities 
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between blockbusters.  While this might seems at odds with the claim made by 
Stringer regarding the lack of “essential characteristics” (10), the identification of 
similarities does not necessarily imply that the parallels are essential to the 
blockbuster.  To that end, a starting point is provided by Star Wars, one of the films 
that arguably launched the age of the blockbuster. 
When it was released, the success of Star Wars was so overwhelming that it 
immediately became the focal point for numerous imitators who wanted to 
reproduce its formula for success.  While this led to a revival of the science fiction 
genre, it also led to a stronger focus on certain narrative structures.  This was due 
to the fact that the director of Star Wars, George Lucas, openly acknowledged the 
influence the work of mythologist Joseph Campbell had on the film, particularly 
with regard to the “hero’s journey.”  While that journey can certainly be found 
throughout numerous films that are not blockbusters, its simplicity lent itself well 
to a form that was slowly emphasising its spectacular elements while potentially 
reducing the complexity of the narratives.  Along those lines, one way to 
supplement the diagnostic critique to better analyse the relationship between the 
Self and Other in blockbuster cinema would be through the work on narratology.   
The importance of the Self/Other binary to constructions of cultural violence, and in 
particular the branches of narratology that focus on character functions and their 
relationships are most useful here.  For example, the work of Vladimir Propp on 
folktales is particularly useful as it analyses the narratives in terms of a hero (the 
Self) and a villain (the Other).  This closely parallels the formulation of cultural 
violence that Galtung establishes, since that definition is heavily predicated upon a 
Chosen/Unchosen binary, which indeed manifests itself as Self and Other 
(“Cultural” 297).  Given the similarities, the work of Propp lends itself well to an 
analysis of the violence in blockbuster cinema.  Thus by supplementing the 
modified diagnostic critique with it, the ways in which the villain is made the 
acceptable target of violence can be better understood.  However, the specific 
categories identified by Propp do not always sufficiently capture the diverse 
representations of violence in the film.  Specifically, the consideration for the ways 
in which non-human elements reinforce the violence in the films is sometimes 
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minimal.  To that end, an additional framework is needed that accounts for the 
ideological implications found outside of the characters and their functions.  For 
that purpose, the work of Roland Barthes on myth will be utilised as well. 
For Barthes, myth is a second order sign.  While the first order involves signs which 
encompass the signified and the signifier—the word flag represents the literal 
image of a flag—the second order positions the first order sign as a signifier and 
couples it with a signified meaning—the flag, as Barthes argues, becomes a sign of 
the nation, with the image effectively privileging France over all others (116).  This 
is the level of myth.  Given the way Barthes discusses how myths essentially 
reinforce certain cultural standards, it bears a strong resemblance to the paradigm 
of cultural violence established by Galtung.  Specifically, myth functions to 
legitimise ideological positions which may contain within them certain 
discriminatory or prejudicial positions, as the example above about the flag shows.   
This is essentially the same function of cultural violence, but Galtung approaches it 
in a way that presents it within a clearer Self/Other paradigm.  Therefore, by 
mobilising the concept of myth in a way that augments the diagnostic critique, 
particularly with regard to the historical contexts being discussed, the deeper 
meanings of the representations of violence being examined can be understood, 
and indeed the connections between elements of the films that might not seem to 
be connected to violence, but are, can be analysed as well.  While each theory will 
not necessarily be applied to each film, their incorporation into the diagnostic 
critique forms an essential toolkit that will enable an application of the violence-
calibrated diagnostic critique that is more finely tuned to the subtleties of tripartite 
violence and blockbuster cinema at the turn of the millennium.  The result will be a 
more precise analysis of violence that permits even deeper connections to be made 
with the geopolitical situation that preceded and followed 9/11.  Of course, to do so 
a better understanding of that time period needs to be explored in order to 
determine the precise scope of this thesis. 
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The End of the War 
During the Cold War, the world was divided by the United States and the Soviet 
Union, two superpowers.  Accordingly, a binary relationship existed wherein 
allegiances could be categorised in terms of us or them.  Of course both sides saw 
themselves as “us” and the other as “them.”  In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed.  
The decades-long struggle which shaped the binary relationship gave way to a 
world with only one superpower.  However, in the escalation of arms and military 
spending during the Reagan years, despite the fact that the objective was victory, 
there seemed to be no actual plan for the peace that would presumably follow.  
This was made clear by the disappearance of the Soviet Other.  The result was that 
the identity of the United States came into question.  As Engelhardt argues, the 
nation was effectively lost (The End x).  Engelhardt, whose work will heavily inform 
the reading of history used in this thesis, argues that this was largely due to the 
collapse of what he calls “victory culture,” which will be explored in greater detail in 
Chapter One.  However, the result of the Soviet absence was an identity crisis in the 
United States wherein the position of the US in the world was no longer clear.  This 
crisis seemed to cause an upswing in violence in the domestic United States.  This 
was not necessarily the case, though.  Instead the apparent rise in violence was 
likely due to the fact that fears of foreign threats often no longer muted the 
violence that occurred in the domestic sphere of the nation.  Of course even during 
the Cold War inequalities could not always be contained and eruptions of direct 
violence resulted, as the development of the Civil Rights movement showed, but in 
general, the threat to survival presented by the Soviet Union effectively trumped 
violence which was less dire.  Accordingly, structures of violence which had been 
secondary to the Soviet threat became prominent in the post-Cold War United 
States; they were elevated to primary concerns.  Among the concerns that were 
most pervasive in that period were those that involved class-, gender-, and 
ethnicity-based structural violence.  In each case, the inequalities and prejudices 
manifested themselves at the national level, sometimes even as outbursts of direct 
violence.   
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For instance, in 1992, months after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the verdict in 
the high-profile trial of Los Angeles Police Department officers accused of assault 
and excessive force against Rodney King was released, and the officers were all 
found not-guilty.  The implications of this verdict exacerbated racial tensions in Los 
Angeles and resulted in riots that lasted nearly a week.  Although the riots were an 
isolated incident in terms of large-scale direct violence, the structures of violence 
they erupted from are indicative of systemic issues.  What the rising visibility of that 
violence suggested was that the United States was possibly fragmenting; there was 
no longer a fully cohering national Self. 
In 1994, Robert Kaplan controversially argued that the post-Cold War world was 
one of imminent anarchy.  The United States, he contended, could not survive in 
this increasingly chaotic geo-political system.  The “nation-state” was falling apart, 
and it could be seen, he argued, in signs such as “racial polarity, educational 
dysfunction, *and+ social fragmentation of so many kinds” (76).  Again, the binary 
world—US/Soviet—functioned to force disparate groups together: one was either 
part of the Self or the Other.  The disappearance of that geopolitical formation thus 
produced multiple identity crises in the US.  At one level, the fragmentation 
resulted in the shifting identities of individual groups as new identities were 
negotiated.  Drawing again on the LA riots, it was clear that groups which were 
subjected to ethnic discrimination lashed out against an oppressive system in an 
attempt to alter prejudicial conditions.  Although the riots were unique to the 
nation during that period, the changing domestic dynamics were not. 
For example, during the confirmation hearings when Clarence Thomas was 
nominated to be a Supreme Court Justice, one of his former employees, Anita Hill, 
testified regarding allegations that Thomas had sexually harassed her.  Although 
Thomas was ultimately confirmed as a Justice, the high-profile nature of the 
hearings promoted awareness of gender politics in the United States that had 
previously been overlooked.  At the same time as the hearings, third wave feminism 
was coming into its own as gender became another site of identity negotiation.  In 
discussing both race and gender, bell hooks argues that both “can be used as 
screens to deflect attention away from the harsh realities class politics exposes” (7).  
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She treats the three terms—race, gender, and class—as “interlocking” (7), and 
observes that it is “impossible to talk meaningfully about ending racism without 
talking about class” (7).  Following that logic, it would also be impossible to talk 
meaningfully about ending sexism without talking about both class and race.  
Accordingly, it is worth considering class as another site of identity negotiation in 
the 1990s.  This is particularly evident in the developments which took place during 
the Reagan era as the economic landscape changed dramatically.  As Thomas Byrne 
Edsall argued, the middle class was essentially disappearing.  hooks suggests, 
though, that class is a less visible issue because it is often subsumed within debates 
surrounding race and gender (7-8).  That does not, however, diminish the 
importance of class identity and its negotiation in the United States in the wake of 
the Cold War. 
The way in which Kaplan positions such identity negotiations as fragmentations 
suggests an underlying violence.  Specifically, the crises emerge from the 
destabilisation of the status quo.  If rights for the lower classes, women, and non-
white ethnicities are viewed as dangerous or threatening, it can be inferred that the 
status quo privileges upper class, white males.  Part of the larger identity crisis, 
then, was that the new president, Bill Clinton, did not adhere to the traditional 
concept of leadership that Ronald Reagan had reforged in the 1980s (Jeffords 90). 
Bill Clinton was elected to office on a fairly liberal platform, and did not project 
himself as a father figure, as Reagan and George H.W. Bush had done (Jeffords 90).  
What is more, Hillary Clinton, his wife, was given an active position in the White 
House, being tasked with health care reform.  These changes were indicative of an 
attempt to move away from the past, but they did not last.  His policies moved 
towards centre, and Hillary Clinton, after the failure of her health care initiative, 
played a subdued role in the administration.  The most important aspect of this 
shift was the more overt display of the Clinton Doctrine, which essentially 
advocated military action and intervention “where our values and our interests are 
at stake, and where we can make a difference” (Clinton, “Remarks” n.pag.).  This 
was most clearly evidenced in the US participation in the Kosovo War in the form of 
the Yugoslavia bombing.  The identity crisis persisted, however, after the election of 
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George W. Bush in 2000, although the Bush Doctrine clearly suggested the changes 
to come.  Even so, it was not until September 11, 2001, that things radically 
changed. 
After the events of September 11, 2001, the United States, via the Bush 
administration, had an enemy again.  The vaguely defined terrorists became an 
Other to the national Self.  As noted above, the links to Pearl Harbor evoked images 
of a noble struggle against an evil Other, and the identity crisis of the United States 
seemed to abate.  It is unsurprising that this movement was paired with the 
refiguration of Bush as a white, patriarchal figure.  Interestingly, the construction of 
his image positioned him as a person from the lower class, but he was in fact from 
an elite family.  Despite such inconsistencies, the positioning of Bush as leader 
during the post-9/11 period seemed to avert the crisis.  During that time, the 
United States invaded both Afghanistan and Iraq, and was positioning itself for a 
third war against Iran.  However, with no end in sight for the first two wars, public 
support began to falter by 2004, and, in the 2006 mid-term election, Democrats in 
the United States took control of both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate.  This ultimately led to the election of Barack Obama in 2008.  Based on 
these events, the 2003 failure of the Bush administration to accomplish the mission 
in Iraq marks a clear end to the initial phase of the US response to 9/11, an end 
underscored by the inability of the Bush administration to gain support for an 
invasion of Iran.   
For this thesis, 9/11 is a critical point of inquiry because of the far reaching changes 
it caused not just to the United States, but the world.  What is more, those changes 
were immediate.  Since one of the primary tasks of this work is to determine if 
there is indeed a relationship between cinematic violence and history (again, not a 
relationship of causality), a focus on the time period around 9/11 will provide a 
powerful historical moment to observe.  By focusing on the pre-9/11 and post-9/11 
periods, not only can the patterns of the relationship between screen violence and 
its historical moment be established, but so too can the aftermath.  In this way, the 
dreams of violence can be seen in relation to a dramatic historical shift.  To that 
end, the historical period under investigation in this thesis will span the pre- and 
27 
 
post-9/11 period, with 9/11 serving as the obvious point of demarcation between 
the two.  The first period will span from 1996 to September 11, 2001, and has been 
selected since it encompasses both the application of the Clinton Doctrine and the 
formation of the Bush Doctrine.  The second spans from September 11, 2001, to the 
end of 2003, and includes the development and full deployment of the Bush 
Doctrine via the US military.  Thus, blockbuster films from 1996 to 2003 will be 
analysed using the violence-calibrated diagnostic critique. 
Selection and Analysis   
The films examined in this thesis will be the single highest grossing films from each 
year in the range of study—1996 to 2003.  This is following the logic of both Kellner 
(Media) and Chopra-Gant who view popular media and cinema respectively as 
more in touch with the times in which they were produced.  What is more, by 
selecting the highest grossing films, it will ensure that the films are those which 
have been popular enough to garner repeat viewings at the cinema.  This is in 
keeping with the rationale of Barbara Klinger, who observes, “when a film becomes 
a blockbuster, a larger part of its success is generated by audience members who 
return to see it again in theatres” (135).  Thus, the films selected earned their high 
grosses by resonating with audiences.  The films to be analysed are as follows: 
Independence Day (1996), Titanic (1997), Saving Private Ryan (1998), Star Wars: 
Episode I – The Phantom Menace (1999), Dr. Seuss’ How the Grinch Stole Christmas 
(2000), Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (2001), Spider-Man (2002), Lord of the 
Rings: Return of the King (2003).2  Each of these films was the highest grossing film 
in the year of its release.3 This does not necessarily mean that each film earned its 
entire gross during that calendar year.   
For instance, Titanic premiered on December 19, 1997.  It earned just over 600 
million USD during its domestic theatrical run, but of that amount, only 124 million 
USD was earned in December, with the rest being earned in 1998.  Accordingly, 
                                                             
2 Although the original title of the film and the book from which Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s 
Stone was adapted is Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone, this chapter deals with the American 
release so the American title—The Sorcerer’s Stone—will be used. 
3
 All box office figures from Box Office Mojo. See Appendix for the precise grosses. 
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there is some overlap in terms of years and gross.  It is also worth mentioning that 
some of the second highest-grossing films made nearly as much money as the 
highest-grossing films.  While very often these close second films are directly 
represented by their sequels in this thesis—The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of 
the Ring is not analysed,  but the third film in the series, The Return of the King, is—
they also frequently represent other trends or related themes.  In 1998, for 
instance, Saving Private Ryan earned only 15 million USD more than Armageddon.  
However, the latter film is not only an overtly patriotic film, evoking themes similar 
to Saving Private Ryan, but it is also a disaster film, representing the last major hit 
of the 1990s disaster film cycle of which Independence Day and Titanic, films 
analysed in Chapters One and Two respectively, were a part.  Lastly, it must be 
noted that two of the films, Titanic and Saving Private Ryan deal with actual 
historical events.  While the focus of this thesis is partially on history, it is the 
historical moment of the film itself that is of relevance here rather than that of the 
narrative.  In other words, the historical sinking of the Titanic is   not important 
here, but its presentation in the late-1990s is.  That is not to say the historical 
aspects will not be considered as indeed the mythical implications of any historical 
events in the films are important, but they will not be the focus of the analysis.  
With those points considered, the films selected still represent the peaks of 
blockbuster cinematic popularity from 1996 to 2003. 
Since the diagnostic critique is designed to use history to read texts and vice versa, 
each chapter will necessarily provide more historical information, suggesting the 
ways in which history and the anxieties the films respond to developed alongside 
one another or, to build on Baudrillard, how the films wished the events of 9/11 
and its aftermath. Additionally, drawing on the various supplementary tools 
outlined above, the analysis will reveal the dynamic natures of the Self and Other 
with the goal of showing how the wishes articulated through them developed 
alongside the historical contexts of the pre- and post-9/11 eras. 
The trajectory will be established in Chapter One with an examination of 
Independence Day.  Analysing the construction of myth in the film, this chapter will 
investigate the ways in which violence is established as a conflict between a 
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patriotic Self and an external (literally alien) Other.  Drawing on both Engelhardt 
and Barthes, history will be read against that binary, and it will be made clear that 
the violence of the film offers audiences exactly what was missing in the United 
States at that time which was a national Self united.  This presentation of an alien 
Other parallels developments against Arabs and Muslims in the post-9/11 United 
States, legitimising their overt marginalisation. 
Chapter Two will show how in Titanic the binary Self/Other paradigm found in 
Independence Day is reproduced in an historical rather than fantastic setting.  This 
is accomplished by pairing Galtung with Barthes, and by aligning the Self with a 
mythic construction of the United States—one which relies upon the American 
dream—while the Other remains external and is linked with the violence, largely 
inequalities, of the Edwardian era.  This chapter will then conclude by showing that 
the regression into a mythic historical past where a clear national Self dominated 
served as a counterpoint to the fragmentation of the 1990s.  By re-establishing a 
binary world—Self/Other—in the post-9/11 period that resembled that of the Cold 
War period, the response to 9/11 effectively regressed to a historical Self and Other 
relationship as well. 
In Chapter Three, the threads of the first two chapters will be brought together in 
an analysis of Saving Private Ryan.  It will be shown using the work of Barthes and 
numerous scholars that in this film, the patriotic militarism of Independence Day is 
fused with the historical glory of the mythic United States to create an idealised US 
Self which is placed in opposition to a clear external Other, the Nazi army.  
Additionally, the chapter will focus on how a secondary Other is created, which is 
an Other to both the US and the Nazis, that enables the US to be more heroically 
positioned; violence becomes even more justified as a result.  In terms of historic 
context, the film came out at a point when interest in World War II was high, 
suggesting that the film addresses anxieties felt by many viewers surrounding the 
prowess of the nation, a point supported by the lack of any noble military 
endeavours which united the nation during that period.  The post-9/11 period 
revitalised the use of the military for noble purposes while at the same time 
reconstructed a binary notion of Self and Other. 
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The analysis in Chapter Four will focus on The Phantom Menace with particular 
attention to the way in which it maintains a Self/Other binary in terms of religious 
belief.  This will necessarily draw upon the work of Vladimir Propp.  As before, the 
Other is external despite the suggestion of change in the title.  Situated 
contextually, this binary figures into the approaching millennium and draws on 
many of the anxieties active at that time, particularly the fear that religion was 
slowly vanishing.  The redefinition of the Self in terms of religion was a key 
rhetorical tactic used in the post-9/11 period when constructing the national Self, 
particularly when considering the figure of Bush. 
Chapter Five will look at The Grinch, which is the first film that deviates from the 
trajectory of violence established in the films thus far.  While there is still a 
Self/Other binary, the film ultimately resolves with the Other joining the Self.  This 
is still a movement suffused with violence, particularly in terms of ethnicity-based 
stereotypes, but it suggests that some form of conflict resolution between the Self 
and the Other exists that does not rely on direct violence.  In short, it represents a 
potential shift away from the violence-suffused conflict resolution that dominated 
in the previous films.  Despite this shift, the film does still heavily rely upon 
traditional ethnic stereotypes, only permitting the Other to join the Self in a 
position of subservience.  To that end, the work of Galtung will be used along with 
that of Donald Bogle, who has written extensively on stereotypes in film.  The fact 
that these prejudices persist even in a movie that is apparently peaceful suggests 
that it still informs the stereotypes of the post-9/11 United States which identified 
the Other using the same stereotypes as a way of distinguishing between Self and 
Other. 
Chapter Six will look at the first post-9/11 film in this thesis, and will take the 
concept of the movement of the Other introduced in the previous chapter and 
develop it further with The Sorcerer’s Stone.  However, while The Grinch made 
some effort to resolve conflicts using peace rather than violence, The Sorcerer’s 
Stone takes that movement and reintegrates it into a framework which is grounded 
in violence.  Thus, the fact that the Other could be part of the Self is not a sign of 
subservience, but a threat that must be violently dealt with.  Accordingly, the 
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analysis in this chapter, using the work of Propp, will focus on the way in which the 
narrative structure of the film creates a pervasive atmosphere of paranoia that is 
predicated upon violence.  In addition, though, the film still marks the Other 
through the deployment of multiple structures of violence which draw on 
stereotypical depictions of Others.  By reframing the shift in the Self and the Other 
into a paranoid context, the film manages to participate in the rhetoric of the 
nascent War on Terror by essentially drawing on the fears of the era, and the 
anxieties promoted by the mental state engendered by a “crusade” (Carroll 24-25). 
In Chapter Seven, Spider-Man will be analysed.  Although the film still shows the 
Other hiding within the Self, the paranoia of The Sorcerer’s Stone is largely 
supplanted by dramatic irony.  This transition effectively allows the film to broaden 
its engagement with other issues, specifically an exploration of power and 
responsibility.  While this exploration permits the film to perpetuate the separation 
of the Self and the Other, it also allows the film to dream of a noble struggle against 
the Other in which the Self is able to metaphorically atone for failing to protect 
members of the Self.  While that positioning will be articulated largely through the 
work of Galtung, it will then be connected to the Clinton and Bush Doctrines, 
showing how the film articulates anxieties active during the post-9/11 period that 
enhance the threat level of the Other, making the need for an empowered and 
proactively violent Self urgent. 
The final chapter, Chapter Eight, will explore The Return of the King.  The focus here 
will be the final phase in the violent repositioning of the Self and the Other in the 
post-9/11 period.  While the film still endorses the standard tropes of violence seen 
in the previous two films, it takes the movement of the Self and Other to its 
terminal moment.  Specifically the analysis, working with both Galtung and Propp, 
will explore the new dimension the relationship takes with the Self becoming like 
the Other in terms of its deployment of violence.  Although there is never a true 
crossover where the boundaries between the Self and the Other cease, this 
movement suggests a new sense of approval in terms of behaviour the Self can 
utilise while still remaining part of the Self.  However, the film reduces the 
complexity of these changes to such a degree that as the real-world corollaries 
32 
 
emerged in the post-“Mission Accomplished” phase of the Iraq invasion, 
particularly in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, the dreams of the film could not be 
realised.  This was largely due to the fact that the film showed the transgression of 
the Self leading to an immediate era of peace.  This formulation will be connected 
with the idea of the Pax Americana, and its inability to bring the War on Terror to a 
clear and concise conclusion, ultimately resulting in the ebbing of support for the 
adventurism instigated by 9/11. 
This thesis will continually examine the trajectory of violence in blockbuster films 
from 1996 to 2003 and will situate it historically.  This will be accomplished by 
drawing on the diagnostic critique developed by Kellner and fusing it with the 
concept of tripartite violence articulated by Galtung.  This modified critique will 
then be supplemented with tools to more fully engage with tripartite violence.  In 
so doing, this work will explore the relationship between blockbuster cinematic 
violence and the historical moment of 9/11, ultimately reaching the conclusion that 
blockbuster cinema is cultural violence, a point which will be explored further in the 
conclusion.  Thus, by better understanding the ways in which the violence of these 
films is situated historically, the violence of history itself can be better understood.  
Returning to the claim made by Baudrillard in relation to 9/11 that “they did it, but 
we wished for it” (5), this thesis is not simply looking at the wishes evident in the 
violence of blockbuster cinema before and after 9/11, but it is looking at its dreams, 
and in so doing it will develop a critical approach to blockbuster cinematic violence. 
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Chapter One 
Patriotism Reborn: Independence Day (1996) 
 
In the wake of the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States found 
itself at a loss.  Despite its victory in the Cold War, the US was a nation which had 
defined itself for decades against the Soviet Other.  In the 1990s, though, the US 
emerged as the sole superpower in the world.  The result was that it no longer had 
an Other against which to define its Self.  Accordingly, the United States 
experienced a post-Cold War identity crisis wherein it sought to find a new identity 
in the pre-millennial world.  This search is evident in the disaster film cycle that 
erupted in the United States during the 1990s. 
Disaster films were not new to Hollywood in the 1990s.  In the 1970s, for instance, 
numerous films were released which showed the destruction of the United States in 
various ways, often by way of natural disasters.  Comparing the new cycle of 
disaster films to the previous cycle, Stephen Keane observed that the new films 
“have the effect of bringing existing social and political themes to light, issues 
independent of pure zeitgeist and characteristic of the 1990s as a whole” (64); they 
address “national and international concerns” (64) in ways not seen in previous 
disaster films.  Geoff King takes ideas such as those further, connecting them 
directly to the changes in the geo-political landscape during that time, observing 
that the 1990s disaster films made manifest the anxieties over the “instability and 
uncertainty” ( Spectacular 154) of the era.  While many of these films, such as 
Twister and Armageddon, present natural disasters, the highest-grossing film of 
1996, Independence Day, positioned its protagonists against a clear, corporeal 
Other.  In fact at first glance Independence Day, with its spectacular space battles 
and extraterrestrial Others as foes, appears to be a science fiction film rather than a 
disaster film.  However, as Susan Sontag notes of the original science fiction 
invasion films in the 1950s, they are concerned “with the aesthetics of destruction” 
(44), and indeed the feature set-piece of the film is the mass destruction of New 
York City, Los Angeles, and Washington, D.C.  This connection to previous science 
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fiction films is explicitly noted in the promotional materials for the film, but the core 
of the film was also said to include “the disaster films of the Seventies” (Twentieth 
Century Fox 3) as well as “the war movies of the Forties” (Twentieth Century Fox 3).  
Despite the futuristic nature of the plot—an alien invasion—Independence Day is a 
film very much grounded in a militaristic past. 
It is my contention that the violence in Independence Day functions to resolve the 
post-Cold War identity crisis experienced by the United States.  This is because it 
recreates a Self/Other binary which returns the US audience to a pre-Vietnam War 
era of “unabashed patriotism” (Twentieth Century Fox 3) so as to evoke a mythic 
image of the United States as a worldwide protector, an image that would 
ultimately be revived in the post-9/11 era.  My analysis will begin by examining the 
state of the US Self in the mid-1990s, focusing on the concept of “victory culture” 
that Tom Engelhardt defined.  I will show how politically there did appear to be a 
significantly diminished presence of “victory culture.”  However, I will argue that 
the cultural demand for it remained high, as evidenced from the very beginning of 
Independence Day.  My analysis of the film will start, then, by focusing on the ways 
in which it attempts to recuperate patriotism and, via patriotism, the US military.  
Specifically, I will discuss how the film draws on older conventions and genres in 
Hollywood cinema in ways that reposition the viewer both in and before the Cold 
War in a mythic United States.  For this I will draw upon the work of Roland Barthes.  
With the viewer repositioned, I will examine how the Self and the Other within the 
film are constructed beginning with the ways that technology is used to define the 
Self as human and the Other as inhuman.  While this creates a clear distinction 
between Self and Other, it is a distinction which is supported by multiple structures 
of violence.  Accordingly, my analysis will continue by showing how the heroic Self 
is predicated upon multiple inequalities, particularly sexism.  Drawing on the 
concept of “dreaming” the attacks of 9/11 that Jean Baudrillard suggests, my 
analysis will conclude by showing how the film did not dream of the destruction of 
the United States, but rather of the resilience of the nation and its securing of 
power.  It is that dream which can be seen in the way that the Bush administration 
responded to the attacks of 9/11.  Specifically, the Bush administration reconnected 
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the post-9/11 United States with its mythic past, resurrecting notions of Self and 
Other grounded in an era of “victory culture.”  What is more, like the film, this new 
national Self claimed to be about the unification of the United States, but that unity 
elided rather than addressed the numerous structures of violence that seemed to 
underpin domestic US politics in the 1990s.  Ultimately, what Independence Day 
dreams of is a Self united by internal structures of violence, and it is that manner of 
Self which the Bush administration sought to create in the post-9/11 period. 
Post-War Blues: Identity Crisis in the United States 
At the end of the Cold War, the United States was a Self alone.  With decades of 
struggling against the Soviet Other, it was ill-prepared for peacetime.  As Engelhardt 
writes, “The United States also stood alone and enemy-less and seemingly confused 
in a world of midget bad guys” (x).  One aspect of this seemed to be that the United 
States was looking inward, rather than outward, for an Other.  In his apocalyptically 
titled article, The Coming Anarchy, Robert Kaplan said that the United States in the 
nineties was under threat by long standing domestic issues such as “racial polarity, 
educational dysfunction, social fragmentation of many and various kinds” (76), all 
reflecting structures of violence pervasive throughout the United States.  He 
predicted that “As Washington's influence wanes, and with it the traditional 
symbols of American patriotism, North Americans will take psychological refuge in 
their insulated communities and cultures” (76).  In short, without an external Other, 
the Self seemed like it would break apart.  This process is similar to the one Johan 
Galtung describes in his theories surrounding state systems. 
In articulating his concept of states, Galtung identifies five types of states: 
dissociative, associative, confederal, federal, and unitary.4  He then assesses each of 
these systems in terms of their “peace-building capacity inside” and their “peace-
threatening capacity to the outside” (Peace 65), concluding that the dissociative 
system—an anarchic state—has the lowest levels of both while the unitary system 
has the highest potential for both.  While the truly unified system would be 
something akin to a nation-state, by defining its national Self against the Soviet 
                                                             
4
 For the complete discussion of the five state systems, see Galtung Peace Part I, Chapter Five. 
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Other, the Cold War era United States managed to approach to those levels as it 
was a federal system.  Accordingly, the capacity for violence against that Other—
peace-threatening, as Galtung terms it—was high (Peace 65).  As the Cold War 
evidences, that capacity was realised more often with structural violence than with 
direct violence.  With no super-power Other against which to direct that violence, 
the internal peace-building capacity of the United States seemed to go unrealised, 
as seen in the increasingly fragmented nature of the United States that Kaplan 
observed.  As such, it is reasonable to conclude that the national Self was 
increasingly a series of insular Selves that saw different groups within the United 
States as Other.  This meant that race-based structures of violence, for instance, 
which had always been part of the United States, were focused on more directly by 
the public and as the issues of violence which drove them were addressed, the 
sense of a unified national self decreased.  Otherwise stated, the larger identity 
crisis that the nation experienced drew attention to domestic crises it fuelled.  One 
reason for the collapse of the national Self that precipitated this crisis is put 
forward by Engelhardt with his notion of “victory culture.” 
For Engelhardt, victory culture is very closely tied to what he calls “the American 
war story” (5).  This story was “an inclusive saga of expanding liberties and rights 
that started in a vast, fertile, nearly empty land whose native inhabitants more or 
less faded away after that first Thanksgiving” (4).  He suggests links towards such 
concepts as manifest destiny, and notes: 
“If occasional wrongs were committed or mistakes made, these 
were correctable; if unfreedom existed within America’s borders, it 
was only so that—as with slavery—it might be wiped away forever” 
(4). 
Accordingly, victory culture is the mentality embraced by the United States wherein 
“war was invariably portrayed as a series of reactive incidents rather than organized 
and invasive campaigns” (4), and “victory, when it came, was guaranteed to bathe 
all preceding American acts in a purifying glow” (4).  Drawing on the work of Roland 
Barthes, then, “victory culture” does not rely upon historical fact, but instead upon 
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myth.  As Barthes writes, a key trait of myth is the “privation of history” (151).  He 
notes that, “Myth deprives the object of which it speaks of all History” (151).5  In 
fact, it would seem that historical fact is antithetical to victory culture.  This is 
apparent in the argument Engelhardt makes that “between 1945 and 1975, victory 
culture ended in America” (10).  He bases this on the fact the horrors of dropping 
the atomic bombs on Japan and the fighting in Vietnam did not adhere to the 
narrative of the American war story.  Thus, after World War II, he argues, the 
culture of the United States “was not one of triumph, but one of triumphalist 
despair” (9) as the threat of nuclear catastrophe and the Cold War defied the war 
story.  As he observes: 
“Triumphalist despair proved a unique and unstable mix.  Without 
the possibility of total victory, without the ballast of the war story, 
‘freedom’ came unanchored as the ‘freest country on earth’ 
presided over a ‘Free World,’ many of whose members from 
Franco’s Spain to Diem’s Vietnam embodied unfreedom” (10). 
He concludes by observing that young people were “horrified by a war fought in 
freedom’s name that had the look of an atrocity” (10).  Recontextualising this 
within terms of violence, then, “victory culture” ended because the Self came to 
resemble the Other.  As noted, this is due to the mythic conceptions of both Self 
and Other which came into increasing conflict with the reality of the situation.  To 
borrow the language of Barthes, the history of the object could not be entirely shut 
out since it was being broadcast nightly on US televisions.  The result was that the 
mythic construction of the United States that fuelled victory culture could not be 
sustained.  Accordingly, victory culture retreated and took along with it the image 
of the US military as heroic. 
While there were certainly films which celebrated the Cold War binary between the 
United States Self and the Soviet Other after the Vietnam War—Rambo: First Blood, 
Part II and Top Gun being two key examples—there was a distinct national attitude 
towards war which positioned it as a negative.  This response has generally been 
                                                             
5
 Barthes uses the term “history” here in a Marxist sense.  For more see Barthes 151. 
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labelled the Vietnam Syndrome and is described by Douglas Kellner as “the shame 
concerning the loss of the war and overcoming the reluctance to again use U.S. 
military power” (Media 28).  Its pervasiveness has even been acknowledged by the 
United States government.  For example, when the Persian Gulf War ended in 1991, 
George H.W. Bush, speaking to the American Legislative Exchange Council stated, 
“It's a proud day for America. And, by God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome 
once and for all” (n.pag.).  While his re-election bid in 1992 failed for numerous 
reasons, the fact that the victory in the Persian Gulf was not enough to secure a 
political win showed that neither the military nor patriotism had been recuperated 
in the mind of the public.  It is likely, then, that events such as these led Kaplan to 
predict the increasing fragmentation of the United States and the fading of 
“traditional symbols of American patriotism” (76).  Again, though, as films like Top 
Gun and Rambo: First Blood, Part II showed, the mythic “American war story” of a 
noble Self in opposition to an evil Other was still in demand in some sites, and in 
1996 this was nowhere more evident than in Independence Day.  Despite being set 
in an alternate present, the film exists largely as a pastiche of mythic national pasts, 
specifically pasts immersed in “victory culture.” 
Flag Waving on the Moon: Patriotic Imagery in Independence Day 
Independence Day has a Classical Hollywood three act structure which follows the 
three days of an alien invasion.  The aliens arrive on July 2, they launch an attack on 
much of the world and its population on July 3, attempting to eradicate all human 
life, and on July 4, the American Independence Day, they are instead themselves 
destroyed by humanity.  While the formulaic structure of the film certainly evokes a 
traditional quality, the film does not hesitate in making its patriotic intentions 
excessively clear.  The opening shot of the movie presents an American flag on the 
surface of the moon, shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – The dominance of the United States in the opening of Independence Day  
 
The mythic nature of the flag is discussed by Barthes, who, argued that even if the 
flag is only implied to be part of the image, it still is a mythic sign that represents 
the nation itself (116).  The image of the flag in this case, then, points toward the 
pinnacle of American ingenuity and its iconic call to being a ‘frontier’ nation.  The 
myth of America is reinforced in the subsequent shot, which shows the plaque left 
on the lunar surface by the Apollo 11 mission, focusing on one sentence in 
particular: “We came in peace for all mankind.”  In terms of Self, this focus 
establishes the mission of the United States as one of peace, effectively eliding a 
history of violence which manifested itself domestically and abroad.  What is more, 
by focusing on the idea of the United States as representatives of “mankind,” 
something the film extensively reiterates, the notion of the United States envelops 
the idea of humanity; the United States is humanity.  It is the Self of the world.  
However, the accomplishments of the United States are not solely symbolic cloth 
and metal plaques, as the next shot shows the footprints left on the moon by the 
US astronauts.  Jan Mair sees this brief sequence as “*identifying+ the 
instrumentalities inherent in American cultural production—liberation, freedom, 
democracy—the peak of human civilization” (36).  While the flag can be read as a 
symbol of direct violence, a fact underscored by a brief shot of a statue 
memorializing the raising of the flag on Iwo Jima, it is a reading which omits the 
historical context of the imagery since the numerous dead soldiers that contributed 
to that moment are absent from the memorial.  Considering the historical moment 
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highlighted by these open lunar shots, the sequence also frames the United States 
as a benevolent and peaceful nation, specifically through its connection to the 
American moon landing of 1969. 
What makes the highlighting of the moon landing so important is that it positions 
the viewer to identify not with a United States embroiled in the Vietnam War or 
even suffering a post-Vietnam identity crisis, but with a United States which was at 
the apex of its achievements.  The importance of the lunar moment was established 
in 1962 in the vision laid out by President John F. Kennedy who said: 
“For the eyes of the world now look into space, to the moon and to 
the planets beyond, and we have vowed that we shall not see it 
governed by a hostile flag of conquest, but by a banner of freedom 
and peace. We have vowed that we shall not see space filled with 
weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge 
and understanding” (n. pag.). 
Read this way, the lunar imagery at the start of Independence Day directly responds 
to the anxiety over the “instability and uncertainty” King  refers to in the post-Cold 
War 1990s by relocating the viewer to the Cold War era of the 1960s (Spectacular 
154).  While this was still an era where the United States faced, as Engelhardt 
labelled it, “an enemy too diffuse to be comfortably located beyond national 
borders” (6), the film rectifies this by its use of an Other external to humanity, 
space aliens. 
Unlike the Other of the Cold War, the alien Other of Independence Day lacks any 
humanity.  It has eyes and appendages, but it has tentacles and a differently shaped 
body.  Through such extreme physical differences, then, the film is able to maintain 
a distinct separation between Self and Other. This differentiation precisely evokes 
the work of Sontag who, writing about the original cycle of invasion films in the 
1950s and 1960s, argues that the films are based on an “extreme moral 
simplification” (45) in which the enemies are “beings excluded from the category of 
human” (45).  Given that Independence Day is attempting to recreate, among other 
genres, the alien invasion genre of the 1950s, the assessment Sontag makes of the 
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earlier invasion films applies to Independence Day as well.  As for the function of 
the alien Other, Ziauddin Sardar, writing about alien characters in general, suggests 
that “Aliens demonstrate what is not human to better exemplify that which is 
human” (6).  Sardar, though, goes further, noting that  
“Difference and otherness are the essence of aliens for only then 
can they stiffen the sense of self and self-defence that completes 
the chain of science fiction as normative genre” (6).    
In short, the aliens foster a sense of unity in those positioned against them, creating 
a binary conflict.  While normally those unified would be humanity in general, in 
Independence Day the United States is humanity.  Before the nuances of the Self 
can be examined, particularly the ways in which gender-based structural violence is 
mobilised within it, the distinction between Self and Other must be better 
understood, and it is through technology that the film most clearly articulates that 
difference. 
Technologies of Difference: Mapping Self and Other through technology 
At one level, Independence Day is a battle of technology.  On one side is the dutiful 
military technology of the United States Self, poised to defend the nation.  On the 
other is that of the futuristic aliens which is foreign in its appearance, but familiar in 
its effects—an uncanny presence.  Galtung describes technology as a reflection of a 
culture and its predilections towards peace and violence (Civilization n.pag.).  The 
positions of both human and alien technology are shown in their arrival during the 
previously discussed close up of human boot pints on the moon.  These footprints 
are linked with a sense of “knowledge and understanding,” to quote Kennedy (n. 
pag.), which present the US Self as benevolent, while the arrival of the aliens by 
way of intense vibrations which erase the prints indicates the pervasive violence, 
direct and structural, associated with the aliens and their technology.  The violence 
of that technology can be seen throughout the film in the gratuitous displays or 
their technology ranging from the scenes of urban destruction due to the “massive 
phalanx of fire” (Twentieth Century Fox 20) to sequences of aerial combat.  It is 
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important to note, though, that in all of these displays it is the technology of the 
aliens, and not the aliens themselves, which is visible as the technology conceals 
the bodies within.  Even when it seems an alien is finally revealed it turns out to be 
a bio-mechanical body suit which shrouds the being within even further.  This 
sheath of technology that envelops the aliens evokes the notion Sontag advances 
about technological artefacts being the “sources of power” (45) in invasion films.  
By contrast, the technology of the US Self displays rather than conceals the human 
element. 
The human technology exhibited in the film—nuclear weapons, computer viruses, 
fighter jets—undoubtedly reflects a violent culture, but the film focuses instead on 
the fact that this technology, unlike the alien technology, requires explicit human 
control to function.  This focus is established in the opening sequence with the 
focus on the Eagle Lunar Module.  The Eagle exists in the film only as a harmless 
monument to American ingenuity since without its human operators that is all it 
can be; it is functionally useless on its own.  While this technology could easily be 
read as a manifestation of the Cold War struggle making it a symbol of the constant 
threat of mutually assured nuclear destruction, its functionality is underscored in 
the film by the visual linking with the Apollo 11 plaque.  The plaque operates as 
what Sontag would call “a certificate of utility” (45) because it marks the technology 
as tame, thereby detracting from the potentially negative reading of the resulting 
violence.  The only times the humans use technology is when it is explicitly under 
control.  This is the case in the numerous flying scenes where fighter jets engage in 
aerial combat with the alien craft.  However, rather than adhering to the argument 
made by Mark Jancovich of the original invasion films from the 1950s, “that rather 
than legitimating Fordism and its application of scientific-technical rationality to the 
management of American life, these texts often criticised this system by directly 
associating the alien with it” (26), the “scientific technical rationality” of 
Independence Day is coupled with American exceptionalism.  Thus while there are 
many shots of airborne acrobatics, the film continually brings the viewer inside the 
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canopies of the US jets to see the pilots. 6   What is more, the audio track is filled 
with the voices of the US men and women in the sky.  The result is a technophilic 
position because the technology serves the needs of the people using it to protect 
the Self, while simultaneously allowing some people to stand out.  Of course that 
protection is contingent upon the fact that the human technology is just as deadly 
as the alien technology. 
Halfway through the film this is made very clear when the president is faced with 
the decision to deploy nuclear weapons over Houston in an attempt to destroy one 
of the alien ships hovering over the city.  For the Self, then, the question of 
deploying this destructive technology is not questioning the technology itself, but 
instead the morality of its use.  Accordingly, one of the primary heroes of the film, 
President Thomas J. Whitmore (Bill Pullman), resists launching the missiles as there 
could be survivors in the city.  He is ultimately swayed to use them, but the fact that 
he resisted at all suggests a unity of Self—the United States, through its president, 
must protect itself or it will cease to be.  This decision, of course, gains extra 
ideological importance given the importance of Houston to the lunar missions that 
landed humans on the moon.  By authorising the use of weapons and destroying 
Houston, it is suggested that the US must forge a new history, one that ultimately 
elevates humanity above its technology rather than subsuming it.  In this way, the 
film also articulates technophobia. 
Scott Bukatman sees a fear of dehumanisation at the root of technophobia.  When 
technology can transform a human into something inhuman, as the cavalier use of 
nuclear weapons would, it is a transformation to be feared (2-5).  Thus the mass-
destruction of cities via alien technology seen in the first act of the film is a display 
of inhuman technology.  This disregard for human life is made explicit later in the 
film when a captured alien is asked by the president, “What do you want us to do,” 
and the alien simply responds, “Die.”  In that moment, then, the alien has shown 
that it has become indistinguishable from its technology—all it can do is 
mechanically destroy.  The technophobia of the film also resembles that which is 
                                                             
6
 See Jeffords, especially Chapter Five, for a detailed analysis of the hardy body in action films as it 
relates to technology.  For a critical race reading of this sequence, see Kakoudaki 128. 
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articulated by Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner who, discussing fantasy films, 
situate it within a conservative context.  For them, the transformative technology 
puts “’natural’ social arrangements” (245) in peril because it threatens to 
destabilise the status quo.  Interestingly, since Ryan and Kellner view the status quo 
as a system of inequalities, such as patriarchal authority, what Galtung would call 
structural violence, technology which threatens that status quo would challenge 
those structures of violence potentially ushering in structural peace.  Of course, as 
the alien technology of Independence Day shows, it may also usher in an era of 
even more extravagant violence. 
The fact that technology is viewed through the double paradigm of phobia and 
philia is unsurprising, though, given the historical context of the period.  Specifically, 
the mid-1990s were a period of promise and caution with technology.  In 1996, the 
Internet was gaining increasing notice as the World Wide Web rose to prominence, 
promising a new electronic frontier.  At the same time, however, millennial 
anxieties became focused on the threats posed by technology, such as the Y2K bug, 
a computer error which would reset the dates on computers at the turn of the 
millennium, a flaw which many theorised would result in the end of Western 
civilization.  Independence Day draws on both these hopes and fears with the 
hopeful technologies aligned with the Self and the fearful ones relegated to the 
Other.  There are some overlaps in technology at the start of the film, though, as 
the United States is over-reliant on its technology.  This is clear in the way that the 
aliens use the satellite technology that the United States is shown to be dependent 
on against the US.  This technological reliance ultimately facilitates the destruction 
of all the major cities of the world.  At the end of the film, the reversion to more 
“human” forms of communication is exemplified by the fact that worldwide 
repulsion and destruction of the aliens is made possible by Morse code 
transmissions, technology that requires constant human intervention.  The film, of 
course, cannot escape entirely from its position as a blockbuster, though, as the 
heroes achieve victory large in part due to the destruction of the alien mothership 
through the use of an Apple MacBook, which is featured prominently in the story.  
While this reflects the industrial concerns of the blockbuster and the importance of 
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product placement, it does not negate the stance on technology the film articulates 
since even though the technology was cutting edge at the time the film was 
released, it is still subordinate to the user. 
Ultimately, the distinction the film makes between the technologies of the Self and 
Other hinges upon structural violence.  When the aliens arrive, their immediate 
action is to attempt to destroy humanity.  The only way for this position to be 
justified for them is if they have established such a steep Self/Other gradient that 
privileges themselves in relation to all others, a key component of nationalism 
according to Galtung; they are the only species that matters.  While Galtung largely 
grounds his theories in human relations, what the aliens exhibit would be an 
extreme form of nation-based violence, “speciesism,” rather than nationalism 
(Cultural 298).  The extremity of it authorises not just a structure of violence which 
elevates them, but it does so in a way that legitimises direct violence at the level of 
genocide, which is made possible with their technology.  Conversely humanity 
attempts to communicate with the aliens, sending out a greeting craft aptly named 
the Welcome Wagon.  The Welcome Wagon is a sign of structural peace, one that 
indicates humanity does not picture itself above or below any other species.  The 
aliens, however, destroy it without provocation, an event which integrates the 
spurning of the metaphoric open hand into the concept of “victory culture.”  
Humanity, again represented by the United States, is shown to be peaceful until the 
destruction of the Welcome Wagon and, subsequently, their cities.  Like the mythic 
United States of victory culture, the US of the film, a victim of an unprovoked 
assault, wages war against the aliens as a reactive measure rather than as a 
premeditated assault.  The result is a just war with American heroes leading the 
way. 
The American Self: Structural Peace and Violence in Independence Day 
In keeping with the generic traditions of both the disaster film and the combat film, 
Independence Day has multiple heroes.  The four primary heroes are the war 
veteran-cum-president; a fighter pilot, Captain Steve Hiller (Will Smith); a computer 
genius, David Levinson (Jeff Goldblum); and an alcoholic Vietnam veteran, Russell 
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Casse (Randy Quaid).  Despite the military similarities between three of them, these 
heroes are intended to represent a cross-section of America, albeit a limited one.  
As with other disaster films, the concept seems to be one of adversity bringing 
diverse people together, and that notion of equality—structural peace—can be 
seen in the ways in which these characters interact with one another, particularly 
Hiller and Levinson, a black character and a Jewish character respectively. 
In the climactic battle of the film, Hiller and Levinson fly a captured alien craft into 
space to plant a virus on the alien mothership.  While this is a standard act of 
heroism, the ethnicity of the two characters adds an extra dimension to the 
sequence.  Specifically, as Michael Rogin argues, they contribute to the larger 
agenda of the film which is to dramatise the mending of relations between African 
American and Jewish communities in the United States (45-50).  This is, of course, a 
response to the perceived rift between the two groups.  However, at a larger level 
the attempt the film makes to reconcile these groups is reflective of a larger effort 
at reforming the nation.  Borrowing again from Kaplan, the suggested clashing 
between Jewish and African American communities reflects the fragmentation of 
the larger national Self into “insulated communities and cultures” (76).  Indeed the 
film shows, through Hiller and Levinson, that when united under the banner of the 
nation, the pieces of the Self can indeed be reformed into a single whole.  In terms 
of these two characters, then, a structure of peace emerges.  However, a broader 
examination of social factors reveals that the film actually constructs the Self from 
structures of violence, even in its depiction of apparent racial harmony. 
Of the main characters, three are not ethnically white.  In addition to Hiller and 
Levinson, there is the partner of Hiller, Jasmine Dubrow (Vivica A. Fox), who is 
black.  Yet these characters bear only superficial markings of their ethnicities; they 
could be played by actors of any race or ethnic heritage.  This could simply be a 
reflection of the fact that, as Sontag contends of the original invasion films, 
characters were often weakly developed (45).  Additionally, it could be a sign of a 
post-race America where ethnicity is a non-factor, suggesting a structure of peace 
rather than a race-based structure of violence.  However, the casting of Will Smith 
points towards a conscientious engagement with race in the United States.  That 
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engagement, though, does not confront deeper race-oriented issues, a fact that 
Amy Taubin argues is the reason Will Smith was cast in the film, as his role on the 
television show The Fresh Prince of Bel Air positions him as “the only African 
American actor in Hollywood guaranteed to be nonthreatening to a white middle-
class audience” (6-8).  This is a contention echoed by Despina Kakoudaki who 
suggests that “The alignment of the white male hero with the black male hero 
enables the reaffirmation of a patriarchal bond, which is used to reestablish white 
supremacy” (127).  The fact that the representations of race as well as class 
relations in the United States which could potentially threaten a white-middle class 
audience, are absent in the film—or reappropriated, as when one white pilot 
quotes Jesse Jackson—supports those arguments.  However, both Taubin and 
Kakoudaki point towards further structures of violence by way of integrating issues 
of class and gender into their arguments.  This integration supports the arguments 
of bell hooks, about class, gender, and race being “interlocking” concepts (7).  
Accordingly, it is useful to further examine the ways in which the film articulates 
notions of class and race as well. 
In terms of class, the film presents another (limited) cross-section of America.  On 
one end is the first family—the president, first lady, and their daughter.  On the 
other are characters like Dubrow, who works as a stripper to support her son, and 
the Casse family, who live in a mobile home, which is used as a sign to represent 
their lower socio-economic standing.  While this positioning of certain characters 
along various class lines could serve as a commentary on the class struggles in the 
United States during the mid-1990s, particularly by presenting an ensemble of 
characters from different classes who are forced to come together, the ultimate 
resolution of the film does not engage with the class disparities that started the film 
in any way, nor does it suggest they have been resolved.  In fact in the final 
moments of the film, the poverty-stricken Casse sacrifices his own life to save 
humanity while Hiller and Levinson await approval from the president for their own 
heroic acts.  Thus, the class-based hierarchy remains in place.  Since it privileges the 
president over all others, it is a structure of violence.  However, the most overt 
structure of violence in the film remains that which is tied to gender. 
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 Figure 4 - Spano (Margaret Colin) visually dominating male aides in Independence 
Day 
 
At the outset of the film, there appears to be gender equity.  This is most apparent 
in the presentations of the first lady, Marilyn Whitmore (Mary McDonnell), and the 
White House Communications Director, Constance Spano (Margaret Colin).  Both 
women are shown in positions of power and authority such as when Spano is seen 
giving orders to two men who are following her and are periodically obscured by 
her figure, as shown in  Figure 4.  Although both women are, in a sense, bound to 
the president, being his wife and handler respectively, it is not a binding that 
operates within traditional notions of patriarchal order.  For instance, Marilyn 
Whitmore is seen as an independent woman and politician working on her own 
agenda.  The fact that women are presented in this opening as the equals, and 
sometimes even superiors, to men, points towards a society which has moved 
outside the boundaries of traditional patriarchal leadership, a movement which 
would suggest that it is indeed a structurally peaceful society in terms of gender.  
However, these elements do not function in that fashion due to the ways in which 
the film draws on the negative treatment of Hillary Clinton in the media by making 
Marilyn Whitmore her clear proxy. 
Hillary Clinton was assailed in the media during the 1992 presidential campaign, 
specifically due to her gender.  Karlyn Kohrs Campbell notes that Clinton has the 
“dubious distinction of being the first presidential candidate’s wife to be the focus 
of a major opposition strategy” (qtd. in Mattina 424).  That strategy focused on 
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comments Clinton made which appeared belittling to women in traditional gender 
roles, such as housewives.  Lisa M. Burns details how the media continued to put 
Clinton in a negative light once she was the first lady, specifically with regard to her 
efforts to reform health care in ways that present her as “boundary-violating” (141) 
because she was not acting like a traditional first lady.  Having the character of 
Marilyn Whitmore parallel Hillary Clinton by violating boundaries is not a negative 
thing in and of itself.  Again, Whitmore, like Clinton, expands the role of women in a 
traditionally patriarchal society by challenging the structural violence of patriarchal 
gender roles by acting as an individual, Whitmore by working on an undeveloped 
political agenda, and Clinton through her attempts at health care reform.  This 
makes both women images of a potential structural peace. 
However, the negativity comes from the fact that the expansion of her role as first 
lady is contrasted with images of her husband, the president, and their daughter, 
alone and unhappy.  At one level the personal aspirations of the first lady appear to 
bring her happiness and, on a larger level, represent steps towards a society of 
gender-based equality rather than inequality.  However, the fact that the 
potentially positive elements are immediately contrasted with images of the hurt 
family unit and the injured masculinity of the president elevates both masculinity 
and patriarchy above independent identities for women.  In short, the challenge to 
patriarchy via empowered women is framed as negative, thereby reinforcing the 
gender-based structural violence of a patriarchal system.  This is also an interesting 
revision to the notion of dehumanization Sontag describes. 
Writing about technology, Sontag observes that the dehumanization found in the 
original invasion films is a source of anxiety as well as an ideal to which one should 
aspire (48).  As discussed above, the technological elements in the film adhere to 
this formulation.  In other ways, though, the film shows that humanization, 
specifically the humanization of women, is a threat.  In this way, the gender politics 
of Independence Day address the anxieties surrounding the destabilisation of 
patriarchal order in the 1990s.  These anxieties are seen in three of the four main 
families as Levinson and Spano are a divorced couple; Casse is an absent father 
without a wife; and the president seems to simply wander around the White House 
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ineffectually.  However, because the scale of the conflict is taken to such a 
catastrophic extreme, the threat of the humanization of women is also amplified so 
that it jeopardizes more than just family structures. 
Teresa Santerre Hobby argues that Independence Day blames the women who exist 
outside of the traditional patriarchal system for the suffering humanity must 
endure throughout the narrative.  She asserts that the death toll of the film is only 
as high as it is because of Spano, who “*refused+ to listen to her estranged husband 
about the countdown and the inevitability of the attack” (52).  Read this way, the 
liberated women in Independence Day are dangerous because they threaten to 
destroy humanity itself.  However this misogyny results in the reversion to the 
“’natural’ social arrangements” Ryan and Kellner (245) discuss as it is only after the 
female characters in the film are removed from all positions of power that 
humanity is able to achieve victory over the aliens.  Thus the Self is divided between 
men and women where men are privileged above women.  This is reinforced by a 
theme of conservative heteronormativity throughout the film. 
In Independence Day, when the first act reaches its climax and massive direct 
violence is meted out by the alien weaponry, those who do not conform to 
traditional heterosexual couplings, specifically monogamous marriage, are 
eliminated.  Thus, despite the claims of the filmmakers that any character could die 
at any moment (Twentieth Century Fox 3), the only two named characters who die 
in the initial holocaust are Marty Gilbert (Harvey Fierstein) and Tiffany (Kiersten 
Warren).  Marty is clearly coded as homosexual, one of the negative comic relief 
stereotypes the film contains, and Tiffany is an exotic dancer like Jasmine, who 
again is one of the heroines of the film.  However, while Jasmine openly states that 
she is only working as a dancer to support her family, framing her as a mother 
figure, there is no similar explanation as to why Tiffany holds the position, an 
absence which positions her as an unfit mother figure.  In addition to these deaths, 
Jimmy Barnes (Harry Connick Jr.), the best friend of Hiller, dies in an early 
retaliatory attack. As Rogin argues, in one of the few scenes Jimmy is in before his 
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death he is coded as sexually ambiguous if not openly homosexual (65).7  The first 
lady, although a wife and mother, is established both in the film and through 
connections to Hillary Clinton as incapable of being rehabilitated into the 
patriarchal order, and eventually dies from wounds suffered in the initial invasion, a 
death which Mair reminds “serves to galvanise our WASP president into acting” 
(45) further underscoring the patriarchal structures of violence.  Lastly, Casse, an 
alcoholic and absent father, redeems himself in his final sacrifice, metaphorically 
atoning for his failure to be a proper father.  Interestingly, Casse accomplishes this 
in suicidal fashion using an aircraft, an act which holds a parallel with the 9/11 
attack, but also, as Rogin notes, in a fashion which carries with it strong homosexual 
undertones (69).  The dominant reading of this sequence, though, ignores those 
undertones, focusing instead on the masculine heroism of the act as it is shown to 
be the way he finally regains the respect of his children. 
At the end of the film, then, the Self that has persevered is one rife with structural 
violence.  It is a strongly patriarchal system which has no room for those who do 
not adhere to its hierarchical order.  Additionally, while men are privileged, those 
who belong to higher socio-economic classes are more esteemed than those who 
do not.  While there is some apparent ethnic diversity, the prominence of the 
nation means that the individual, along with any ethnic heritage, is secondary.  It is 
necessary to remember that even though the film sanctions this violence by 
normalising it, the larger goal of this articulation of the Self is to create a unified 
entity against which it positions the alien Other.  Accordingly, the Self of 
Independence Day ultimately forms a state system that Galtung would describe as 
Unitary since it shows a very high internal capacity for peace-building, and a very 
high external capacity for peace-threatening (Peace 65).  This is the mythic version 
of the United States, and it is primarily that national identity which is found in the 
dreams the film presents. 
                                                             
7
 For a more complete analysis of the homosexual themes in the film specifically as they relate to 
AIDS, see Rogin Chapter Five. 
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Aliens and Arabs after 9/11: The Dreams of Independence Day 
In the mid-1990s, the precise nature of the US Self was in question. The concept of 
“victory culture” that had once been integral to its identity was no longer in favour.  
Thus, the policies of the Clinton administration, which in 1994 alone involved a near 
military intervention in Haiti and troubled negotiations involving nuclear 
regulations with North Korea, were met with sharp criticism.  Whether the criticism 
was aimed at the policies or Clinton himself is debatable, but the result was that 
Clinton shifted his policies more towards centre.  Additionally, multiple acts of 
domestic terrorism, including the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Centers and 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, raised questions about the security of the United 
States.  These apparent instabilities seemed to give credence to the apocalyptic 
predictions made by those such as Kaplan (1994) who saw the United States on an 
imminent path toward destruction.  However, the absence of “victory culture” in 
the political arena did not indicate it was gone from the United States entirely.  As 
the above analysis of the film shows, tenets of victory culture not only did not go 
away with the Cold War, but they were in high demand in the public consciousness. 
Discussing the disaster films of the 1990s, Jean Baudrillard described them as 
indicative of a larger phenomenon in the world.  For him, the popularity of these 
films represented a mass envisioning of the demise of the United States before it 
reached “perfection or omnipotence” (7); the ruined cityscapes revealed the 
(hidden) ire towards the capitalist system.  At the same time, though, he views 
these dreams as suicidal, suggesting that the United States itself is chief among 
those wishing for its demise.  Of the 9/11 attacks, then, the remark that Baudrillard 
makes, “they did it, but we wished for it” (emphasis in original) (5), can be read in a 
larger suicidal context, suggesting that “we” is also the United States.  In other 
words, the terrorists who attacked the United States on September 11, 2001, 
simply performed a deed for which the people of the United States had been 
wishing.  However, the idea of the suicidal drive of the United States fails to see the 
larger picture.  Specifically, the physical spaces in these films were destroyed, but 
the principles which built them not only survived, but are reinvigorated.  This is true 
of many disaster films from the 1990s, such as Twister or Volcano, where Self—
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specifically the United States—is brought together through adversity against nature 
as Other.  However, in Independence Day where the Other is corporeal and must be 
actively destroyed rather than just subdued, it serves the additional purpose of 
showcasing the military might of the United States.  As Mair remarks of the aliens in 
Independence Day, they allow for the display of “the impregnability of American 
supremacy and its rightful leadership of the globe” (34).  In other words, what 
Independence Day offers the viewer is a wish fulfilment fantasy where the United 
States uses its apparent destruction by a super-powered Other as a means of 
redefining a unified Self that exists in a binary Self/Other situation.  The steepness 
of the Self/Other gradient imbues the Self with purpose: destroying the Other.  
Thus Independence Day shows a resolution to the post-Cold War identity crisis 
through regression to a pre-Vietnam Cold War-style conflict that erupts, at last, into 
a hot war.  This dream was realised in the response of the Bush administration to 
attacks of 9/11. 
In the rhetoric George W. Bush used in the immediate post-9/11 period, it was clear 
not only that Bush was defining the United States as a unified Self against an enemy 
Other, but that he was doing so in a way that evoked a mythic United States.  For 
instance, on September 20, 2001, in an address to a joint session of the United 
States Congress, Bush said, “They [the terrorist groups] hate our freedoms—our 
freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom to vote and assemble and 
disagree with each other” (“Address” n. pag.).  This definition of the United States 
works both to define the Self and the Other with the Self of the United States 
becoming mythic.  Absent from that definition are the domestic tensions that were 
prevalent throughout its history.  Also elided are the domestic developments in the 
1990s, where the lack of an external Other saw the fragmentation of the national 
Self.  Such an elision points towards structural violence.  Of course, if the Self is the 
mythic supporter of freedom in those remarks, the Other becomes the mythic 
opposition to Freedom.  Again, the historical impetuses for the attacks, “blowback” 
for instance, are not acknowledged in any way by the definition Bush articulates of 
the Self and Other.  For both cases, the comments Bush made serve another 
purpose, which is to connect the post-millennial Self and Other with the heroes and 
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villains of World War II in the period before the atomic bomb, which is to say in the 
period of victory culture.  This is accomplished by the fact that the list Bush 
presented not only evokes the tenets of the Founding Fathers by way of the Bill of 
Rights, it also points towards the Four Freedoms which were articulated by 
Roosevelt during the Second World War.  This twin reference rhetorically 
positioned the United States as a benevolent nation being victimized by forces of 
oppression, and, in so doing, did not resolve any structures of violence, but, like 
Independence Day, drew the focus away from them.  The result was solidification of 
a Self in opposition to the terrorist Other that healed the “instability and 
uncertainty” (King, Spectacular 154) of the 1990s.  Like the film, though, the 
response to 9/11 did not actively address the structures of violence which were 
prevalent in the United States at that time.  Unlike the film, though, which defined 
the Other as a (literally) alien species, the 9/11 response relocated that definition 
onto human races, specifically Arabs, presenting them as inhuman.  This is evident 
in further remarks made by Bush such as his reference to the War on Terror as a 
“crusade” (“Remarks” n. pag.), a statement which will be explored in much greater 
detail in subsequent chapters.  Returning again to the notion of state articulated by 
Galtung, then, the response to 9/11 aimed to create a Unitary-style system wherein 
the population of the United States was bound beneath its president, and sought to 
destroy the foreign Other.  As the approval ratings for Bush evidence, the initial 
reception by the American people was very high, earning him an approval of over 
90% in the immediate wake of the events of 9/11.  However, as time passed this 
approval rating dropped substantially. 
Ultimately, then, Independence Day is a film that presents a standard Self/Other 
binary.  This relationship is key to the concept of victory culture that Engelhardt 
advances, but it was a relationship which was absent in the wake of the Cold War.  
During the 1990s, instead of an external Other, the structures of violence within the 
United States made apparent the internal Others, resulting in an apparent 
fragmentation of the Self.  The dream of Independence Day is not one which sees 
the United States destroyed for its position of potential dominance, but instead is 
one which validates that power by creating an enemy Other to fill the void left by 
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the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991.  After the attacks of 9/11, the response 
of the Bush administration made this dream a reality as the US Self was redefined in 
opposition to the Other of terrorism.  Like Independence Day, which drew on 
conventions from World War II films, the response to 9/11 made allusions to World 
War II—“the good war”—in an effort to frame the War on Terror as another noble 
cause.  For both the film and the 9/11 response, however, it was a redefinition of 
Self that seemingly solved the fragmentation of the 1990s, but ultimately addressed 
none of the underlying issues. 
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Chapter Two 
Adrift with the American Dream: Titanic (1997) 
 
In 1997, still in the throes of a major identity crisis in addition to the numerous 
smaller crises it engendered, the United States found itself on an economic 
upswing.  Despite beginning the decade in a recession, the US underwent an 
extended period of growth in the latter part of the decade.  With the economy in 
such good stead, it is unsurprising that the American Dream found its way again 
into political rhetoric.  During his second inaugural address in 1997, President 
Clinton made the follow statement: 
“May those generations whose faces we cannot yet see, whose 
names we may never know, say of us here that we led our beloved 
land into a new century with the American Dream alive for all her 
children; with the American promise of a more perfect union a 
reality for all her people; with America’s bright flame of freedom 
spreading throughout all the world” (“Inaugural” n. pag.). 
For Clinton, the American Dream was a dream “that one day America would rise up 
and treat all its citizens as equals before the law and in the heart” (“Inaugural” n. 
pag.).  However, at the same time it was a dream of material equality and economic 
mobility.  New technologies, such as the World Wide Web, opened up new avenues 
of potential success.  It was during this time that companies such as Amazon.com 
and eBay rose to prominence.  While the reactivation of the American Dream 
seemed to suggest a resolution to the identity crisis of the United States, the crisis 
itself was not resolved.  Instead the anxieties surrounding the identity of the nation, 
coupled with other anxieties such as those relating to the impending millennium, 
manifested themselves in cultural artefacts.  One such set of artefacts are the films 
which comprised the disaster film cycle that emerged in the mid-1990s. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the disaster films became a major force in 
Hollywood during this time.  Given the advances in special effects technologies, it is 
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unsurprising that these films emphasised destruction, often showcasing it in 
spectacular detail.  This is not, however, simply a matter of enhanced special 
effects.  As Stephen Keane observes, comparing the 1990s films to a cycle of 
disaster films in the 1970s, “the stakes are generally much higher in the 1990s 
disaster cycle” as the disaster often threatens the planet itself (74).  Of course the 
planet is frequently represented by the United States, as in Independence Day.  
While the increased peril could certainly be connected with apocalyptic anxieties 
tied to the millennium, Keane cautions that treating them solely in that way as it 
“ignores not only industrial imperatives but also further, ideological readings that 
can be brought to bear on them” (74).  By considering these films within the 
context of the political developments in the post-Cold War United States, 
approaches to the texts which elucidate the violence they contain can be developed 
in much greater detail.  To that end, the most successful of the disaster films, 
Titanic, which was also the most successful US film in history until the release of 
Avatar over a decade later, speaks to the identity crisis in the United States and it 
does so by addressing the concept of class, specifically class mobility.   
In this chapter I will argue that Titanic “dreams” a resolution to the identity crisis of 
the United States by reactivating mythic notions of the American Dream.  In so 
doing, it perpetuates structures of violence by effacing inequities entirely and 
replacing them with visions of structural peace.  Further, it is my contention that 
the response to 9/11 carried out by the Bush administration brings the dream of 
Titanic to fruition by mobilising a similar rhetoric.  The first portion of my analysis 
will focus on the economic situation in the United States during the 1990s, directly 
connecting it to the work of Johan Galtung who labels the US as a Blue School 
economy (Peace 149).  By establishing that connection, I will show how the 
Self/Other paradigm established during the Cold War between the United States 
and a Soviet Other worked to align the United States entirely with the free market 
principles of the Blue School.  The post-Cold War identity crisis in conjunction with 
increased wealth disparity threatened that definition of the Self, ultimately leading 
to a need for either a new national identity or a revitalisation of the old one.  I will 
next argue that what Titanic provided audiences with was exactly that revitalisation 
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of Self, which, drawing on the work of Roland Barthes, I will suggest was 
accomplished through its articulation of a mythic America founded on the American 
Dream, which itself is a myth.  The Self/Other relationship the film articulates, then, 
is one that hinges upon support, or lack of support, for the American Dream.  I will 
then show not only how the Self is overtly aligned with the structural peace the 
mythic American Dream brings, but also how it is implicitly connected with the 
structures of violence that inform the myth.  This section will show the ways in 
which the Self is thus based upon both gender- and ethnicity-based violence.  
However, I will argue that because these structures of violence are both rendered 
invisible by the film and externalised onto an Other, the Self is able to retain an 
innocence that validates its own deployment of violence against the Other, albeit in 
a struggle to survive.  I will then connect this analysis of the violence in the film to 
the response of the Bush administration to the events of 9/11.  It is my ultimate 
contention that by drawing upon similar mythic notions of the United States which 
emphasised structural peace and concealed structural violence, the response to 
9/11 saw the dreams articulated in Titanic brought to fruition where a peaceful US 
Self was violated by a violent Other. 
Recession, Victory, and Resurgence: The US Economic Self in the 1990s 
At a cultural and political level, the Cold War was framed as an ideological conflict.  
On one side was the democracy of the United States and on the other the 
communism of the Soviet Union.  These ideologies of course informed the 
economics of each superpower such that the free market economy became an 
integral part of how the United States defined the Self, with socialist principles 
enmeshed with the concept of the Other.  In 1987, after a dramatic drop in the 
stock market, the United States economy fell into a recession.  Despite some signs 
of an early recovery, the US economy languished and it took far longer to regroup 
than anticipated.  Coupled with the financial rise of Japan, the position of the 
United States as a dominant economic super-power seemed threatened on 
multiple fronts.  The threat, though, was cut short by the sudden collapse of the 
Soviet Union during that period with the United States technically “winning” the 
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Cold War.  The victory seemed to validate the socio-economic ideology of the 
United States and the capitalist system.  Thus, despite the faltering US economy, 
the free market principles that the US defined as Self throughout the Cold War 
remained firmly in place and continued to thrive throughout the 1990s as the 
economy eventually revived and grew.  To relate this political, and indeed 
economic, development to the definition of Self and Other, it is useful to consider 
the articulation of the US and Soviet models by Johan Galtung. 
For Galtung, the term “economy” refers to “the organization of nature-production-
consumption cycles” (Peace 139).  To understand how an individual society 
structures its economy, Galtung approaches it via the “economic cycle” which he 
sees as involving a range of societal elements including “factors of production” and 
“relations of production” (Peace 139).  Each culture, then, makes certain choices 
which define its economy along six spectra.  Galtung identifies these as 
individualism and collectivism, verticality and horizontality, monetization and 
specificity, processing and ‘naturity,’ and expansion and stability (Peace 139).8  
Certain configurations form the foundation of what Galtung calls “schools” of 
economics, and he roughly categorises the US and Soviet economies into what he 
labels Blue and Red Schools respectively.  The Blue School is grounded in Smithism, 
while the Red School is a socialist model.  Galtung does not see either economic 
model as being necessarily bound to the development of their respective nations, 
but the economics and history are certainly enmeshed.  It is worth further 
clarifying, as Galtung does, that “the Red system is not based on Marxism,” but was 
instead “developed by improvisation, challenging Blue assumptions on crucial 
points” (Peace 144).  Thus a binary is created between “Market and Capital” and 
“State and Power,” representing the US and Soviet Union in turn.  Galtung contrasts 
the two within the six spectra mentioned above, suggesting that the Blue School 
privileges the individual based on merit while the Red School functions based on 
leadership dictates with no substantive consideration of popular opinion.9 
                                                             
8 See Galtung Peace, especially pages 139-141 for a more detailed explanation of these spectra. 
9
 For a more detailed account of how Galtung defines these and other economic schools, see 
Galtung Peace, Part III. 
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In terms of cultural violence, then, the United States identified the tenets of the 
Blue School—the meritorious individual—as key components of the Self while those 
of the Red School—the stereotyped drone worker—were relegated to the Other.  
Films such as Red Dawn and Top Gun capture the Reagan-era bias of an insidious 
Soviet Other in opposition to a noble US Self, making them prime examples of 
cultural violence.  The Soviet Union, of course, utilised the opposite definition of 
Self and Other.  The fact that the US economy began to recover after 1992 and 
indeed entered one of the largest periods of sustained growth in US history 
bolstered this ideological definition of Self and Other.  This is particularly important 
since it was concurrent with the post-Cold War identity crisis that the United States 
experienced.  The free market ideology became a key element of the 1990s US Self, 
exemplified at the end of the decade by the dot-com boom, where fortunes were 
seemingly made overnight on the new electronic frontier.  
Of course, as Galtung contends, ideology is one of the key domains of cultural 
violence, and in this case the ideological system that grew out of the economic 
policy became conflated with national identity, producing an American ideology 
which resembled that of a nation-state (Cultural 298-299).  In defining itself as the 
victor of the Cold War, the connections between capitalism and nation were 
reinforced.  These connections point to the fact that inherent in this economically-
grounded Self was potential violence, especially given the way that Galtung frames 
the nation-state as an inherently violent entity.  The nation-state ideology, 
however, is not the only source of ideology-based violence.  Galtung also argues 
that any economic school, including the Blue School, carries with it certain “side-
effects” which he labels “externalities” (Peace 154); these effects will primarily be 
at the structural rather than the cultural level, although they can certainly be 
validated in cultural artefacts.  It is important to note, though, that these effects are 
not necessarily negative as they could reinforce structural peace rather than 
structural violence.  For instance, the Green School Galtung describes is based upon 
“civil society and dialogue” and makes meeting needs a higher priority than wealth 
accumulation (Peace 146).  Since it essentially encourages social equity, 
“externalities” of the system would produce structural peace.  It is also worth 
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pointing to the fact that Galtung acknowledges his approach towards the 
investigation of these externalities uses definitions which are potentially 
problematic.  However, it is those issues which form the foundation of his 
exploration and he uses them to investigate the complex interrelationships 
between the economic externalities.10 
Since the side-effects can be both positive and negative, Galtung takes a similar 
approach to his analysis of the externalities of the Blue School, noting that at the 
individual level freedom is possible, but so is repression.  Along those lines, within a 
social sphere, equity is paired with exploitation, solidarity with fragmentation, 
participation with marginalisation, and so on.  Again, what these externalities 
represent is the potential for any economic system to both promote and restrict 
social equalities.  However, as Galtung notes, “mainstream economics discourse 
makes much of what happens around economic activities opaque by excluding 
many dimensions from serious consideration” (Peace 154)—and those dimensions 
include the side-effects he delineates.  It is unsurprising, though, that mainstream 
analysts would not give detailed assessments of potential inequities discussed since 
effacing them maintains and supports a status quo.  By identifying the Self in terms 
of the Blue School model, something which was done both explicitly and implicitly 
in the United States, the nation defined its Self in terms of pre-existing, idealistic 
structures of peace, and also with structures of violence which, by definition, 
supported and concealed societal inequities.  By hiding, or eliding, the negative 
aspects of the free market economy, the Self came to be defined in terms of mythic 
concepts like American Exceptionalism and, perhaps even more pervasively, the 
American Dream.  These ideas, and others like them, will be discussed in detail 
below, but it is important here to acknowledge that they came to embody the 
American Self as the United States grew and developed in the period under 
investigation.  However, due to the mythic nature of the concepts being examined, 
they do not reflect historical conditions in full.  Accordingly, they do not 
substantively engage with the negative externalities that Galtung mentions such as 
fragmentation or marginalisation—structures of violence.  By concealing this 
                                                             
10
 See Galtung Peace, part III, especially section 3 for more. 
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violence through omission, the representation of the American Self ultimately 
reinforces it. 
Thomas Byrne Edsall has discussed the shift in the domestic economic and political 
situations in the United States in the late twentieth century.  According to him, the 
economic statistics from the 1980s reflected the fact that “economic and political 
power are flowing from the middle class to the affluent” (n. pag.), a movement 
which points towards potential inequities.  This wealth disparity continued to exist 
throughout the 1990s.  As William Domhoff shows, through his use of work by 
economist Edward N. Wolff, from 1981 to 1998 the share of wealth held by the 
bottom 99% fell from 75.2% to 61.9% and the share of wealth held by the top 1% 
rose from 24.8% to 38.1% (n. pag.).  More importantly, although the changes in 
these statistics span two decades, the more detailed numbers Domhoff presents 
show that the wealth concentration by class remained fairly constant throughout 
the 1990s (n. pag.).  The purpose of presenting these statistics here is not to 
suggest that they serve as evidence of structural violence.  Instead, it is to illustrate 
two key points.  The first is that the wealth disparity in the United States, as shown 
in the statistics above, increased substantially at the end of twentieth century.  The 
second is that this increasing disparity of wealth points to the fact that class 
mobility was limited in the United States during the 1990s.  Both of these are 
important because they point towards a potential conflict with the US identity 
which was predicated heavily on the idea of the American Dream.  While the 
decrease in economic mobility did not kill the American Dream, it did make it 
seemingly more difficult to achieve.  What is more, the fact that the dream was tied 
so closely to the identity of the United States, which was in crisis, caused it to be 
questioned as well.  This questioning manifested itself at the cultural level, as 
exhibited in Titanic.  However, Titanic does not question the viability of the dream, 
nor does it reassert it.  Instead, the film takes the dream and rebuilds it in a mythic 
fashion, effectively revitalising it entirely.  This is accomplished by the creation of a 
representation of the United States based solely on the dreams of those travelling 
to it.  The result is that the film presented late-1990s audiences with a view of 
America that was dramatically different from the nation as it existed at that time.  
64 
 
In the film, the viewer is relocated to a period where the American Dream was a 
novel concept, and abilities and merit were the most important qualities an 
individual could have.  In Titanic, viewers are positioned in a period where the 
American Dream was alive and well.  To understand how the film does that, it is 
useful to first look at the dream itself. 
The American Way: Titanic and the American Dream 
For Galtung, class is a concept that exists as part of a larger network of ideas.  As he 
defines it, it is integrated into a framework which involves both state and race.  
These broad categories are then broken down further into ten “fault lines” where 
humanity and nature intersect with one another (Peace 60).  Those points are 
human/non-human, gender, generation, race, class, nation, countries, “and the 
three edges in the state-civil society-capital triangle, in social and world space” 
(Peace 60).  When there is a unitary system, such as a single-class society, he 
contends that internal peace-building capacity will be high as will external peace-
threatening capacity, which is to say violence.  Conversely, if there is a multi-
system, such as a multi-class system, then internal violence will be high as 
“stratification” increases (66) and levels of external violence will vary.  
The American Dream was first defined by James Truslow Adams in his seminal 
volume The Epic of America, as “that dream of a land in which life should be better 
and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to his 
ability or achievement” (404).  This definition establishes the United States as a 
meritocracy where success is seemingly only connected to personal ability.  The 
implication is that if somebody has the ability, nothing is out of their reach.  
However, since this dream is predicated on class mobility, it necessarily exists 
within a multi-class system.  As Galtung predicts, this will promote stratification, 
something which is evident in a few ways, even in the words Adams uses in his 
definition.  For instance, his language is gendered.  So while it is clear that “every 
man” might achieve the American Dream, it is unclear that women in the United 
States can expect the same thing.  Given the structures of violence in US culture 
that privilege men over women, structures prevalent both at the time Truslow was 
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writing and in the contemporary period, it is likely the definition stands as an 
embodiment of these structures.  The American Dream of a merit-based system is 
one that, even at its codification, privileged certain groups over others, thereby 
reinforcing structures of violence in addition to creating a stratified class system.  In 
other words, the definition itself reinforces social inequities, which is at odds with 
the very concept of a meritocracy.  Titanic is like this original definition of the 
American Dream: there are progressive elements in it, but ultimately the cinematic 
language it uses to define the American Dream, and by extension the America Self, 
is language that reinforces rather than condemns structural violence.   
 
Figure 5 - The luminous white elite set apart from the darker masses in Titanic 
 
Titanic is ostensibly concerned with class.  From the first shots of the boat in port 
with passengers clamouring to board it, there are very intentional distinctions 
drawn between the wealthy and the poor.  The ultra-rich are ostentatiously dressed 
and set apart from both the masses and the environment while the poor blend 
together both with each other and with the grimier locales.  For instance, Rose 
DeWitt Bukater (Kate Winslet) is first shown arriving at the Titanic with attendants 
and masses of luggage.  She is wearing an oversized hat and an extravagant dress.  
The area the wealthy enter into is visually demarcated from the domain of the 
poor; they are figures apart from the crowd, as shown in Figure 5 where a bright 
white light “spots” them.  Rose then ascends a platform reserved for the wealthy 
passengers, literally elevating her above the masses of people below.  This of 
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course works in tandem with the star image of Kate Winslet.  Conversely, Jack 
Dawson (Leonardo DiCaprio) is first shown in a small bar gambling for his passage.  
The bar is in poor repair, and he is surrounded by unkempt sailors.  While his 
handsomeness sets him apart from the others—something Sean Redmond 
connects with his star image which is “heavenly white and blonde-ish” (200)—his 
simple clothing grounds him in the scene. 
Interestingly, the film does not develop the middle class in any way, which perhaps 
can be read as a concern over the disappearance of the middle class in America that 
many have observed.  However, it is more likely that this is due to the fact that the 
binary structure between the rich and the poor makes for a clearer narrative.  In 
fact, the magnification of the conflict between these two classes has led some, such 
as David L. Lubin, to describe the film as telling an “upstairs/downstairs” (17) story, 
in reference to the British television drama, Upstairs, Downstairs, which followed 
the lives of people living in an Edwardian-era London townhouse, specifically the 
wealthy owners and the poor servants.  This comparison is all the more apt given 
the fact that Titanic engages with Edwardian England and its class politics. 
The RMS Titanic is shown in the film to be a physical manifestation of Edwardian 
era politics.  The upper decks which house the wealthy are physically separated 
from the lower decks and the steerage passengers.  However, since the Titanic sank 
at the end of the Edwardian era—some mark the event as the actual end of the era 
rather than World War I—the story itself shows the conflict between the old system 
and the new, with the new represented by the United States and the American 
Dream.  In terms of violence, the old value system and the new are the Other and 
the Self respectively.  The conflict takes shape in the romance between Rose and 
Jack, in which Rose must choose between being a society girl whose wealthy 
lifestyle is guaranteed—thereby becoming part of the Other—or giving it all up and 
relying only on her natural abilities—thus aligning with the Self.  Ultimately she 
chooses the latter and in so doing becomes a symbol of the American Dream.  
However, the fact that she renounces her privileged life to essentially test herself in 
the “melting pot” of the United States says much about the Self/Other paradigm 
constructed by the film. 
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J. Emmett Winn observes of the film that “the upper class are overwhelmingly 
depicted as malevolent; and the underclass, as virtuous” (109).  While this does 
sum up many of the characters, it overlooks some important elements that need to 
be qualified, specifically that neither the upper nor the lower classes are 
homogeneously “malevolent” or “virtuous.”  For example, the “unsinkable” Molly 
Brown (Kathy Bates) is a character in the film based on an historical person.  She 
was ostensibly living the American Dream, having risen from poverty to wealth 
during her lifetime.  Even though the wealth gained her access to the upper class, 
the people in that class did not accept her; in the film much is made of the fact that 
she is “new money.”  Her position as a member of the upper class does not situate 
her as the Other because the money has been earned rather than inherited.  
Accordingly she does not privilege her social position more than her position as a 
member of humanity.  This is clear when Jack is afforded a chance to attend a 
dinner in the first class dining area and she furnishes him with the appropriate 
attire.  That he is able to successfully blend into the culture raises issues regarding 
class and “passing.”  The inverse of Molly Brown can be seen in the character of 
Spicer Lovejoy (David Warner), the personal valet of Caledon “Cal” Hockley (Billy 
Zane), the man Rose is to marry.  Although he is a member of the underclass, the 
“downstairs” as it were, he is only ever seen working to carry out the orders of Cal; 
his motivations never appear to be connected to class mobility.  He has accepted 
his position as underclass, and based upon his antagonistic actions towards Rose 
and Jack for their violation of the strict Edwardian social structures, he becomes a 
villain despite the fact that he belongs to the underclass.  The characters of Molly 
Brown and Spicer Lovejoy, then, stand as evidence that the film does not construct 
Self and Other, as Winn suggests, according to class affiliation.  Instead the film 
articulates them in relation to the American Dream of merit-based class mobility.  
Specifically, the Other of the film is comprised of the particular characters within 
both the upper class and underclass who wish to maintain the rigid class structures 
that formed the foundation of Edwardian values.  The two primary antagonists of 
the film, Cal Hockley and Ruth DeWitt Bukater (Frances Fisher), exemplify this 
position of the Other. 
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Cal explicitly advocates the preservation of a strict class system in the United 
States.  This is clear when he gives Rose a priceless diamond called the Heart of the 
Ocean, telling her that “It’s for royalty.  And we are royalty.”  With the ship sailing 
to the United States, his remark acts as a foreboding comment on the imposition of 
Edwardian values on the American Dream.  It is clear that Cal believes that the 
upstairs and downstairs, so to speak, should be permanent social institutions, and 
that the United States needs a class system.  This ideology is reinforced throughout 
the film by his repeated and vehement objections to the lower-class Jack being 
permitted on the upper decks.  The class mentality is also a part of Ruth: she has 
arranged for Rose to marry Cal as a way of maintaining the position of her family in 
society since her deceased husband lost all of their money.  The fact that she is 
forcing Rose into the marriage is not-so-subtly underscored in a scene where she 
roughly laces Rose into a corset as Rose objects to the marriage saying that it is 
“unfair.”  It is worth noting, though, that Ruth responds by saying, “Of course it’s 
unfair.  We’re women.  Our choices are never easy.”  So while the sequence does 
emphasise the position of Ruth as Other due to her adherence to Edwardian code 
at all costs, it also suggests that gender is as much a factor as class.  This again 
evokes the writing of bell hooks and the “interlocking” elements of class, gender, 
and race (7)—the latter of which will be discussed further below.  While the clear 
gender discrimination does present the larger plight of Ruth, who is indeed a victim 
of structural violence, she remains an Other in the film because she places personal 
privilege over the ideals of a meritocracy.  The Self, of course, is represented by the 
characters who believe in the prospects of America. 
While the Self of the film is ultimately embodied by Rose, who survives the sinking 
of the Titanic and goes on to live the American dream, she adopts her worldview 
from Jack.  Jack is depicted as a figure that is able to transgress class boundaries 
because he wholeheartedly believes in the American Dream.  For him, there is no 
boundary he cannot cross if he so wishes.  He adapts to each situation as he 
confronts it and relies upon his natural abilities to pull him through.  This is clear in 
the already discussed dinner sequence where he successfully passes as a member 
of the upper class, but it is also seen in the larger context of his relationship with 
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Rose.  He wants to be with Rose and ultimately he is.  However the scenes in which 
Jack essentially lives the American dream are those in which Jack gets Rose to 
transgress the boundaries with him.  For instance, at one point he brings Rose to 
the lower decks where the steerage passengers are having a raucous celebration.  
Unlike Jack who only passes as a wealthy passenger while on the upper decks, Rose, 
it is suggested, is able to become a steerage passenger.  Despite her obviously 
upper class attire, the passengers on the lower decks do not care about her position 
since by being there, it is understood, she acknowledges equity between classes.  
This willing downward movement of Rose, and of course her ultimate commitment 
to that movement after the ship sinks, positions her as part of the Self, of which a 
more detailed representation is found in Table 1 which categorises the main 
characters in the film.  What the diagram makes clear is the fact that class status 
does not determine alignment in terms of Self and Other, evidenced by the fact that 
members of the upper and lower classes are defined as both Self and Other. 
 
 
Table 1 – Self and Other overriding class affiliations in Titanic 
 
While the Self/Other binary of the film is not strictly built around class divisions, this 
does not entirely invalidate the observations made by Winn regarding the 
differences between the wealthy and the poor (109).  For instance, as is shown 
during the party on the lower deck, the steerage passengers have an unbridled lust 
for life, and despite their rough appearance, their acceptance of Rose does indeed 
position them as almost universally “virtuous,” as Winn claims.  All of this is perhaps 
best explained in the fact that for them the Titanic, as is stated in the film, was “the 
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ship of dreams.”  This sentiment is also echoed in the production materials for the 
film which state that, “the passengers in third-class were emigrants travelling with 
all they owned, leaving behind all they knew and heading to America flush with the 
hope of a new life and greater fortunes” (“Handbook,” 22).  Interestingly, despite 
the fact that the steerage passengers have been shown to be multi-ethnic, the 
representations here present them largely as stereotypically Irish, a representation 
which suggests a structure of violence.  In fact, the construction of a mythic 
America in the film, particularly with regard to the principles of the economic 
schools discussed earlier, contributes to the articulation of multiple structures of 
violence. 
Below the Surface: The Self and Other in Titanic 
Based on the above analysis of the Self/Other paradigm, it would appear that the 
film is devoutly opposed to the imposition of class structures which create social 
inequities, and indeed it is.  However, the opposition between the Self and Other in 
the film frames the class structures of the Edwardian era as a relic of the old world, 
and an old economic model.  While there certainly are some differences in the way 
Cal and Jack approach business, they both ultimately represent the Blue School of 
economics which elevates private ownership, material wealth, and, as Galtung 
notes, “no stop sign” (Peace 142) in terms of expansion.  The Blue School elements 
are clearly seen in the characters of both Cal and Jack. 
For instance, Cal is a wealthy heir whose family is in the steel industry.  While he is 
framed as arrogant and unsympathetic towards the lower classes, his connection to 
steel evokes the history of Andrew Carnegie, who immigrated to the United States, 
worked as a factory worker, and rose to become one of the wealthiest men in 
history.  In short, he is one of the great examples of the American Dream.  Despite 
that connection, Cal is positioned as inheriting his wealth instead of earning it.  Jack, 
on the other hand, creates his own luck and forges his own destiny.  This is clearest 
in the dinner sequence where the opulence stands in stark contrast to his humble 
beginning, underscoring the fact that he can rise to material heights.  In so doing, of 
course, he validates the American Dream.  In fact, it is because Cal opposes this 
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mobility that he becomes a villain in the film.  His opposition to the lower classes, 
however, effectively conceals the fact that his material wealth is underpinned by 
the same principles that support Jack, which again are those of the Blue School. 
When discussing the externalities of the Blue School, Galtung divides them into the 
positive and the negative (Peace 156).  These are categorised into six spaces, which 
are nature, human, social, world, time, and culture.  The positive are pathways to 
peace while the negative lead to violence.  Reading the side effects of the Blue 
School in terms of the construction of the Self and Other in Titanic reveals a sharp 
division between the two.  Specifically, the Self and Other in the film do not 
represent separate economic schools, as the United States and Soviet Union did.  
Instead they are the positive and negative aspects of the Blue School respectively, 
as shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 - The Blue School in terms of Self and Other (adapted from Galtung Peace 
160) 
 
In that diagram, the Self is clearly aligned with the positive aspects, such as Identity 
and Idealism, the latter being a key element of the American dream.  What is more, 
all of these qualities would be associated with peace building rather than violence.  
As for violence, as the chart shows, it is associated entirely with the Other as 
concepts such as Alienation and Degradation are the tactics used by the upper class 
against the steerage passengers in the film.  It is worth noting, though, that the 
positive and negative qualities of the Blue School economy exhibited in the film are 
not located in a single sphere, with the film representing all, including Nature to 
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some degree.  The result is that the Self in the film is an idealised version of the 
Blue School.  Since the Self is so firmly identified with the American Dream, that too 
becomes idealised; the steerage passengers are seemingly guaranteed to have 
wonderful lives when they reach America despite the scheming of the elite Other.  
The point is that the intentionally skewed nature of the Self produces a mythic 
version of the American dream, a sanitisation that is itself a form of violence. 
It is useful here to draw again on the work of Roland Barthes on myth.  In defining 
myth, Barthes observes that it is “a kind of ideal servant: it prepares all things, 
brings them, lays them out, the master arrives, it silently disappears: all that is left 
for one to do is to enjoy this beautiful object without wondering where it comes 
from” (151).  What Titanic presents is an entirely decontextualised version of the 
American dream where seemingly anything is possible.  For instance, at the end of 
the film after Rose arrives in the United States, she effectively denounces her 
heritage and is left with nothing, yet as the contemporary sequences in the film 
show, she has lived a life full of everything she had ever hoped to have, save for 
Jack of course.  The contention is that the United States welcomed all immigrants 
equally and did not discriminate against anybody.  If somebody wanted to have 
something and was willing to work to achieve it, then nothing would stand in his or 
her way.  What this mythic version of America effectively elides are the numerous 
structures of violence present in American culture that would have prevented such 
dreams from becoming reality such as sexism and racism.  Without that historical 
context, though, the structures of violence become elided, and what remains are 
the positive elements only.  Thus, while Titanic does concern itself with class-based 
structural violence, it does so only at the most superficial level; there is no active 
development of the underlying causes of inequity, namely the violence associated 
with the practices of the Blue School.  Instead what the film explores is how the 
different classes view issues such as gender.  This makes sense since hooks not only 
observes that class, race and gender are related elements, but argues that both 
race and gender are frequently used “as screens to deflect attention away from the 
harsh realities class politics exposes” (7).  Accordingly, the film mobilises gender as 
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a way of deflecting attention away from the deeper issues of class-based structural 
violence.  
For the upper class, the movie posits, women are expected to behave in a very 
specific way, abiding by the patriarchal rules of the culture; Molly Brown is not 
accepted since she challenges this in many ways.  The lower class, however, shows 
that women are able to drink and carouse along with the men.  Additionally, the 
women in steerage, as is evident in the repeated shots throughout the film of an 
Irish mother (Jenette Goldstein) trying to save her children, have a much closer 
relationship with their children.  This becomes all the more evident when 
contrasted with the corset scene where it is binding rather than protection that 
links mother and child.  Of course the corset also suggests the additional layer of 
direct violence—the bodily confinement—that accompanies the gender-based 
structural violence of the film.  The point, though, is that the film does not treat 
sexism as a form of violence found in both Edwardian and American culture, but 
instead is one relegated to the characters that support the old ways rather than the 
new.  This elision implies that such violence is absent from the United States.    Of 
course the US it refers to is a dehistoricised, mythic one.  Returning to the 
externalities of the Blue School, then, the mythic America permits well-being, 
challenge, and identity while the enemy of that myth seeks to institute misery, 
monotony, and alienation.  Interestingly, this view is reinforced in the film in the 
way it critiques the lack of reverence paid to the Titanic by professional scavengers 
in the contemporary framing sequences, particularly the character of Brock Lovett 
(Bill Paxton). 
When Lovett is first encountered, he is delivering a speech about the emotional 
power of Titanic.  His words are immediately revealed to be an act, though, as he is 
simply searching for wealth, again a sign of Blue School materialism.  What is worth 
noting, however, is that Lovett is characterised by a very overt sense of 
stereotypical masculinity.  He smoke cigars, curses, and is above all determined to 
succeed.  Contrasted with the more effeminate masculinity of the primary hero, 
Jack, which Lubin discusses repeatedly in his book on the film, the film does seem 
to mount a challenge towards traditional male gender roles as well.  That having 
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been said, the film also reinforces the concept of the heroic death of the man, a 
subtle condoning of the privileges accorded to masculinity.  Thus, despite the fact 
that the film suggests the need for a different type of masculinity, and even for a 
change in traditional gender roles, it ultimately presents Rose, and all the women, 
as existing in a world dominated by patriarchal authority, something reinforced by 
the final shot of the film.  In that shot, Rose returns to Titanic—in a dream or in 
death, it is unclear—and is reunited not only with Jack, but with all of the structural 
violence between the Self and the Other, as represented by the dead passengers of 
the ship perpetually bound to their identities aboard the Edwardian ship.  Given the 
high level of gender-based violence and following from hooks, it is important also to 
consider, then, how the articulation of Self and Other here inform ethnicity-based 
violence. 
Shining in the Boiler Room: Whiteness on Titanic 
According to the myth of the American Dream, anybody in the United States can 
rise beyond their beginnings if they possess ability.  This, of course, presents a 
severely restricted view of the United States.  What is more, it highlights the 
positive externalities of the Blue School, such as diversity and well-being, while 
concealing the negative.  One way this elision occurs in the film is through the 
depiction of race.  At first, the film appears to deal with race only by omission.  
While there were non-white passengers on the Titanic who are briefly seen in the 
film—a Chinese passenger, for instance, is visible as Jack makes his way to his 
cabin—the film does not focus on them.  This lack of focus is problematic in and of 
itself, but the bigger issue in the film is its depiction of whiteness.  Specifically, the 
absence of racial diversity is compensated for by a repositioning of race-based 
discourses along a spectrum of whiteness.11 
Both Sean Redmond and K.J. Donnelly situate the ethnic discourses in the film 
around the Irish passengers on the ship.  Redmond, for instance, notes that among 
the ways Jack is marked as an “Other” is his identification as a bohemian as well as 
                                                             
11 For a more developed discussion of the development of a spectrum of whiteness, particularly as it 
relates to physical appearance of women, see Gilman 221, for his discussion of the painting The 
Babylonian Marriage Market by Edwin Long, as well as Chapter Three. 
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his association with the Irish (200-201).  This is an observation which situates the 
“dark” Irish on one end of the spectrum in opposition to the hyper-white upper 
class.  Donnelly makes a similar assertion, writing that “Titanic’s ‘Irishness’ works as 
a signifier of difference” (212).  In short, structures of violence which might 
normally revolve around different skin colours are instead mapped onto different 
ethnicities of characters that could in other contexts be viewed as being a 
homogeneous group.  The processes of othering both Redmond and Donnelly 
discuss clearly mark Jack, and more so the steerage passengers, as ethnically 
different, especially with regard to Cal and the upper class. Following from the 
discussion above, then, the Self of the film is associated with the less pure whites in 
the film.  However, it is very important to emphasise that this association does not 
mean they are identified as belonging to the same area of the spectrum of 
whiteness.  To understand this connection, it is useful to consider Rose. 
Rose is the ideological anchor of the film.  She is the narrator for much of the film, 
and what the audience sees is almost entirely through her eyes.  As discussed, 
when first seen she is old, but living a seemingly happy life.  When she begins her 
story of Titanic she is wealthy and pristinely white.  As the narrative progresses, she 
begins to associate with those at the other end of the spectrum of whiteness, but 
she herself remains pure in her own whiteness, the embodiment of idealised 
female whiteness.  This is most apparent in the sequence where Rose and Jack run 
through the engine room.  Earlier in the film the coal shovelers on the ship were 
juxtaposed with the bridge of the ship—the working poor versus the working 
elite—and the filth of the coal room, bathed in blackness, was shown in opposition 
to the brightness of the bridge.  When Rose enters the coal room, at a narrative 
level she is able to completely transgress the boundaries of the ship suggesting she 
belongs there, but at the visual level her luminous white gown is contrasted with 
the blackness of the room.  Similarly when she arrives in port at the end of the film, 
her whiteness is emphasised by the lights on her face in a way that resembles the 
use of lighting Richard Dyer argues is key to the construction of whiteness in 
women.  He writes that, “Idealised white women are bathed in and permeated by 
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light.  It streams through them and falls on to them from above.  In short, they 
glow” (122), and indeed Rose does “glow” in this scene, as shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6 - The white Rose embarking on the American Dream in Titanic 
 
Given the fact that the film presents Rose as a figure who is aligned with the impure 
end of the whiteness spectrum, her continual framing as idealised whiteness 
reveals that to be an appropriation of the Other, and not a true identification with 
it.  Thus despite dancing with the Irish, and choosing to stay behind with the poor 
steerage passengers, Rose remains the paragon of white beauty.  Nonetheless, the 
film uses Rose to suggest that race-based structures of violence are not present in 
the United States.  This is clearest in the sequence which shows that even though 
Rose arrived in the United States poor and alone, she was able to realise her own 
American Dream as seen in the presentation of multiple photographs showing her 
living an unbridled life.  In other words, by grafting racial Otherness onto a white 
female character and having the character succeed, the film suggests that there is 
no gender- or ethnicity-based structural violence.  Of course by effacing this 
structural violence, the film ultimately reinforces the very violence it suggests is 
absent.  Yet while structural violence informs direct violence, it is only the overt 
representations of structures of violence, specifically gender and class, which 
inform the direct violence of the film. 
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Death on the Decks: Direct Violence in Titanic 
Titanic is a film filled with death.  Over 1500 passengers died when the ship sank 
and the film attempts to show them all including the conditions which caused them.  
While there are some wealthy passengers who die, Thomas Andrews (Victor 
Gerber), the shipbuilder being one of them, the direct violence of the film largely 
targets the lower classes.  Due to the construction of the Self and the Other, this 
means that direct violence is primarily directed against the Self.  This is clearest in 
the containment procedures enacted by the crew during the sinking which 
privileged the wealthy over the poor. 
When the ship is sinking, the steerage passengers, including Jack and Rose, are 
locked below deck.  The film shows them begging to be freed, but the crew refuses.  
In terms of structural violence, this would be an instance of the Other restricting 
the needs of the Self, particularly those relating to what Galtung terms identity, 
well-being, and freedom (Cultural 292).  While the marginalisation and 
segmentation of the steerage passengers was clear before the ship began to sink, 
the fact that it does sink elevates the structural violence to direct violence as 
survival is at stake.  By keeping the steerage passengers locked below decks, the 
crew are essentially sentencing them to death.  Faced with such a dire situation, the 
steerage passengers resort to physical violence.  In this way, the film condemns the 
violence committed against the Self, but condones the violence committed against 
the Other.  This is made even clearer in a scene later in the film where First Officer 
William Murdoch (Ewan Stewart) fires a gun at a poor passenger attempting to get 
onto a lifeboat.  The passenger dies almost immediately and Murdoch, realising 
what he has done, shoots himself in the head.  In short, the First Officer is a working 
class person.  Being a First Officer on Titanic, however, aligns him with an 
Edwardian system that privileges the wealthy over the poor, or in this case, the 
greed over humanity.  Accordingly, realising that he has aligned himself with an 
inhuman system, Murdoch “resigns” by killing himself as his crime of disregarding 
the Self cannot be atoned.  The sanctioned and condemned direct violence, then, 
raises two points.  The first is that if the Self is sufficiently imperilled by an Other, 
then direct violence is legitimised.  The second is the notion that when such 
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retaliatory violence is coupled with the violence of the Other, the result will be the 
manifestation of self-destroying direct violence.  This point is reiterated later in the 
film when the fate of Cal is revealed to be suicide after the Wall Street crash in 
1929, but it is most forcefully underscored by the sinking of the ship itself. 
At one level, the ship is an inanimate object and the disaster of the film, though the 
result of human labour, is essentially natural.  However, since the ship itself is a 
microcosm of the Edwardian Era and its attending structures of violence, the 
sinking of the ship and the mass death of the Self can be read much the same as the 
violence above, which is to say as structural violence becoming direct violence.  
Accordingly, the deaths that punctuate the last act of the film can be read as 
murders.  This reading is echoed in the direct violence perpetrated against Jack and 
Rose.  Specifically, once the ship begins to sink, both Cal and Lovejoy target Jack 
with direct violence and, eventually, Rose as well.  Initially this is in the form of 
physical restraint where Jack is handcuffed below deck, and, interestingly, Rose 
must deploy direct violence in the form of a fire axe to free him.  Ultimately, 
however, both Cal and Lovejoy pursue Jack and Rose with a firearm.  At that point 
in the film, the violence deployed against Jack and Rose is less a question of 
suppressing the underclass and more a matter of vengeance for deposing, as it 
were, the upper class.  Thus when the ship finally sinks, the wealthy passengers 
have largely been preserved, save for those who the film deems “noble,” Andrews 
again being one, while the poor are dealt a final blow of direct violence from the 
Edwardian Era, being cast into the frigid waters.  This violence is given a personal 
edge and tied directly to the feature Self of the film by focusing on Jack and Rose in 
the water.  Since Jack embodies the American Dream, his death at the end of the 
film suggests that the Edwardian Era, or more broadly, an Other, is assaulting that 
dream.  That the dream survives this devastating assault in the icy waters of the 
North Atlantic ultimately shows it is a dream of resiliency as much as it is a dream of 
success, and indeed this privileging of American myth is exactly what the post-9/11 
United States used to define itself. 
 “The Ship of Dreams”: Titanic and the response to 9/11 
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Throughout the 1990s, American identity waned and a post-Cold War identity crisis 
ensued.  As discussed above, one of the potential themes which resonated for the 
audience of Titanic was the redefinition of American identity through the 
revitalisation of the American Dream.  In so doing it emphasised the positive 
aspects of the dream, such as social equity and a merit-based society, elements 
which ostensibly advocate for a structural peace.  The negative elements, including 
wealth disparity and discrimination, issues which similar to those Kaplan argues 
fuelled the increasing fragmentation of the United States in the 1990s, thus became 
associated with the Other (76).  In a similar fashion, even before the attacks on 
September 11, 2001, Bush cultivated a political persona that situated him as a man 
of the people.  This is clearest in his continued reinforcement of his cowboy image, 
one that can be directly traced to the very same persona Jeffords identifies with 
Ronald Reagan while he was president.  For Reagan, Jeffords observes that this was 
that of a macho man “chopping wood at his ranch, riding horses, *and+ standing tall 
at the presidential podium” (25).  However, Erik Baard of The Village Voice 
observes, the cowboy Bush is quite far from the actual “cowboy code” (n. pag.).  His 
comparison between Bush and the mythic image of the cowboy goes a long way in 
debunking the notion that Bush is a true cowboy, but it does not address the 
deeper issue, which is that the reality of the situation is not what is of primary 
importance (n. pag.).  Just as Titanic presented an image of America which elided 
historical and contemporary fact with regard to the violence in the United States, so 
too did the presentation of Bush as a resilient cowboy.  This image, however, was 
not a passive construction; it actively informed the policies of the Bush 
administration, specifically the Bush Doctrine.   
The key tenet of the Bush Doctrine, as defined by Charles Krauthammer, is that the 
United States is the sole super-power in the world and it is deserving of the title and 
willing to act accordingly (n. pag.).  While a more detailed analysis of the Bush 
Doctrine will be conducted in Chapter Seven, the salient point here is that, as 
Walter Lafeber notes, the doctrine drew heavily on the notion of American 
Exceptionalism (558).  Lafeber specifically refers to the speech Bush delivered on 
September 20, 2001, where he asked other nations to “join us” (553).  Lafeber 
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argues that the particular wording of this speech resulted not in an open dialogue 
with allies, but in an indication “that U.S. strategies were not open for debate” 
(553), something that would later define the unilateralism of the Bush Doctrine.  
Further, Lafeber contends that the foreign policy deployed by the Bush 
Administration amid uniform public support was not one that really was contingent 
upon approval from anybody (554).  In other words, by creating the image of Bush 
as a man having risen from the people of the United States, the fact that he had no 
connection to the people of the United States became less important because his 
status seemed to reflect the support of the people.  This positioning was bolstered 
by the fact that the cowboy president image Bush cultivated accentuated the 
positive aspects of the United States—those embodied in the American Dream. This 
was particularly the case given the fact that, despite his privileged upbringing in the 
northeast United States which ultimately saw him attending Yale University, Bush 
affected an image of a man who had adopted the principles of the American Dream 
as his own.  It was as if he had renounced his name to become a lowly Texas 
rancher who had then risen to become governor of Texas and the president of the 
United States.  This idea of Bush as a self-made man despite his family connections 
holds clear parallels with Rose in Titanic, but it also resonates with the myth of the 
United States as a classless society.  Even so, in the pre-9/11 period this image was 
criticised by some such as USA Today writer Laurence McQuillan, as it gave “the 
impression that he’s not in charge” (n. pag.).  What is more, it made it seem as if 
Bush was inattentive toward the domestic issues which fuelled the US identity 
crisis.  What his persona was missing, however, was an Other.  In the period after 
the events of 9/11, with terrorists shaped as the new Other, that same persona was 
lauded.  This was because the response to 9/11 escalated the concerns surrounding 
the survival of the United States to such a level that it ultimately managed to have 
myths attached to nation elide the fragmented America of the 1990s.   To better 
understand how this relates to Titanic, it is useful to return to the notion proposed 
by Baudrillard that the disaster films of the 1990s were an instance of “wishing” 
9/11 and the end of an American empire (5). 
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As Baudrillard argues, the popularity of the 1990s disaster films articulated a desire 
on the part of the audience to see the United States fall.  Specifically, he claims, 
they make evident “the impulse to reject any system growing all the stronger as it 
approaches perfection or omnipotence” (7).  Titanic, though, equates “perfection 
or omnipotence” with Edwardian England, the Other, thus positioning the US Self as 
the location of resistance against such power.  In fact, in the reading Baudrillard 
conducts of the destruction of the World Trade Center buildings, he observes that 
“When the two towers collapsed, you had the impression that they were 
responding to the suicide of the suicide-planes with their own suicides” (7), it 
recalls the sinking of the ship itself, suicidally sinking into the ocean as if it was 
aware of its own violence against humanity.  However, as the above analysis of the 
violence in the film shows, the resistant US Self is one that conceals the fact that it 
ultimately supports structures of violence which create inequities similar to those 
that are used as rationale behind the vilification of the Other.  This does not suggest 
that the United States of the film is nearing “perfection or omnipotence,” though, 
since Titanic asserts the resiliency of the United States, particularly in its ideals.  
Thus when Bush argued for a retaliation against the terrorist attacks, he utilised 
rhetoric which fore-grounded the ways in which the United States was a 
structurally peaceful nation.  For that argumentation to work, though, the 
contemporary history of the United States could not be considered.  Accordingly, 
the policies of the United States in the Middle East in the twentieth century could 
not be fully taken into account.  Those that did, such as Chalmers Johnson, argued 
that the attacks on 9/11 were the result of “blowback,” essentially response to the 
US foreign policy (vii-xvii).  Read that way, it is the Other and not the US Self which 
is the victim.  As with Titanic, then, rather than revealing the structures of violence 
(both domestic and foreign) which permeated the fabric of the nation, the rhetoric 
of the Bush administration effectively highlighted the mythic structural peace of the 
United States—namely the Four Freedoms.  Accordingly, the dream of Titanic, 
where the anxieties that plagued a fragmented US Self could be assuaged by a 
return to a mythical period of hope, was realised by the response to the attacks of 
9/11.  What is more, the underside of that dream was brought to fruition as well, 
where the status quo and its attending structures of violence are not just 
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preserved, but externalised onto an Other, against whom the deployment of direct 
violence became legitimate.  Titanic dreamed of a resolution to the post-Cold War 
identity crisis that faced the United States, one which revived a mythic America 
without having to address any of the causes of the strife, and the response to 9/11 
carried out by the Bush administration realised that dream.  
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Chapter Three 
Fighting the Good War Again:  
Saving Private Ryan (1998) 
 
In 1998, the identity crisis the United States faced in the wake of the Cold War 
intensified.  It was in that year that President Bill Clinton was embroiled in a sex 
scandal for which he was impeached.  Although approval ratings for Clinton 
remained high throughout the scandal, the ordeal underscored the fact that the 
nation was no longer defining its national Self against an external Other, but was 
instead focusing on internal disputes.  This fragmentation was precisely what 
Robert Kaplan had predicted would happen as the nation drifted further away from 
the identity it had during the Cold War (76).  This search for identity was 
exacerbated by anxieties surrounding the approaching millennium as well, with 
apocalyptic fears mounting.  The future offered people no certainty.  It is 
unsurprising, then, that many looked toward the past for hope.  While this connects 
with the idea of nostalgia articulated by Fredric Jameson (“Postmodernism” 18), 
which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five, it is more useful here to 
examine the precise way in which World War II reappeared in popular US culture at 
the end of the twentieth century. 
The late-1990s in the United States marked a period of renewed interest in both 
World War II and its veterans.  Guy Westwell notes that this “renewal” can be seen 
across media, particularly in the publishing industry which had a major success in 
1997 with Citizen Soldiers: The U.S. Army from the Normandy Beaches to the Bulge 
to the Surrender of Germany, June 7, 1944 - May 7, 1945 by Stephen Ambrose (84-
86, 98-99).  The book focused on the struggles of individual GIs rather than on the 
broad trends of the war.  The result was a reframing of the conflict that worked to 
highlight the ways in which individual contributions were made by soldiers out of a 
sense of duty to the nation regardless of the walk of life from which they came.  In 
1998, the wave of interest in World War II crested with the release of Saving Private 
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Ryan which drew heavily on this newer image of the citizen duty-bound to the 
national Self, and reluctantly, but ably, deploying direct violence in the war effort. 
The film earned over 216 million USD domestically, making it the highest grossing 
film of 1998.  As with most blockbusters, though, despite a veneer of novelty, the 
film did not greatly diverge from its cinematic forebears. 
Jeanine Basinger asserts that Saving Private Ryan is a very generic combat film, 
which has much in common with other war films such as Beach Red and The Sands 
of Iwo Jima (“Translating” n. pag.).12  However, she also claims that arguments 
which suggest the film has a “new and different purpose” when compared to 
previous war films merit further attention.  She specifically writes that this is 
because Saving Private Ryan, like other combat films throughout cinematic history, 
is a response to the historical conditions of its time.  Going further, Basinger then 
poses the question, “What has reactivated the combat genre?” (“Translating” n. 
pag.)  She offers a variety of explanations including anxieties surrounding the 
millennium, but she does not commit to a single theory.  Instead, she sums up the 
historical importance of the film for contemporary audiences, writing: 
“Spielberg's true accomplishment is that he has used familiar genre 
elements for a new purpose, putting them together in a brilliantly 
visualized movie that causes Americans to take the war seriously 
again” (“Translating” n. pag.). 
It is my contention that the combat genre is “reactivated” by Saving Private Ryan as 
a way to address the post-Cold War identity crisis, specifically the concerns brought 
about by domestic anxieties surrounding the fragmentation of the US Self as well as 
the approaching millennium.  Accordingly, my analysis in this chapter will show the 
ways in which the film articulates Self based upon traditional forms of masculinity 
while at the same time incorporates multiple structures of violence.  I will begin by 
looking at the identity of the United States in the post-Cold War period, specifically 
the way in which the concepts of nationalism and “victory culture,” articulated by 
Johan Galtung (“Cultural”) and Tom Engelhardt respectively, no longer formed the 
                                                             
12
 For more examples supporting these points, see Basinger “Translating.”  
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foundation of the US Self, as they had during previous historical periods.  I will then 
discuss how Saving Private Ryan mobilises both concepts to construct a Self that is 
predicated upon patriotism.  Drawing on the work of Roland Barthes, however, I 
suggest that the Self the film presents is based upon a mythic version of the United 
States, and, by decontextualising the conflict of World War II, effectively 
incorporates multiple forms of structural violence including racism and sexism.  As 
my analysis will show, the racism was necessary for the elevation of the Self and 
ultimately in positioning it against the Other.  I will also show how these concepts 
are reinforced by the deployment of direct violence and technology in the film.  I 
will connect that analysis to the response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, 
showing the ways in which the Bush administration brought into being the Self that 
the film dreamed of, including its attending violence.  Lastly I will show how the 
Bush administration attempted to present a unified national Self which seemed to 
address the pre-9/11 anxieties surrounding the structural violence in the United 
States, but, in fact, did not. 
Nation Without Other: The Post-Cold War US 
The end of the Cold War dealt a major blow to the national psyche of the United 
States.  Engelhardt describes the reaction to the collapse of the Soviet Union as one 
of “befuddlement and paralysis” (x).  This can be explained by the fact that during 
the Cold War the United States relied heavily upon the rhetoric of nationalism 
which is predicated upon a Self/Other binary.  As argued previously, with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union there was no longer an Other against which to define 
the national Self.  Although the US engaged in multiple military interventions 
throughout the 1990s, they existed outside the framework of a Self-Other binary; 
the United States was the sole super-power and there were no suitable opponents 
to frame as Other.  Without an Other, nationalism as an ideology cannot function. 
Johan Galtung describes nationalism as ideologically informed cultural violence 
which is “rooted in the figure of the Chosen People and justified through religion or 
ideology” (“Cultural” 298).  There are often religious overtones in the definition of 
the United States as a nation of Chosen People—the notion of the United States as 
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the “City upon a Hill” is a prime example—but nationalism in the United States is 
also often predicated on the ideology of a more secular version of American 
Exceptionalism.13  During the Cold War, this often factored into the self promotion 
of the United States as it served as a perfect point of contrast with the Soviet Union 
whose citizens were easily framed as the Unchosen People due to their dramatically 
different ideology.  Jim A. Kuypers observes that the “Cold War metanarrative 
permeated every aspect of U.S. foreign policy decisions” and “involved the general 
American cultural perception of the Soviets as bad or evil, as opposed to the United 
States, which was identified with being good or moral” (emphasis in original) (2).  
Kuypers grounds these statements in the work of Robert L. Ivie, who argues that 
the enemies of the United States are traditionally vilified through the use of 
“images of savagery,” and shows how Lyndon Johnson positioned the Vietnam War 
as one of defence against “‘forces of violence’” rather than as an aggressive 
manoeuvre by the United States (279).  This meshes well with the idea of “victory 
culture” put forth by Engelhardt in Chapter One, as the direct violence of the United 
States remains reactive.  Thus, the Cold War fostered a domestic sense of 
nationalism wherein the civilised United States was defined in opposition to savage 
Soviet Russia.  Galtung warns, though, that when nationalism is combined with 
“steep Self-Other gradients, and statism with the right, even the duty to exercise 
ultimate power” (“Cultural” 299) the result is the “ideology of the nation-state” 
(“Cultural” 299).  While the diversity of the United States, ethnic and otherwise, 
throughout the Cold War shows that it was a country which existed as more than a 
nation-state, as Galtung defines it here, events such as the Second Red Scare and 
the Civil Rights struggle demonstrate that the United States does have a history that 
often intersects with the “steep Self-Other gradients” to which Galtung refers, 
perhaps indicative of a desire for the uniformity of the culture of a nation-state. 
Without the Soviet Union the Self-Other relationship broke down in the 1990s as 
there was no suitable external Other for the United States to position itself against.  
The United States was the sole superpower, a fact that Engelhardt suggests led to a 
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state of confusion (x).  Basinger observes that some films, such as Starship Troopers 
(1997), made use of alien villains to fill the gap of the Other, but Saving Private 
Ryan responded to the post-Cold War anxieties more directly with the resurrection 
of a human villain in the form of the Nazis (“Translating” n. pag.).  During the Cold 
War, the on-screen Soviets served as a consistent external entity, a cinematic 
bogeyman as it were; they were the de facto Other.  No matter what the US Self 
did, the Soviet Other opposed it.  However, the collapse of the Soviet Union 
diminished their screen villain status as they were revealed to be virtual hollow 
men.  What made the Nazis a successful replacement Other was largely the 
memory of the Holocaust.  Accordingly, the historical relationship between the 
Nazis and the United States allowed them to easily fill the gap left by the collapse of 
the Soviet Union in the nationalist ideology of the United States.  At the same time, 
however, it permitted a return to a time before both the Vietnam War and the 
atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, events which Engelhardt claims led to 
the American disillusionment with warfare and the end of what he refers to as 
“victory culture” (3-15).  This transition is represented in Figure 7 where the 
contrast between the time of production and the time of the story itself are shown, 
with the narrative being located before the atomic bombing of Japan.  This, of 
course, refers to the World War II sequences of the film since the film is essentially 
an extended flashback sequence, which will be discussed below. 
 
Figure 7 - Production and setting of Saving Private Ryan in relation to Victory 
Culture 
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Again, Engelhardt (4-5) views victory culture as part of an all-encompassing 
narrative that validated the military adventurism of the United States by having the 
goal—a mythically ideal nation—justify the means—violence of all types.  In short, 
the history of the United States was continually sanitised to present it as a nation 
working to achieve a structural peace that would live up to the founding ideal of 
equality.  This sanitisation was made manifest in the fact that, as Engelhardt 
suggests (4-5), the violence that did erupt was framed as an incursion against the 
US rather than the US acting as an instigator.14  Even a cursory examination of US 
history reveals ideological initiatives such as Manifest Destiny which show that 
military interventions were not “reactive,” but actually were, as Engelhardt claims, 
“organized and invasive campaigns” (4).  However, the attempt to legitimise those 
campaigns rhetorically suggests the presence of both cultural and structural 
violence which ultimately legitimises the direct violence of the interventions.  This is 
also the case for World War II.  The historical memory of US involvement in the war 
often suggests the United States acted solely as a protector of the persecuted Jews, 
and it is with this version of history that Saving Private Ryan largely deals.  The 
result is that the film permits a return to an historical period of moral certainty 
where direct violence was ostensibly deployed to protect people and was therefore 
morally justified.  While that appropriation of the Holocaust is problematic, as will 
be explored below, the relevant point to the current discussion is that the return is 
a selective one. 
Commenting on the idea of memory that permeates Saving Private Ryan, John 
Bodnar remarks that “as Spielberg remembers, he also forgets” (806).  This is 
because, for Bodnar, the representation of history in the film has very little to do 
with the historical United States.  As he points out, the “Forties' calls to patriotic 
sacrifice were contingent on assurances of a more democratic society and world” 
(806), specifically citing the Four Freedoms, which were the list of four freedoms 
Franklin Roosevelt expounded upon in the 1941 State of the Union Address; the 
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freedoms were the freedom of speech and worship, and the freedom from want 
and fear.  For many, then, the war effort was very much about equality.  Bodnar 
also argues that the films made during that period, such as the Why We Fight 
series, articulated the war as a means of building a United States with “more social 
justice and individual freedom” (806).  Of course, implicit in these calls is the fact 
that the United States was not a harmonious entity and that domestic structures of 
violence fostered inequalities along many lines including ethnicity and gender.  Yet 
in Saving Private Ryan, there is no developed sense of domestic unease or tension.  
As will be discussed in more detail below, the men in the film do question the 
mission, but they do not question the Self of the United States.  This historical 
elision is a process of sanitation, something Galtung regards as a type of cultural 
violence (“Cultural” 299).  This is because, through omission, it conceals structures 
of violence, such as racism.  So when Spielberg defines the Self of the United States 
by way of forgetting, as Bodnar argues (806), it results in Saving Private Ryan losing 
the democratic consciousness that Bodnar sees as being a hallmark of the forties.  
The film, he writes, focuses on “the moral individual in heroism and in pain at the 
expense of the moral or democratic community” (807).  Thus, as Marouf Hasian Jr. 
contends, the film intentionally capitalised on nostalgia and sought to produce an 
“idealized past” (342) which replaced the moral ambiguity of modernity with clear 
cut morality from the past.  In other words, the violence of sanitisation is deployed 
to strip the conflict in Saving Private Ryan of its historical context which in turn 
informs the violence of nationalism and the post-Cold War Self.  What emerges 
from this process of decontextualisation is a United States Self which is not 
historical, but mythical. 
The Mythic Self of the United States: American History in Saving Private Ryan 
As discussed previously, Barthes sees myth as antithetical to history; for myth to 
function, it must remove the historical elements from an object (151).  So although 
Saving Private Ryan shows World War II in graphic detail, it does not focus on the 
historical context or implications of the war, simply on the broad binary of the war: 
the United States against the Nazis with the US as Self and the Nazis as Other.  This 
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binary is often placed within the context of direct violence.  While the Nazis are 
linked in the film to the Holocaust, even the Holocaust, to some extent, loses its 
historical meaning.  This is evident in the way that the film only indirectly 
references it, and relies on the audience to fill in the details.  For instance, in one 
scene the US soldier marked as Jewish, Private Mellish (Adam Goldberg) shouts 
“Juden” at German prisoners while holding up his Star of David necklace.  Since 
none of the characters explicitly mention the Holocaust in this scene, the film relies 
on the memory of the audience to make the link between the Jewish icon and the 
defeated Nazis.  In this way, Schindler’s List becomes an important companion piece 
to this film, helping to shape the memory of the Holocaust.  Yet by treating the 
Holocaust so indirectly, instead of as an historical event, it is reduced to its 
constituent violence—a steep Self-Other gradient that prompted the direct violence 
of attempted genocide.  The result is that the Holocaust is not an historical event in 
the film, but instead functions as a sign of ultimate evil and extreme direct 
violence—attempted genocide—which allows the Nazis to easily become the Other 
to not only the mythic United States but the contemporary United States as well. 
This historical displacement mythicises the Nazis and allows them to become viable 
as contemporary villains against whom the post-Cold War United States can define 
itself as a nation.  In short, the decontextualised Saving Private Ryan allows the 
late-1990s United States to enter into a vicarious relationship with the mythic 
United States where there is a Self-Other relationship with the mythic Nazis.  The 
lack of any historical grounding to this relationship further evokes Barthes, 
particularly his argument that myth presents an object, but obfuscates the origins 
of the object, and indeed effaces the historical context entirely (151).  By deploying 
violence, direct and structural, against the pure evil of the mythic Nazis, the United 
States, though tarnished in reality as evidenced by the Vietnam Syndrome, is able 
to become mythic—what Barthes would refer to as a “beautiful object” (151)—and 
the violence of nationalism is able to function once again.  Of course this is 
predicated upon the notion that the United States is not “beautiful” to begin with, 
an assumption that the film reinforces at the outset. 
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Figure 8 - The opening and closing image of Saving Private Ryan 
 
The opening shot of the film features an American flag waving in the wind with the 
sun shining behind and through it, as shown in Figure 8.  This positioning of the sun 
behind the flag results in a faded image with desaturated colours.  The flag, of 
course, is a meaningful image in many ways.  As discussed earlier, Barthes saw 
veneration of the flag as a blanket approval of the represented nation and its 
policies (116).  Westwell, however, observes that in this shot “the weathered 
material and washed out cinematography suggest that the American flag post-
Vietnam is still a relatively problematic signifier” (89).  Thus, in the post-Cold War 
era, the flag of the United States can be read as sign of guilt rather than pride due 
to the fact that, as discussed above, American identity itself is still problematic in 
the post-Vietnam era.  A. Susan Owen reads the flag in a similar way, but also sees 
it as an attempt at recuperation, as the flag is one of many “previously disabled 
icons of national identity lost to the [Vietnam] syndrome (the flag, honorable 
military service, military history, war in the service of democracy)…*moved+ forward 
to diegetic and visual prominence in the story” (261).  The flag at the beginning of 
the film, then, enhances the mythic nature of the United States and reinforces the 
importance of the mythic binary the film depicts between the United States Self 
and the Other of Nazi Germany.  It is worth noting, here, that this image parallels 
the opening shot of Independence Day where the flag on the moon is shown to be 
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under threat by an alien menace.  Owen comments directly on the display of the 
flag in Saving Private Ryan, arguing that the film fulfils the function of a jeremiad 
“*offering+ viewing audiences a ‘way home’ to mythic America” (250). 
Read within the paradigm of a jeremiad, the film amounts to a direct critique of the 
millennial United States for failing to maintain the Self-Other binary that defined 
the World War II generation.  Interestingly, this generation has come to be known 
as “the greatest generation” in contemporary times, a term which originated in the 
book of the same name by Tom Brokaw.  That book served as a memorial to the 
disappearing generation that Brokaw described as “the greatest generation any 
society has ever produced” (xxx), and helps to further articulate the mythic past of 
the United States.  However, because that generation was slowly fading in the late-
90s, the film articulates a need to remember it.  As Owen puts it, through certain 
characters the film articulates a “fear of forgetting a unified national purpose, paid 
for in blood and absolved through noble outcome” (emphasis in original) (261).  The 
result is not just that the film functions as a jeremiad, but that it reemphasises the 
importance of nationalism.  Beyond the opening shot, the film, of course, does not 
directly engage with the nuances of the waning of nationalism in the United States 
such as the end of the Cold War and the array of domestic tensions in late-90s 
America.  Again the mythic nature of the film results in an elision of those elements 
since they would challenge the unified nature of the national Self.  As Owen argues, 
the film articulates its sense of unity by foregrounding icons of nationalism such as 
the flag (261).  The overwhelming success of the film shows that this recuperation 
of national icons and the structural violence they entail—primarily nationalism—
was something that many people desired.  This of course directly contradicts the 
arguments made by some, such as Kaplan, who claims that “the traditional symbols 
of American patriotism” (76) would wane in the 1990s, a sign of the increasing 
fragmentation of the United States.  Despite the fact that his prediction did not 
come to pass, the destruction of symbols of America is something which deserves 
closer scrutiny, especially given the continued assault on the US soldiers in the film.   
In a mirror of the opening, the last image of the film is of the same desaturated and 
weathered flag still waving in the wind.  Frank Tomasulo contends the bookending 
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of these shots “suggest that the United States is the alpha and omega, the be-all 
and end-all, of human civilization” (118).  The implicit message is that the United 
States, despite the horrors of war, remains; it has endured the violence, direct and 
structural and has emerged all the stronger for it.  This message is underscored in 
framing sequences of the film that show the aged Ryan (Harrison Young) visiting the 
Normandy graveyard with his family.  These sequences follow and precede the first 
and last shots of the flag respectively.  Juxtaposed in such a way with the flag, the 
family becomes the embodiment of the Chosen People and the Self as it is they 
who precede the violence of the film and remain after it as well.  They are the 
descendants of myth.  The absence of direct violence in these scenes contrasts 
greatly with the rest of the film as even when physical force is not explicitly on 
display in the World War II sequences, the scarred landscapes serve as a constant 
reminder of that violence.  The effect is that the framing sequences, particularly the 
final one, emphasise the peaceful time the Chosen now live in due to the sacrifices 
of direct violence made by the soldiers.  However, the veneer of direct and 
structural peace in these sequences conceals the fact that the identification of the 
Chosen People in the film relies upon distinct structures of violence. 
The White Man’s War: Ethnicity in Saving Private Ryan 
From the opening scene to the end of the film, Saving Private Ryan is a film which is 
bathed in whiteness.  The Ryan family members at the beginning of the film, for 
instance, are over-powering in their whiteness, a fact which is accentuated by the 
bright lighting of the scene.15  The uniform ethnicity on display at the start functions 
to identify the Self as white while the Other, absent here, must be non-white.  
However, since the Ryan family are essentially proxies of the United States—
underscored by the visual link between them and the mythic flag—their 
homogeneity is not brought into question.  The film does not suggest there is 
anything amiss with the lack of non-white ethnicities.  One reason for this might 
simply be that the filmmakers wanted to ensure that the image of the United States 
remained harmonious at the end of the film, but this would be problematic since 
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that harmony comes at the cost of collapsing the diverse United States into a single 
ethnic identity.  As Catherine Gunther Kodat argues, through these sequences, 
particularly when they transition from the World War II Ryan to the aged Ryan, the 
film “attempts to pass itself off as a ‘color-blind’ re-birth of a nation” (89).  Again, 
the absence of engagement with these issues despite their presence in the film 
amounts to an ethnicity-based structure of violence which causes the film to 
implicitly condone racism.  This is not isolated to the framing sequences either, as 
the entire film presents whiteness as the standard. 
As defined by Basinger, an integral element of the combat film genre is the group of 
men on a mission (The World 73-74).16  Basinger notes that “the group of men is a 
mixture of unrelated types, with varying ethnic and socioeconomic backgrounds” 
(The World 74).  Additionally, within this group “minority figures are always 
represented: black, Hispanic, Indian, and even Orientals” (The World 74).  By 
contrast, the group of men in Saving Private Ryan depicts none of the minorities 
listed by Basinger.  Instead, the group has an Italian-American soldier as well as a 
Jewish soldier.  While both of these ethnically marked soldiers add to the diversity 
of the squad, Private Mellish is as Peter Ehrenhaus notes, entirely assimilated and 
“embodies the ideals of American masculinity” (326), meaning that the ethnic 
diversity of the group does not compromise the larger identification of the soldiers 
with the United States as Self.  While the segregated nature of the United States 
army during World War II could historically explain the homogeneity of the group, 
as Gerald Early observes, the contributions made by African American soldiers, for 
instance, have already been depicted in films such as Red Ball Express (n. pag.).  
Thus it is a significant omission that Saving Private Ryan shows no non-white 
characters even outside of the core group of characters.  What is more, it is an 
omission which suggests the presence of structural violence through which 
whiteness becomes privileged by the absence of other ethnicities.  Yet even 
without that omission, a closer reading of the ethnicities of the soldiers shows that 
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the apparent homogeneity is nonexistent as there are marked differences between 
certain soldiers, particularly the ethnic and non-ethnic whites. 
In discussing the painting The Babylonian Marriage Market by Edwin Long, which 
depicts maidens being auctioned for marriage, Sander L. Gilman observes that the 
women are sold “in order of comeliness” (221), and that the painting translates this 
into a continuum of whiteness where the most attractive girl has the whitest 
appearance and features while the least bears “Negroid features” (221).  A similar 
continuum of whiteness can be seen in Saving Private Ryan, which positions the 
Italian-American, PFC Caparzo (Vin Diesel), and the Jewish Mellish in opposition to 
the purer whiteness of characters such as Captain Miller (Tom Hanks), and 
especially the all-American Private Ryan (Matt Damon).  This conclusion is 
supported by the fact that at the end of the main flashback, which is the last 
sequence seen dealing with World War II, the only characters who have survived 
are Ryan, PFC Reiben (Edward Burns), and Technician Fifth Grade Upham (Jeremy 
Davies), none of whom are ethnically marked in the film.  Interestingly, despite the 
fact that Ryan is an Irish name, a group which has traditionally been posited as less 
white, the film still presents the family as the pinnacle of whiteness.  The implied 
message is that even though the ethnically marked characters are white and 
presumably equal, it is they who must die to ensure the survival of the unmarked 
characters.  The massive display of direct violence that dominates the first act of 
the film, literally bathing the camera in blood, can be read as a winnowing, which 
ultimately purifies the US Self.   
In this way, the US Self of the film parallels that of the historic Nazis and their 
attempt at ethnic cleansing.  In the film, though, what makes the Nazis Other is that 
they threaten whiteness in addition to the non-white (or less white) US ethnicities.  
In that way, they hold a position in a spectrum of whiteness which has gone too far.  
They want to eliminate even Private Ryan.  By comparison, of course, the structures 
of violence that support the US Self and its own prejudice are diminished.  This is 
aided by the film itself since it operates on a central binary of nationalism that does 
not call into question or even recognise that structures of violence which privilege 
whiteness are present; this implicitly condones them.  As briefly noted above, there 
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are multiple points at which the leadership of the group is questioned, but at no 
time is this internal strife suggested to stem from ethnicity-based structural 
violence.  As a result, the Self is aligned with unmarked whiteness throughout the 
film.  Given the fact that the Nazis are the villains of the film, this creates logical and 
ideological contradictions. 
As mentioned above, one of the primary ways in which the Nazis are positioned as 
Other in the film is through their connection to the Holocaust.  Again this is not the 
historic Holocaust, but a mythic version.  Thus the agenda of genocide is reduced to 
individual acts of direct violence which illustrate the fact that the Nazis have 
created such a steep Self-Other gradient that direct violence becomes a legitimate 
course of action for them to take against both the Jewish Other against which they 
define themselves and those who would attempt to stop them, namely the US Self.  
The multiple references throughout the film to the Holocaust, primarily situated 
around Private Mellish, reinforce this connection.  It is this desire for genocide due 
to an ethnicity-based structure of violence which makes the Nazis the villains of the 
film.  This structure of violence conflicts with the primary tenets of the United 
States, particularly the mythic United States, that “all men are created equal.”  
Thus, because the Nazis are attempting to restrict the freedom of the Jews through 
both structural and direct violence, direct violence against the Nazis is legitimised; 
the aggressor, the film suggests, must be stopped.  Yet even as the film exhibits 
contradictory positions on ethnicity, it also articulates further structures of 
violence, particularly in the ways it characterises male and female characters. 
The fact that Saving Private Ryan focuses almost solely on the male experience of 
fighting in World War II is enough to suggest a gender-based structure of violence 
exists in the film.  This extends beyond, however, the articulation of a traditional 
masculinity associated with mastery of direct violence.  It also encompasses the 
characterisation of female characters in the film as subservient to males.  This 
structural violence is primarily informed by the gender roles of the film as the 
women are either secretaries or wives and mothers.  In both instances they lack 
true agency in film.  For instance, one scene shows secretaries, all women, in an 
office typing up letters when one of them realises that three of the four Ryan 
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brothers have been killed in the beach landings on D-Day.  While this moment could 
elevate the female characters to a role of narrative significance, all they do in the 
film is bring the information to the attention of their male superiors in the office 
and then disappear from the film entirely.  This elides the historical fact that 
women were active in capacities beyond secretarial work during the war.  The film 
does not limit this violence to the past, however, as the framing sequences also 
reinforce gender roles by way of the most prominent female character in the film, 
Old Mrs. Ryan (Kathleen Byron).  
Hillary Harris observes that in these framing sequences, Mrs. Ryan is consistently 
positioned between the family and the father (194).  By positioning Mrs. Ryan in 
this way, she argues, “White Woman literally embodies both a meditation on and a 
mediation between the white patriarch and his life’s meanings, as those meanings 
are stored in the family he was apparently saved to reproduce” (194).  The linkage 
here between ethnicity and gender is unsurprising since, again following from bell 
hooks, they are “interlocking” elements (7).  These sequences in Saving Private 
Ryan, though, show that it is the role of the wife to validate the patriarchy.  This is 
clearest at the end of the film when the old Ryan speaks to the grave of Miller, 
saying that he hopes he has lived up to the final words of Miller, which were “Earn 
this…earn it.”  “This” and “it,” as suggested by these sequences, is leadership over a 
family, which is of course a proxy for the United States.  Thus, when the wife joins 
Ryan and he asks her to, “Tell me I’ve led a good life.  Tell me I’m a good man,” her 
immediate affirmation validates the position of white male over all others.  In 
essence, it condones both race- and gender-based structural violence.  As Harris 
argues, this scene makes it clear that  
“the individualized American white patriarch—as well as his 
reproduction—is the deserved beneficiary of the combined 
sacrifices of lives, materials, and nations as represented by the 
cemetery at Normandy” (195). 
Otherwise stated, these sequences identify the white male as the ideal American 
Self.  Yet these structures of violence do not yet inform the direct violence of the 
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film.  For instance, the fact that Mrs. Ryan is subservient to Old Ryan bolsters his 
position as Self, but it does not explain how the film legitimises the direct violence 
deployed by the US Self against the Nazi Other.  For that, it is necessary to look 
more closely at the relationship between the Self and Other. 
The Secondary Other: Positioning the Jewish People in Saving Private Ryan 
The conflict between the US Self and the Nazi Other is unusual, particularly in terms 
of the films already analysed, because this particular Self-Other relationship did not 
begin with the Other assaulting the Self.  While the film presents its first act as a 
scene of unbridled direct violence deployed by the Other against the Self, the 
memory of World War II suggests an earlier beginning, specifically when the Nazis 
attempted to exterminate the Jews.  For that attempted genocide to become 
legitimised in Nazi culture, ethnicity-based structural violence needed to reach such 
a point that the Jewish Other was regarded as inhuman by the Nazi Self.  The fact 
that Saving Private Ryan utilises similar ethnicity-based structures of violence to 
define its Self problematises the relationship between the US Self and the Jewish 
characters, both on and off screen, but that seemingly contradictory structure of 
violence is ultimately necessary in defining the Self-Other binary between the US 
Self and the Nazi Other in the film.  Accordingly, the lack of an initial conflict of 
direct violence between the Other and the Self necessitated a deeper motivation, 
which is provided for both parties by the Jewish Other.  This is because the assault 
on the Jewish Other by the Nazis is recontextualised within an American context as 
an assault against its principle tenets, namely “life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness.”  However, despite the fact that the United States in the film is implicitly 
fighting for the survival of the Jewish people, it is suggested that the Jewish people 
are unable to save themselves.  This is primarily seen in the figure of Private 
Mellish. 
Through the repeated and overt identification of Private Mellish as Jewish despite 
his previously noted “assimilation,” he becomes intimately linked with the 
Holocaust.  As Ehrenhaus remarks, “Mellish is the vehicle through which viewers 
can engage the Holocaust and participate in construction of its memory as an 
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American phenomenon” (emphasis in original) (325).  Ehrenhaus emphasises that 
the Holocaust of the film is not a crisis for Jewish people, but it is a crisis of 
involvement for the United States as evidenced by Mellish, particularly through his 
death (325).  When he is killed, it is by a Nazi who was previously a prisoner of the 
American soldiers.  The Nazi, nicknamed Steamboat Willie (Joerg Stadler), was 
released earlier in the film rather than executed.  The murder of Mellish by Willie 
occurs in a secluded building within the battlefield.  After a brief exchange of 
gunfire, the two become locked in a hand-to-hand struggle with a Hitler Youth knife 
introduced after the beach landing.  Willie ultimately positions himself on top of 
Mellish and quietly drives the knife into his chest; Mellish futilely resists the much 
stronger man.  In this moment the film seems to posit that the Jewish people were 
not strong enough to resist the Nazi Other.  At the same time, though, neither are 
they strong enough to survive the war so that they can be part of the mythic United 
States.  Of course while the murder transpires, Upham is next door, failing to 
intervene, and becoming an accomplice in the death of Mellish through is 
inaction.17   
Ehrenhaus and others have read this as an explicit re-enactment of the Holocaust 
with the Nazis privately and silently killing the Jewish Other while the United States 
passively allows it (325-328).  Critics have also read this scene in terms of its 
homoerotic undertones, suggesting a further structure of violence in the film, which 
is normative heterosexuality.  Regardless, at the end of the scene, Mellish is dead 
and Upham, who is demonstrably weaker than Mellish throughout the film, 
survives.  It is worth noting, however, that Upham, although cowardice prevents 
him from saving Mellish, redeems himself by killing Willie at the conclusion of the 
battle.  At that time, however, he also lets other Nazi soldiers go.  This act serves 
the double purpose of validating the humanity displayed in the earlier release of 
Willie—an important act in reinforcing the Self status of the United States—while at 
the same time underscoring the punishment accorded to those who were directly 
involved in the Holocaust versus those who were part of the war effort.  Since Willie 
                                                             
17
 For close reading of this scene in terms of the parallels with the Holocaust, see Ehrenhaus 326-
328. 
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killed Mellish, an act Ehrenhaus again sees as metaphoric involvement (325-328), 
he is killed while the other German soldiers are released.  However, the salient 
point of this discussion remains the fact that Upham ultimately survives while 
Mellish dies, a difference that suggests division between Mellish and Upham or, 
more broadly, the US Self and the Jewish Other.  
Mellish, who is a proxy for the Jewish people, has no control over his life.  He obeys 
all orders given to him by Captain Miller, and at the moment of his death he is 
entirely powerless.  He can either be saved by Upham or be killed by Willie, which is 
to say his life is in the hands of the United States Self and the Nazi Other.  His lack of 
agency reframes the conflict such that the apparently contradictory structures of 
violence which define the primary Self and the Other relationship, position the 
Jewish people as an Other to both the Nazis and the United States.  The heroes 
achieve their status because they can save somebody who is otherwise helpless, 
and the villains because they can kill somebody who cannot defend themselves.  
What both sides need is a mythic victim and it is the Jewish people that Saving 
Private Ryan puts in that role even as it aligns them with the United States.  This 
evokes the words used by Ehrenhaus when describing Mellish, whom he called “the 
mortally endangered Jew” (325).  The ethnicity-based structures of violence which 
condone racism by Othering the Jewish people are used by the film to legitimise 
violence against the Nazi Other.  Of course the Nazis are Others since they have 
already defined the Jewish people as Other.  What emerges is a denial of agency for 
the Jewish people through Self-Other relationships as depicted in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9 - The Self, Other, and Secondary Other of Saving Private Ryan 
 
Of course the assumption of the diagram, and indeed the film, is that the United 
States is defined as Self.  Without that assumption, any vertex of the triangle could 
be selected as Self to both of the others.  However with that assumption, the Nazis 
are both a Self in relation to the Jews and an Other in relation to the United States, 
while the United States is a Self in all regards leaving the Jews always to be Others.  
Thus while the United States is a double Self, the Jews are a double Other.  Another 
important aspect of this chart to note is that the enemy, the Nazis, are entirely 
external to the United States.  While it is true that some of the men question the 
mission, they do not do so in any way that identifies them as Nazis.  For instance, 
the most contentious moment between the US troops is when they argue about 
whether or not to execute Willie.  One side claims that he is a Nazi and should be 
killed while the other states that he is a human and should not.  The debate, then, is 
apparently between nationalism and peace, and at no point do the US soldiers 
discuss the matter in terms of ethnicity.  The result is that even in the moment of 
the greatest discord, the US soldiers remain distinct from the Nazis in terms of their 
regard for humanity despite their unacknowledged similarities.  This is an important 
102 
 
distinction since, as will be discussed in Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, the historical 
trajectory sees a shift toward an internal enemy in the post-9/11 period.  For now, 
though, the external enemy is important to note because it is vital in establishing 
another key aspect of the larger Self-Other binary, that of humanity. 
Mechanical Death: Technology and Direct Violence in Saving Private Ryan 
As mentioned earlier with the work of Ivie, one of the key approaches to defining 
enemies of the United States has been to cast them as savage (279), and that is 
exactly what Saving Private Ryan does.  This is particularly clear when the Nazi 
Other in the film is contrasted with the United States.  The US will deploy direct 
violence, but only to stop an aggressor.  The initial beach landing sequence does not 
establish its context, instead relying upon cultural memory of the mythic war 
wherein the United States responded to the aggressions of the Nazi Other.  Drawing 
on these same myths, the Nazis are shown to have no regard for human life.  Not 
only do they mercilessly kill the US soldiers at the beginning of the film, but they 
slowly kill all of the members of the group going to save Ryan.  What is more, as is 
seen in the death of Mellish, the Nazis practically enjoy killing.  This contrast is 
established in the first act during the beach landing.  The first shot of the soldiers in 
the sequence is a close up of the trembling hand of Captain Miller (Tom Hanks) as 
he shakily drinks from his canteen.  This involuntary gesture is a motif throughout 
the film, which serves as a constant reminder not only of his vulnerability as a 
human being, but of his humanity, and by extension that of the United States.  The 
shot then pulls back from a close up on Miller to reveal the other soldiers in the 
landing craft.  One, Sergeant Horvath (Tom Sizemore), is putting chewing tobacco in 
his mouth.  Two other soldiers, both nameless, vomit.  Miller and Horvath then 
discuss their landing strategies and a series of close ups on the faces of the soldiers 
with them conveys an array of human emotions—fear, dedication, resignation, 
panic, and faith.  These shots all clearly show the reluctance of the soldiers to 
participate in armed combat.  These are not the actions of men who love violence, 
the film suggests here.  These are men who resist direct violence.  The implication is 
that the Self of the film—the United States—is not an aggressor.  Similar to the 
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ideas Engelhardt (4-5) proposes regarding the “American war story,” the US is only 
reacting to violence, not initiating it, a position which strengthens the notion that 
the US and its soldiers depicted in the film are mythic.  This is underscored by the 
fact that their motivation is the protection of a secondary Other, the Jewish people.  
As already discussed, the motivations for American involvement in World War II 
were diverse and extensively connected to domestic politics, but the ultimate 
connection to the Holocaust elides those connections.  Again, as Ehrenhaus argues, 
the memory of the event is “Americanised” (328-332).  Importantly, this elision, 
structurally violent though it is, is never actively engaged with by the film.  The 
result is an unquestioned portrayal of the American soldiers as having the utmost 
regard for all human life.  This, of course, is contrasted with the Nazis who are 
almost always characterised as non-human entities, a positioning achieved largely 
through the representation of technology. 
The first shot of a Nazi soldier occurs just after the US soldiers arrive at Omaha 
Beach.  After seeing the US soldiers reduced to blood and flesh by machine gun fire, 
the perspective switches to the inside of one of the bunkers on the beach so that 
the perpetrators of the horrific direct violence are seen.  From this interior 
perspective, the beach is shown clearly, but because it is properly exposed, the 
bunker is reduced to murkiness. All that can be seen are dark silhouettes of soldiers 
firing machine guns at the small figures on the beach, as shown in Figure 10.  This 
alone is enough to establish the Nazis as villains since the gruesome deaths of the 
frightened US soldiers on the beach have already been shown, but the film does 
more to remove the humanity of the Nazis.  Specifically, the Nazi silhouettes 
themselves make it difficult to distinguish between the soldier and the weapon.  
Instead there is a unified image that is part human, but also part weapon.  
Tomasulo remarks on the style of these images, noting that it “preserves their 
anonymity, prevents any identification with their predicament, and leaves them 
faceless automatons, no more human than their weapons” (119).  The negative 
linkage between the Nazis and technology not only removes their humanity but 
enmeshes them with violence.  They have not taken up arms, but are weapons 
themselves.  The two cannot be separated.  The technophobic position here echoes 
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the ones articulated by Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner and Scott Bukatman in 
Chapter One, which see technology as a threat to the natural—and therefore 
“correct”—order, as well as a dehumanising threat respectively (Camera 245, 
Terminal 2-4).  Both of those theories can easily be applied to the technology of the 
Nazi Other in Saving Private Ryan.  While this might seem to be contradicted in the 
figure of Willie who initially appears as an unarmed soldier begging for his life, he 
returns for the final battle in Ramelle as the killer of both Mellish and Miller.  The 
first killing sees Willie using a knife.  That action is given additional ideological 
importance since Willie is revealed to be a member of the Nazi SS.  For the second 
killing, Willie uses a rifle.  Although he is still recognisable, these views of him 
during the battle serve to not only underscore his deceptive nature, but also his 
(not-yet-complete) reintegration into the technological matrix that drives the Nazis 
of the film. 
 
Figure 10 - The Nazi techno-human killing American soldiers in Saving Private Ryan 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapters, anxieties surrounding technology were 
becoming stronger with the approach of the millennium.  As the fervour 
surrounding the Y2K bug evidences, fears were largely situated around the idea of 
technology getting out of control and destroying humanity.  The integration of 
weapons technology with the Nazis manifests this fear quite clearly, particularly 
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given the fact that the US soldiers in the film are killed by this force en masse.  
While the US soldiers absolutely rely on technology, their use of it always shows 
either the technology mastered, but with reverence for its power, or unmastered 
such that its threat to humanity is clearly visible.  In both cases, the technology 
humanises those who utilise it.  For instance, Private Jackson (Barry Pepper), the 
sharpshooter for the main group of US soldiers, treats his gun like an extension of 
his body.  He rarely misses a shot yet is almost always shown reciting scripture 
while using the gun.  Thus his expertise is not associated with the technology itself, 
but with his faith, a subtle addition which adds further ideological implications to 
the notion of the Chosen People, fixing it in Christian ideology, something which the 
US response to 9/11 also did.  Apart from the constant threat of being killed by Nazi 
arms, the threat of technology is most visible in the final battle where the US 
strategy relies upon makeshift explosives called sticky bombs.  While the bombs 
eventually work to destroy their targets, they also function imperfectly with one 
prematurely detonating and annihilating the soldier holding it.  Interestingly, the 
bloody death is regarded by the film as a tragic sacrifice, but a heroic one 
nonetheless.  This further enmeshes masculinity with direct violence.  It is also 
worth noting that despite the military nature of the target, the soldier has 
essentially become a suicide bomber.  The salient point, however, remains that this 
depiction of technology reinforces the human binary which separates the United 
States—Self—from the Nazis—Other—in a way that makes the dangers of 
technology eminently clear.  In fact, this disdain for technology is even briefly 
glimpsed in the framing sequences when Ryan’s son (Rob Freeman) is given an 
admonishing look by the others for filming the return to the graveyard, an act 
which the other characters indicate cheapens the ritual.  Of course this contradicts 
the message of the film as the film itself functions, in the words of Michael 
Hammond, as “a celluloid memorial” (69).  Ultimately, then, the film establishes a 
Self-Other binary wherein the Self is defined by its display of humanity in the face of 
an inhuman Other.  In the film the representations of technology make the gradient 
between the two even steeper, but it is structural violence that ultimately brings 
the two into conflict. 
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A New Good War: Saving Private Ryan after 9/11 
In early 1998, stories began to be published about President Clinton having 
inappropriate sexual conduct with an intern.  By the end of the year, with the story 
confirmed, Clinton was impeached.  While acquitted of the perjury charges against 
him, the ordeal underscored the fact that the identity crisis the US faced was 
ongoing.  This was exacerbated by the fact that Clinton did not adhere to the 
traditional notions of noble masculinity espoused by President Ronald Reagan 
during his terms as president.  As Susan Jeffords observes of the “Reagan 
Revolution”:  
“It was a revolution whose success pivoted on the ability of Ronald 
Reagan and his administration to portray themselves successfully as 
distinctively masculine, not merely as men but as decisive, tough, 
aggressive, strong, and domineering men” (11).   
What Reagan, and Bush to a lesser extent, offered the nation was a father figure.  
As Jeffords notes, the election of Clinton was a sign of change, particularly in terms 
of masculinity (23).  She also notes that “the Clinton/Gore ticket negated any 
expectations for a presidential/vice-presidential father/son relationship by 
emphasizing their shared youthfulness” (90).  Even when running for office, then, 
Clinton diverged greatly from the Reagan model; he was not a father for the nation.  
While his approval ratings remained high during the impeachment, they seemed 
not to engender a sense of national Self.  In fact, they underscored the divisiveness 
of the process, with many perceiving the impeachment to be a political manoeuvre 
by Republican politicians.  In short, it revealed further fragmentation of the Self.  
This is certainly not to indicate that the nation was united under Reagan, as there 
was considerable dissent during his tenure.  Instead it is to suggest that what 
Reagan succeeded in doing was creating a national Self, driven by tenets of 
traditional masculinity, which was founded on diametric opposition to the Soviet 
Other.  It is of a return to not only this Self-Other relationship, but of its World War 
II progenitor that Saving Private Ryan dreams. 
107 
 
As noted in previous chapters, Baudrillard views the attacks of 9/11 not only of a 
worldwide wish for the “omnipotent” United States to be stopped before it reaches 
supreme power, but also as the suicidal wishes of the people living within the 
increasingly powerful United States made manifest (7).   While Baudrillard 
specifically makes this point in regard to the 1990s disaster films, his argument 
could be transposed to the bodies of the American soldiers, which are vigorously 
dispatched throughout the film, reduced to blood and pulp.  Yet even as the film 
shows the American body being destroyed, like the American spirit in Titanic, 
Saving Private Ryan shows that body persisting.  Most importantly, it is locked in a 
struggle against an evil Other which, unlike the previous two films analysed, is 
persecuting a secondary Other.  The United States had to intervene, the film 
suggests, so as to ensure that people the world over share the same liberties as 
citizens of the United States.  This position is what the film dreams and it is a dream 
which was realised by the response to 9/11 of the Bush administration, especially in 
the Bush Doctrine. 
Before 9/11, Charles Krauthammer identified three key principles of the Bush 
Doctrine.  For him, they were that the United States acts as enforcer of the peace, 
maintainer of the peace, and extender of the peace (n. pag.).  Otherwise stated, the 
United States, being the sole superpower, must act unilaterally to ensure that the 
world adheres to its concept of “peace,” which is one which privileges the United 
States exclusively, making it an explicit structure of violence.  However, the 
supposed benevolence of these actions served to distract from that underlying 
violence.  In addition, the foreign nature of the Other directed the attention of the 
nation away from the domestic spheres and the anxieties surrounding the 
structures of violence which were brought to the fore during the identity crisis of 
the 1990s.  Thus the dream articulated by Saving Private Ryan of a foreign conflict 
which seemingly made domestic conflicts irrelevant was brought to fruition.  
However, the dreamed Self of the film was riddled with structures of violence it 
sought to conceal.  In the same way, the post-9/11 national Self articulated by the 
Bush administration was plagued by structures of violence.  This can be seen in the 
rearticulation of Reagan-era masculinity that Bush affected.  For instance, in 2001 
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Bush remarked that he wanted Osama bin Laden “dead or alive” (“Guard” n. pag.), 
evoking the image of a lawman from a Western.  What is more, the Other was not 
limited to bin Laden, but was extended to include an “axis of evil” which included 
North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.  It was specifically the latter, Iraq, which provided the 
Self with a secondary Other.  This relationship was made clear on March 19th, 2003, 
when President Bush addressed the United States to inform its citizens that the 
United States was indeed pre-emptively invading Iraq.  In that speech he said that, 
“American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to 
disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger” 
(“President Bush’s” n. pag.).  In this statement the relationship seen in Saving 
Private Ryan between the United States, the Nazis, and the Jewish people is 
replicated between the US, Saddam loyalists, and the Iraqi people, as shown in 
Figure 11.  
 
Figure 11 - The Self, Other, and Secondary Other in the Iraq Invasion 
 
Thus, in framing their response to 9/11, the Bush administration positioned al-
Qaeda and subsequently Iraq as enemies which were equivalent to both the Nazis 
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and the Soviets.  Then it framed the military intervention as one designed to curtail 
the hostilities of this new Other against a secondary Other.  In that way, the United 
States aimed to become a noble Self again, one grounded in the dream of the 
resurrection of a mythic American tradition predicated on direct violence.  Of 
course, as discussed above, it was also one which was grounded in multiple 
structures of violence—sexism and racism—and indeed those structures of violence 
were present in the articulation of the post-9/11 Self.  This is clear in the fact that 
the secondary Other was identified as the Iraqi people, a non-white population, but 
also in the stories that emerged from the Iraq invasion itself such as the supposed 
rescue of Private Jessica Lynch.  In the end, the dreams and nightmares articulated 
by the violent construction of the Self and Other in Saving Private Ryan were 
realised by the Bush administration in its response to the attacks of September 11, 
2001. 
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Chapter Four 
Having Faith in Myth:  
Star Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace 
(1999) 
 
Near the beginning of the latter half of the twentieth century, there was a 
perceived move away from formal religious practices in the United States.  For 
instance, C. Kirk Hadaway et al suggest that church attendance dropped sharply 
during this period (742-743).  These findings are in keeping with trends identified by 
Caplow et al who observed that “many indicators of religious activity manifest 
decline in the late 1960s and early 1970s” (279).  However, this apparent religious 
crisis prompted a revival in the US which manifested itself with a push for more 
active participation in religion or, as Caplow et al note, “a reversal of the downward 
trend” (279).  This was evident in the late-1970s and early-1980s when a variety of 
political groups, such as the Moral Majority, founded in 1979, were on the rise.  
Their vocal condemnation of the lack of religion in US society was heard by many as 
a clarion call for a return to traditional religious practices.  In the late-1990s, these 
calls intensified as major events in the US transpired which seemed to show a 
nation without morality, such as the Clinton sex scandal and the school shooting 
that took place at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado.  Yet despite the 
apparent decline of formal religion, some argue that other religious outlets 
emerged during this time. 
In 1997, author Orson Scott Card argued that, “…we Americans, despite all 
appearances, have not abandoned religion.  We’ve merely changed its name” (n. 
pag.).  Card was specifically referring to the Star Wars films, which were rereleased 
as Special Editions in that same year.  For Card, the films respond to “the innate 
human need for some religion, for a Deep Story that gives meaning to suffering and 
makes sense of the randomness of life” (n. pag.).  This “religion” is primarily 
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represented in the film through the main source of mystical power in the saga, a 
pervasive life-energy called the Force.  As director George Lucas himself has stated, 
the Star Wars films “*take+ all the issues that religion represents and *try+ to distil 
them down into a more modern and easily accessible construct” (n. pag.).  Similarly, 
Lucas claims that he wanted to encourage “more a belief in a God than a belief in 
any particular religious system” (n. pag.).  In this way the films responded to the 
shift away from formal religion and provided a mythological religion—a “Deep 
Story”—with which its viewers are able to connect.  In 1999, the religion of the 
original films was brought back to cinemas with the long-awaited prequel to the 
original trilogy, Star Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace, which became the 
highest domestic grosser of the year. 
The narrative of The Phantom Menace is grounded by its relation to a mystical 
divinity featured in the original trilogy, called the Force.  In the film the concepts of 
the Force are expanded, refined, and focused on in a way that caters to the fans of 
the mythology and centralises it within the narrative.  Importantly, this 
development allows the film to present a world where religion is not solely a result 
of belief because the religion of the film, the Force, is a tangible entity; there are 
numerous instances in the narrative of the Force actually existing.  However, the 
interest in the religion of The Phantom Menace is not solely due to a void left by the 
shift from formal religion in the twentieth century.  Given the historical context of 
the film as a pre-millennial artefact, it is necessary to consider the religion of the 
film as it relates to the eschatological concerns of the period.  Specifically, it is 
useful to consider how it mobilises religious concepts to define the Self and Other, 
and the ways in which that deployment articulates structures of violence. 
It is my contention that The Phantom Menace responds to the anxieties active in US 
society at the time of its release by articulating a Self/Other Binary that is grounded 
in religious belief.  However, rather than dramatising the conflicts between 
separate religions, it presents a world with a single religion, relocating the 
differentiating elements of Self and Other onto other concepts based on a morality 
constructed by the film.  This relocation effectively conceals the structures of 
violence that dominate the film.  Further, the stability of the religious solution 
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offered by the film mirrors those ultimately brought to bear on the United States by 
the response of the Bush administration to the events of 9/11.  My analysis will 
begin by showing the ways in which millennial anxieties fused with religious 
concerns to exacerbate the post-Cold War identity crisis in the United States.  
Additionally, I will discuss how those elements contributed to the fragmentation of 
the US Self.  I will then look at how the articulation of Self and Other in The 
Phantom Menace addresses those anxieties.  Specifically I will show how the Self 
and Other are not based on religious beliefs, but belief itself in conjunction with 
moral action.  With the Self and Other thus defined, I will next explore the ways in 
which the binary is undermined by multiple structures of violence, particularly 
those informing racism.  With the positive and negative aspects of the Self and 
Other articulated, I will then establish connections between the response to 9/11 
and The Phantom Menace.  Specifically, I will suggest that the religion-based 
Self/Other binary the film “dreams” is realised by the Bush administration.  I will 
close by arguing that these parallels also reflect the concealed structures of 
violence found within the film.  Thus the film dreams of both the positives and 
negatives of the post-9/11 era. 
Crisis of Faith: Millennial Religion in the United States 
At the end of the twentieth century, religion in the United States often became 
conflated with the anxieties surrounding the approaching millennium, particularly 
in terms of apocalyptic thinking.  As Daniel Wojcik highlights, these apocalyptic 
undercurrents were found in the beliefs and behaviours of both secular and 
religious groups within the United States, and represent a long tradition of 
apocalyptic thought in the country (6).  Along those lines, he notes that during the 
Cold War the Soviet Union played a key role in apocalyptic scenarios, but that the 
fears surrounding the USSR have segued into more contemporary conspiratorial 
beliefs surrounding the First Gulf War and the perceived threat of Islam.  For 
instance, Wojcik observes that a number of eschatological writers have drawn 
connections between the First Gulf War and biblical prophecy (156-158).  What 
prophetic beliefs such as those reflect, he argues, “is a complete loss of faith in 
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government and dominant social institutions… *they also+ reveal the depth of 
despair and alienation that exists among many Americans” (173).  In short, anxieties 
at the millennium indicate a fragmentation in American society much like the 
already discussed predictions made by Robert Kaplan which were embodied in such 
events as the LA riots.  While much of what Kaplan says is relevant here, the most 
noteworthy suggestion he makes is that people of the United States would retreat 
into “insulate communities and cultures” (76) as the fragmentation of the nation 
continued.  Otherwise stated, as the large scale identity crisis exacerbated the 
numerous crises, groups in the United States would no longer be defined according 
to a single national Self, but instead as a series of isolated—and much smaller—
Selves.  With the millennium approaching and fostering a rise in eschatological 
beliefs, this fragmentation often occurred along the fault lines between various 
religions, such that each system of belief became a veritable Self in opposition to all 
others.  As Nancy A. Schaefer observes, the focal point of this apocalyptic 
fragmentation for many was the Y2K bug (85-86). 
The Y2K bug was a computer programming error in which dates were electronically 
stored using two rather than four digits.  At the turn of the millennium, then, 
computers would revert to 1900 rather than 2000, causing a host of potentially 
catastrophic issues.  History has shown that the bug was either patched or minor in 
its effects, but as Schaefer notes of the pre-millennial period, “some associated Y2K 
with biblical prophecies about apocalypse, forecasting widespread havoc, the 
breakdown of society, even the collapse of the government, implying that the 
‘crisis’ could accelerate the advent of Christ’s return” (86).  Thus, the Y2K bug was 
incorporated into eschatological belief systems and became what Schaefer calls an 
“endtime sign” (85).  While these contentions are open to technophobic readings, 
which will be investigated further below, what is relevant to the religious crisis in 
the United States at the turn of the millennium is how these fears of the apocalypse 
shaped the understanding of Self and Other in the post-Cold War era. 
The apocalyptic fears prompted by the Y2K bug did not cause the religious rupture 
that many have observed in the United States to heal, but instead promoted a 
further fragmentation which caused visible effects even within religious groups, as 
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can be seen in the actions taken by prominent religious figures.  For instance, 
Schaefer notes that Jerry Falwell, a prominent Southern Baptist, encouraged his 
“followers to collect provisions and arm themselves” (86), words which essentially 
advocated the isolationism that, as mentioned above, Kaplan predicted earlier in 
the decade (76).  Though such examples as that are common, it is important to 
note, as Schaefer does, that while some Christian leaders made such statements, 
the sentiment was by no means universal in those communities, nor was it limited 
just to Christian cultures (86).  As Schaefer remarks, “computer programmers and 
corporate executives” also saw the Y2K bug as a source of major anxiety (86).  
However, since The Phantom Menace is overtly concerned with religion, it is useful 
to understand the ways in which sense of Self and Other in the United States, which 
Johan Galtung labels “the most Christian nation on Earth” (“Cultural” 298), is 
influenced by religious, specifically Christian, thinking.  Galtung argues that this is 
unsurprising given the fact religion is one of the major domains that sustains 
cultural violence. 
Since Judeo-Christian-Islamic thinking that is prevalent in US culture, there is a 
pervasive notion of a single god that exists outside of the individual.  Galtung views 
this perception of divinity as a potential source of danger because it could cause 
“some people *to+ be seen as closer to that God than others” (“Cultural” 296).  Thus 
when a particular religious deity chooses one group, it automatically creates a 
binary division between those who are chosen and those who are not.  Galtung 
suggests that this symmetry manifests itself in the God/Satan binary.  For many 
religions, including Christianity, the Chosen People are the believers and the 
Unchosen People are the non-believers.  Of course this division is treated 
differently by various religions, but it is not uncommon for structural violence based 
on such beliefs to lead to direct violence.  For instance, in World War II the Jews 
were systematically Othered by the Nazi party on account of both their religion and 
their ethnicity.  This process involved the deployment of an increasing number of 
structures of violence which threatened the basic needs of the Jewish people.  
Ultimately the structures of violence reached such a level that the Jewish people 
were no longer regarded as human, and direct violence in the form of attempted 
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genocide became sanctioned by the Nazi party.  Thus, a group which is perhaps 
initially only discriminated against may eventually be met with physical violence.  
However, because of the large-scale fragmentation of the Self in the Post-Cold War 
United States, which included religious groups, the notion of a single Chosen People 
also fractured.  The result was that instead of a macro-Self defined by one or more 
religions, the millennial anxieties engendered the development of micro-Selves 
which made the Other even more threatening as it now included former aspects of 
the self, effectively splitting the subjectivity of the Self.  This is shown in Figure 12 
with Christianity as an example, although any religious or ideology group could be 
substituted.   
 
Figure 12 - The post-Cold War fragmentation of the religious Self in the United 
States 
 
In the diagram, the larger Christian Self has been reduced to a smaller individual 
Self with elements that were previously part of that Self now regarded as Others 
along with those populations that were already seen as Other.  While this 
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redefinition of the Self is certainly not bound to religion—ethnicity-based structural 
violence, for instance, might have some groups retreat into homogeneous racial 
groupings—the important aspect of the Self with regard to The Phantom Menace is 
the religion itself.  Returning to the concept of nostalgia, what the film offers is a 
world not defined by a multitude of oppositional faiths, but by a single 
denomination which, as in the original Star Wars films, fuses multiple belief systems 
in a way that seemingly heals the religion-based divides in pre-millennial US culture, 
effectively reconfiguring the shattered micro-Selves into a macro-Self by placing 
them in opposition to a single evil Other. 
“May the Force Be with You”: The Religious Self in The Phantom Menace 
At its core, The Phantom Menace is a film about religion.  As mentioned earlier, the 
central system of belief in the film, the Force, exists as an amalgamation of multiple 
real-world corollaries.  Accordingly it fuses belief systems which have very different 
Self/Other binaries, specifically Judeo-Christian-Islamic beliefs and Eastern beliefs, 
religious structures that have static and fluid conceptions of good and evil 
respectively.  At a conceptual level, combining religions can potentially result in 
peace if structurally violent concepts are selected against.  For instance, if the 
tenets of Jainism, which encourage direct peace in all aspects of life, were fused 
with any other major religion, the result could be the absence of direct violence, 
possibly even structural violence, in religions which define a Chosen People and an 
Unchosen People. 
However, given the vast number of subtle variables in each major worldview, or 
cosmology as Galtung labels it, unforeseen outcomes are very probable when 
attempting to effect change in such a complex system (Peace 238).  Thus, while a 
combination of religions could accentuate the peaceful aspects of each—“Thou 
shalt not kill,” for instance—there is an equal propensity for such a combination to 
elevate the elements of structural violence found in many religions, as evidenced by 
the Crusades and the Spanish Inquisition.  What is important here, though, is that 
while the religious foundations are important, so too are the ways in which they 
come together.  By analysing the presence of the Western and Eastern religious 
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elements in the film, it becomes clear that although the combination of religions 
initially appears to assuage anxieties surrounding religion in the millennial United 
States—possibly suggesting a structural peace—the structures of violence inherent 
in the component religions are preserved and work together to articulate further 
structures of violence, including racism and sexism.  To understand how this is the 
case, it is necessary to first look at the component religions of the film, beginning 
with the Judeo-Christian-Islam traces. 
In terms of violence as defined by Johan Galtung, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
have similar Self/Other binaries in that each defines a Chosen People and an 
Unchosen People (“Cultural” 296-298).  For these religions, though, Galtung 
differentiates between an external transcendental god and an internal immanent 
deity (“Cultural” 296), with the former shaping what he refers to as a “hard 
Judaism-Christianity-Islam” (“Cultural” 297) where a strict hierarchy is established 
which privileges certain groups as Chosen over others.  Galtung also notes, 
however, that softer versions of those religions emerge when they incorporate an 
immanent rather than transcendental god.  Although there is no deity in the Star 
Wars films, the Force functions as a divine power.  As characters in the previous 
films remark, the Force exists within all living things, making it very similar to the 
immanent concept of god that Galtung discusses.  In fact, as described in The 
Phantom Menace, micro-organisms called midi-chlorians reside in all people and 
connect them to the Force.  In this sense, the divinity in the film is literally 
immanent.  Certain aspects of the film, though, link the force specifically to 
Christianity.  
For instance, while John C. McDowell acknowledges the Eastern qualities found in 
both the film and the concept of the Force itself, he identifies elements of Christian 
iconography in the film such as the “devilish-looking Darth Maul” and “the virgin 
birth image used of Anakin” (21).  While the virgin birth is strongly connected to 
Christianity, it is worth mention that in an article by Jim Windolf in Vanity Fair, he 
quotes Lucas as saying that the birth was something he drew from the work of 
Joseph Campbell, the prominent mythologist, rather than the New Testament, 
saying “I don't want to get into specific terms of labelling things to make it one 
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religion or another, but, basically, that's one of the foundations of the hero's 
journey” (117).  Even so, his intent does not preclude a Christian reading of the 
virgin birth and the messianic overtones of the film.  The importance of these 
Christian connections, though, is twofold.  First, by establishing such clear 
corollaries between the Force and Christianity, the film effectively provides a 
location for domestic audiences to see their anxieties regarding the crisis of 
(Christian) faith played out on screen.  The other reason the Christian connections 
are important is because the immanent nature of religion they articulate 
contributes to the definition of a very specific Self/Other binary.  Although Galtung 
does not directly analyse immanent religions in a way that enables a clear 
elucidation of that particular Self/Other binary, an examination of his discussion on 
transcendental religion provides important information which can be used to infer 
what the Self/Other binary would be (“Cultural” 296-298). 
As mentioned above, Galtung sees transcendental religion operating within a 
Manichean binary which identifies a Chosen People and an Unchosen People 
(“Cultural” 296).  For the faithful, the Chosen are the Self and the Unchosen 
become the Other.  Yet while Galtung says that this division can be found in both 
transcendental and immanent religions, he adds that “an immanent concept of god 
as residing inside us would make any such dichotomy an act against god” 
(“Cultural” 297).  In other words, if everybody has access to the divine, then nobody 
can be closer to it, thus problematising the division between Self and Other in 
religious terms.  In Star Wars, this is of course complicated by the fact that some 
characters in the film have more midi-chlorians within them than others do, 
effectively bringing them closer to the divine, but the film avoids getting locked into 
that strict binary by incorporating elements of Eastern religions.  
Walter [Ritoku] Robinson cites the pervasive presence of the Force in “all living 
things” as an example of the ways in which it resembles the Eastern concept of ch’i, 
which some religions believe is the energy that flows through all life (29).  As he 
notes, “The philosophy of the Force is thus best understood by way of 
understanding the nature of ch’i and the wisdom of Zen” (29).  He specifically refers 
to the search in The Phantom Menace for a messiah who, as is said in the movie, 
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will “bring balance to the Force.”  Although the notion of a saviour clearly evokes 
Judeo-Christian-Islamic beliefs, Robinson focuses instead on how the concept of 
balance parallels Taoist notions of good and evil, showing that the ideas themselves 
exist in relation to one another rather than as universal absolutes (32).  In terms of 
violence, the notion of balance evokes the idea of peace articulated by Galtung 
where all people are treated equally, without social inequity, which is to say 
without structural violence. 
Kevin J Wetmore Jr. expands upon the connections the film has to Eastern religions, 
arguing that the lack of a concrete good/evil binary is antithetical to Christianity.  
He writes,  
“Spiritual evil in the West is ultimately subservient to the divine principle, 
and the divine principle itself contains no inherent evil or dark side.  It would 
seem, then, that if the Force consists of both light and dark sides, and 
neither is ultimately ascendant over the other, then real world religions that 
embrace duality are more echoed by the concept than Western 
monotheism ” (82).   
In that way, the Judeo-Christian-Islamic tenets that are key to much Western 
thought are insufficient for the religion of the film.  Thus because the religious 
construct of the film draws on these Eastern elements, it does not truly reproduce a 
Manichean binary of Good and Evil.  This is not to say that within the religion itself 
there are not clear distinctions between what a good character is and what a bad 
character is, it simply is not a factor of faith.  As Figure 13 shows, however, faith is a 
key factor in determining the narrative importance of the Self and Other.  Those 
who are more closely aligned to the Self exhibit a stronger believe in the Force and, 
additionally, gain more narrative importance.  However, this also holds true for 
characters defined as the Other, which is shown in the v-shaped line in the diagram.  
Interestingly, those characters that either display no belief or simply casually 
believe are largely positioned as neutral.  Thus, the more faithful a person is to the 
religion, the more forceful their alignment with Self and Other.  This is not to say, 
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however, that no other characters in the universe of the film believe, simply that 
for those presented in the film, this diagram holds true. 
 
 
Figure 13 - Belief and Narrative Importance in relation to the Self/Other binary 
 
It might seem like this matrix of relationships would reinforce the proximity to the 
god quality identified by Galtung (“Cultural” 297), making some people more 
Chosen than others.  This would certainly seem to be supported by the introduction 
of midi-chlorians in the film since the identification of Anakin Skywalker (Jake Lloyd) 
as the “Chosen One” is due to having so many in his cells.  Interestingly, this 
discovery is made via a blood test, suggesting the bodily fluids of Anakin have a 
sanctity which again alludes to the figure of the Christian messiah, but it is also 
important in terms of the concept of lineage, which, if privileged, can ultimately be 
tied to structurally violent concepts such as ethnic purity.  However, the claim that 
it is an innate holiness which identifies the heroic from the non-heroic characters is 
weakened by the positioning of Queen Amidala (Natalie Portman), who has no 
ability to control the Force, but performs as a hero.  The fact that Amidala devoutly 
believes in the Force, the same as the Jedi, again suggests that it is not proximity to 
the divine that defines the good characters, but is instead explicit belief in the 
divine.  The quality of belief, however, cannot be used to distinguish between good 
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and evil.  Instead, what determines which side of the spectrum one is on is a sense 
of morality.   
The heroes and the villains of the film represent two approaches to the Force.  One, 
the light side, uses the Force to attempt to help people, for good.  As is seen at the 
beginning of the film, the Jedi, who are on the light side, are called upon to 
arbitrate in a trade dispute, a role which positions them as advocates of social 
equity, aligning them with elements of structural peace.  The other approach to the 
Force, the dark side, uses the Force for personal gain, for evil.  In this way the 
adherents of the dark side become icons of structural and direct violence as they 
privilege themselves over all others, and do so in ways that threaten the survival 
needs of any who oppose them.  For the dark Jedi, then, the trade dispute is a way 
to gain political power, but only through the attempted extermination of all life on 
a planet.  Thus the dark side followers diminish the importance of the inhabitants of 
the planet as living beings, essentially exhibiting both racism and speciesism.  The 
light side faction, campaigning for social equity, opposes the structural violence 
which legitimises the deployment of mass direct violence by the villains with direct 
violence of their own.  The result is a Self/Other relationship which, like that in 
Saving Private Ryan, depends heavily on a group that is neither Self nor Other, but 
is under threat from the Other and thus needs to be protected by the Self.  
Although there is a racial component to the way in which this secondary Other is 
defined in Saving Private Ryan, the corresponding group in The Phantom Menace is 
defined by way of religion; they are the people who do not believe as fully in the 
Force as others do.  A key example of this is the leader of the Gungans, one of the 
alien races in the film.  The leader acknowledges the Jedi as powerful, but does not 
exhibit proper reverence for them.  Ultimately, he is swayed by their powers.  In 
this way, the film articulates a division between the faithful and the unfaithful, 
which elevates the former to both Self and Other while the latter is never more 
than Other.  This relationship parallels the one in Saving Private Ryan between the 
US Soldiers, the Nazis, and the Jews, as evidenced by Figure 14.  Here, though, 
instead of the US Self, the Self is comprised of the good heroes who are faithful.  
The Other, the one that is attempting to commit genocide, is defined by the evil 
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villains who are also faithful.  Lastly, the secondary Other is made up of the 
characters that are good, but are not true believers in the Force.  Thus, the Gungan 
army, which performs heroically in the final act of the film, is prevented from truly 
being part of the Self since they do not fully believe in the power of the Force.  The 
one partial exception is Jar Jar Binks (Ahmed Best), who believes and is elevated 
above his Gungan compatriots even though he is not fully integrated into the Self.  
The importance of this division along religious lines is of particular importance 
when considering the historical anxieties surrounding religion in the pre-millennial 
United States. 
 
Figure 14 - The Secondary Other in The Phantom Menace 
 
As mentioned above, the religion in The Phantom Menace is not a uniform one 
despite the fact that it all stems from the single divine power of the Force.  Apart 
from the major division between the light and the dark sides of the Force, which are 
essentially sects, there is a further division shown within the light side with one 
character, a Jedi named Qui Gon Jinn (Liam Neeson), encouraging a belief in what 
he calls the “living Force,” a concept not readily explained in the film, though others 
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discourage this.  The textures of the religion revealed by these sectarian divisions 
once again parallel real-world anxieties with feuding religions representing the 
tensions which had come to the fore in a post-Cold War era, not just through 
debates over family values, but also through deployments of direct violence in 
events such as the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.  It would be easy to read 
these religious tensions in relation of the events of 9/11, but given the time 
difference between the two there is not a concrete connection.  It is worth noting, 
however, that while the film does contain a Self/Other binary based upon the 
sectarian divisions within the religion, the characters all ultimately believe in a 
single divine force.  This connects with the Taoist notion of good and evil which 
posits that the oppositional sides are part of a larger unified whole rather than 
separately existing entities. 
In the film, of course, this manifests itself in the already discussed faithfulness that 
both the heroes and the villains maintain.  At this larger level, then, the film offers a 
view of a world where there is a single divine power.  Despite the intense sectarian 
violence in the film, an alternate reading suggests it not as a reflection of pre-
millennial religious anxieties, but as a response to them.  Accordingly, The Phantom 
Menace becomes a film which shows a world at war, but it also shows a world 
which has a single theism.  There is only one divinity in The Phantom Menace and it 
defines the world of the film.  Again, since the film draws on various religions in a 
way that opens it up to diverse readings, different audiences were potentially able 
to watch it at the time of its release and see a world wherein their own religion was 
represented.  Thus the film can be seen as a sort of religious paradise where the 
Self is aligned with the faith of the viewer.  Interestingly this even applies to 
atheistic and agnostic viewers as the claim above by Lucas about his mythological 
inspiration suggests.  However, as previously discussed, the nostalgia for this 
religious panacea is only superficial to the film.  The religion used to define the 
primary Self/Other relationship of the film carries with it structures of violence that 
function to further texture both the Self and Other.  Specifically, they solidify the 
connections between the film and its non-religious historical context.  Thus by 
examining the violence inherent in the construction of religion in the film, secular 
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structures of violence become clear such as racism and sexism, both major issues in 
the United States in the late-1990s.  These structures of violence become visible 
through an analysis of the mythic construction of the film. 
Mythic Divisions: Defining the Self and Other in The Phantom Menace 
The Star Wars films are often referred to as modern myths.  In his analysis of the 
presence of alien messiahs in science fiction film, Hugh Ruppersberg observes that 
the original films shared much with other science fiction films that showcased 
messiah-like characters (33).  While Star Wars did not feature an alien messiah, a 
lack which Ruppersberg argues is not typical of science fiction films, there remains a 
strong messianic subtext throughout the trilogy.  Ruppersberg contends that the 
“messianic theme lent these films a governing mythology” even though “the 
primary emphasis falls on action and character” (33).  While this emphasis remains 
in The Phantom Menace, the centrality of the mythological elements to the plot 
enhances the importance of the “governing mythology.”  For Ruppersberg, though, 
“The struggle of good and evil *in the original films+ never develops beyond an 
amorphously defined abstraction” (33).  However, by analysing the mythic 
construction of The Phantom Menace in greater detail, particularly in light of the 
Self/Other binary discussed above, it becomes clear that the apparent emptiness of 
the mythological elements and binaries in the film actually conceal a nuanced series 
of relationships.  A closer examination of these relations reveals the presence of 
implicit inequalities—in other words, structural violence. 
The mythology of the Star Wars films grew substantially between the release of 
Return of the Jedi and The Phantom Menace, and became a key aspect of the 
marketing for the film.  This is clear in the initial trailer for the latter which claimed: 
“Every generation has a legend…Every journey has a first step…Every saga has a 
beginning…”  (“Star Wars The Phantom Menace”).  The remainder of the trailer 
then highlights specific elements of the mythology regarding the character Anakin 
who later becomes Darth Vader from the original trilogy of films.  As previously 
mentioned, Lucas has acknowledged he drew on the myth theories of Campbell in 
devising the plot to the films, and this is alluded to through the mention of the 
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“journey” in the trailer.  Wetmore, though, argues that the Star Wars saga is “not 
truly myth” (101) in the sense Campbell defines it.18  He does, though, observe that 
the integration of mythic structures into the films results in pervasive 
“Manichaeisms” (96).  By their very nature, these mythic binaries segment groups 
in such a way that they become Self and Other to one another, often representing 
oppositional ideologies.  In order to sustain these oppositions, structures of 
violence are needed.  As discussed above, The Phantom Menace does not segment 
good and evil—Self and Other—along the broad division of faithfulness so much as 
it does across a constructed moral system, which is predicated upon the mythic 
elements of the film. 
When discussing myth, Wetmore engages with the work of Roland Barthes.  At a 
general level, Barthes asserts that “myth is a type of speech” which “is not defined 
by the object of its message, but by the way in which it utters this message” (107).  
If myth was to support structural violence, then it would be evidenced in the 
construction of the message rather than the message itself.  To examine the 
violence of the film, particularly with regard to the mythological binaries it 
presents, it is necessary to explore the ways in which the Self and Other in the film, 
the good and evil believers respectively, are characterised.  A starting point to this 
investigation is provided by an argument Wetmore makes when he writes, “If we 
cannot understand other people on our own terms, myth allows us to remove their 
humanity and make them something other than people” (96).  What Wetmore 
suggests, then, is that it is the notion of humanity—and often the lack of it—which 
is a key factor in The Phantom Menace in terms of identifying the Self.  More 
importantly, since both the good and evil characters of the film are faithful, 
humanity, in a very literal sense, becomes one of the primary axes upon which the 
Other of the film is defined. 
At the purely visual level, the Self, composed of the good characters in the film, is 
primarily represented by humans while the Other, made up of the villains, is 
comprised primarily of non-human characters.  As shown in Table 3, although there 
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 See Wetmore The Empire 100-101 for his complete argument. 
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are some good characters which are either aliens or robots, almost none of the 
villains are human.  
However, this is not to suggest that the good aliens and robots are heroes, as they 
are secondary characters in the film.  For instance, although Yoda is a key figure in 
the mythology of the saga, his role in The Phantom Menace is minor, essentially 
acting only as an advisor to the heroes.  Additionally, following the narrative model 
established by Vladimir Propp and applied by Graeme Turner to the original Star 
Wars, the good non-human characters fulfil traditional secondary roles (Turner 82).  
So while R2-D2, a Droid, and Jar Jar Binks, a Gungan, both perform heroically at 
points in the film, they fit better into the other character categories Propp 
establishes such as the donor, the helper, and the dispatcher (79-80).19 
 
Table 3 - Humans and Aliens sorted in Good/Bad alignments 
 
The only human among the villains is Darth Sidious (Ian MacDiarmid).  Despite the 
fact that he is the primary villain in the story, he makes only minor appearances in 
                                                             
19
 See Chapter 4 in Turner 1999 for more. 
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the plot itself.  When he is shown, he is a cloaked figure with a face shrouded by a 
black hood.  While this conceals his face, making him appear less human, he is also 
often presented via holographic communication technology which reduces him to a 
flickering blue image.  By mediating his image in this way, he ceases to be a human 
figure.  Much like the representation of the Nazis in Saving Private Ryan, this fusion 
of human and technological is a pervasive element of The Phantom Menace, and 
again suggests a connection between the film and the underlying technophobia of 
the era through another binary of the film: technological mastery versus 
technological reliance. 
While the villains in the film are sometimes presented as fused with their 
technology, the above example of Darth Sidious as a hologram being the prime 
example, more often they appear separate from it.  For instance, although the 
Neimoidians, one of the villainous races in the film, control the Droid army, they are 
physically distanced from it such that when they are confronted by the weapon-
wielding heroes, they are forced to submit.  What is more, the Droid army itself is 
entirely dependent on a single spaceship which controls them all.  When the ship is 
destroyed, the entire army immediately deactivates in a scenario akin to the Y2K 
bug predictions.  Conversely, the heroes, though heavily dependent on technology, 
prize natural qualities instead, as is evidenced in the repeated statements made by 
Qui Gon Jinn to “be mindful of the living Force.”  This is also evident in a 
comparison between the villainous Droid army, composed entirely of virtually 
identical robots—some have different paint schemes—and the noble Gungan army 
which is a homoethnic, but has individual fighters such as Binks. 
It is useful here to draw again on the work of Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner, 
who observe that “fantasy films concerning fears of machines or of technology 
usually negatively affirm such social values as freedom, individualism, and the 
family” (245).  In response, they suggest, “conservative values associated with 
nature” were posited as “antidotes to that threat” (245).  The Phantom Menace 
operates very much within that paradigm with the technologically-oriented Trade 
Federation supporting structures of violence which privilege them in a variety of 
ways, legitimising direct violence in terms of race, species, and more.  Since 
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technology is the means by which the Neimoidians are able to deploy direct 
violence, technology becomes something to be feared.  However, as Ryan and 
Kellner observe, technology itself is not always “ontologically evil” but is “subject to 
changes in meaning according to context and use” (251), a fact that is clear in the 
deployment of technology by the heroes that stands in opposition to the use of it 
by the villains.  Thus the deployment of technology reinforces the divide between 
human and inhuman, even when the characters being represented are other 
species.  For Galtung, this dehumanisation of the Other is a key tactic in legitimising 
structural violence through ideology (“Cultural” 298).  As he remarks, “When Other 
is not only dehumanized but has been successfully converted into an ‘it’, deprived 
of humanhood, the stage is set for any type of direct violence” (298).  Thus by 
making the non-human villains so reliant upon a technology which has been framed 
as extremely threatening, they become that ‘it’ and direct violence becomes 
legitimised.  This evokes the work of Robert L. Ivie on “images of savagery” (279) 
and enemies of the United States. Given the prolific use of tactics during the Cold 
War which sought to dehumanise enemies, the fact that the Neimoidians are 
reduced to genocidal non-humans subtly aligns them with the vilified Soviets from 
the Cold War.  Potential connections to the Soviet Other are not the only real world 
corollaries found in the film, however. 
In designing the various alien races of The Phantom Menace, the filmmakers prided 
themselves on the fact that they created numerous unique amalgamations of real 
world cultures.  While this could have functioned similarly to the combination of 
religious elements discussed above by potentially unifying a fragmented society 
under a multicultural banner, the filmmakers instead essentialised non-white 
cultures and reproduced various stereotypical elements.  Along these lines, 
Wetmore writes: 
“When using real world material, including mythic structure, real 
languages, recognizable environments, and characters rooted in 
actual ethnicities, to construct an imaginative geography and 
history and then posit a simple duality as the method for defining 
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what everything is…the narrative can be used to define the real 
world equivalents” (96). 
Thus, although the alien races are visually different from human races, they are 
culturally similar, and in those similarities exist structures of violence. 
Intergalactic Stereotypes: Race and The Phantom Menace 
One of the major alien races of the film is the Neimoidians.  The Neimoidians run 
the Trade Federation, the evil organisation attempting to exploit the inhabitants of 
the central planet of the film, Naboo.  As many have observed, the Neimoidians are 
clear stereotypes of Asian cultures.  For instance, John Leo draws parallels with 
cinematic antecedents describing the characters as  
“stock Asian villains out of black-and-white B movies of the 1930s 
and 1940s, complete with Hollywood oriental accents, sinister 
speech patterns, and a space-age version of stock Fu Manchu 
clothing” (14). 
Wetmore takes these connections further, focusing specifically on the negative 
Asian stereotypes evoked by the depiction of the Neimoidians (162-168).  
Specifically, he draws a connection between the stereotypical Asian qualities of the 
characters and the depictions of Japanese villains found in many World War II films 
such as The Bridge on the River Kwai (163).  Wetmore argues that similarities such 
as the sneak attack on Naboo and the subsequent establishment of (off-screen) 
prison camps establishes direct parallels between the Neimoidian Leader, Nute 
Gunray (Silas Carson), in The Phantom Menace and Colonel Saito (Sessue 
Hayakawa), the Japanese Colonel tasked with building the titular bridge in The 
Bridge on the River Kwai.  This positioning, as Wetmore observes, is so pervasive 
that “there is not a single Neimoidian presented in a positive light in either *The 
Phantom Menace] or [its sequel Attack of the Clones+” (163).  The result is that the 
Neimoidians are consistently shown to be weaker than their adversaries.  Since the 
Nemoidians are so strongly depicted using negative Asian stereotypes, the 
inferiority of their characters becomes an issue of ethnicity.  This connection 
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effectively privileges whiteness and Western culture over non-White Eastern 
peoples.  It is worth noting that the post-9/11 racial profiling of Arabs extended to 
Asian persons as well.  As Edith Wen-Chu Chen and Grace J. Yoo observe, after the 
passage of the USA PATRIOT Act “South Asians throughout the United States have 
experienced increased racial and religious profiling that has taken the forms of 
harassment, hate crimes, and profiling in airline and travel security” (xx).  The 
Other, then, is not limited to the Arab in the post-9/11 United States, but is instead 
tied more fully to a non-white ethnicity.  Returning to The Phantom Menace, 
though, it is important to emphasise that the preference the film exhibits towards 
whiteness is not just evident in the depiction of the villains, but of the heroic 
sidekicks as well. 
Binks, an alien creature encountered by the Jedi, quickly establishes himself as a 
good character albeit one whose primary function is to be a comic sidekick.  While 
the behaviour and mannerisms of the Neimoidians clearly draw on Asian 
stereotypes, those of Binks are drawn from stereotypical traits of Caribbean 
cultures.  At the same time, though, Binks also reactivates racial stereotypes 
ascribed to black characters in America, specifically the “Coon.”  Donald Bogle 
defines the pure Coon stereotype as “unreliable, crazy, lazy, subhuman creatures 
good for nothing more than eating watermelons, stealing chickens, shooting crap, 
or butchering the English language” (8).  Jar Jar Binks fits this description well; in 
one scene he even attempts to steal a chicken-like creature from a market stall he 
passes, as shown in Figure 15.   
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Figure 15 – Stereotype reactivated with Binks stealing “chicken” in The Phantom 
Menace 
 
Esther Godfrey, writing on The Phantom Menace, argues that the film “speaks 
volumes about society's love affair with blackface” (n. pag.), and observes that 
“Binks puts on what is indeed a ‘new millennium minstrel show,’ pushing the burnt 
cork and lipstick of traditional blackface into a computer-generated construction 
that masks the entire black male body” (n. pag.).  Her remarks here evokes the 
historical context of the film, and can be interpreted as a suggestion that Binks 
functions as a response to the questioning of the structural violence in the United 
States that reasserts the privileging of whiteness over non-whiteness.  However, it 
is worth considering the fact that Binks is indeed a “computer-generated 
construction,” as it complicates his position as a strictly racial figure since he is also 
a special effect.  Dan North, for instance, suggests the hate directed at Binks from 
fans is less perhaps because of the racial elements and more because Binks exists 
simultaneously as a character, an effect, and a commodity (156-157).20  This is not 
to say that Binks should not be considered in terms of the pre-millennial anxieties 
centred on the cinematic black body, as he should, but for now the salient point 
remains that The Phantom Menace constructs a Self/Other relationship which is 
very much fuelled by race-based structural violence.21  So while Binks, the “Coon,” 
                                                             
20 See North 155-162 for a discussion of how Binks is positioned at the focal point of a number of 
different cultural trends surrounding both race and technology. 
21
 For more on the raced body and the millennium, see the following chapter which analyses The 
Grinch. 
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is allowed to accompany the representatives of the Self because he does not 
challenge the authority of whiteness, the Neimoidians, representing a stereotypical 
Asian menace, are villains because they threaten the position of the white heroes 
as “top dogs” in the film world.  After all, despite the racial diversity, the Supreme 
Chancellor (Terrence Stamp) and his replacement, Senator Palpatine (Ian 
MacDiarmid), are both elderly white men.  However, there are some counterpoints 
to these structurally violent stereotypes, specifically in the figures of Queen 
Amidala and her head of security, Captain Panaka (Hugh Quarshie), who is black. 
Throughout the first two acts of the film, Queen Amidala is a passive figure.  She is 
captured by the army of Droids controlled by the Neimoidians, accompanies the 
Jedi on their exploits, and is used as a pawn in the political manoeuvrings of 
Imperial senators.  Similarly, Captain Panaka is unable to protect the queen from 
the Droid army and spends the rest of the second act of the film inactive.  During 
the first two thirds of the film, then, both the queen and Panaka adhere to gender 
and racial stereotypes respectively.  For Amidala, this is evident in the way that she 
always defers to male authority.  Additionally, in all scenes involving political 
discourse, her speech is stilted and mechanical, suggesting she is nothing more than 
a puppet giving a patriarchal regime a matriarchal face, something reflected in the 
narrative itself.  As for Panaka, he specifically resembles some aspects of the black 
stereotype of the Tom. 
Bogle describes the Tom as a constantly “chased, harassed, hounded, flogged, 
enslaved, and insulted” (4-6) character, none of which applies to Panaka.  However, 
he also identifies the Tom as a character who will “keep the faith, ne’er turn against 
their white massas, and remain hearty, submissive, stoic, generous, selfless, and oh-
so-very kind,” (4-6).  All of these traits, Bogle argues, allow white audiences to 
embrace the Tom.  Panaka fits this latter description closely, serving as the loyal 
guardian of the white queen.  This reverence for the white queen is additionally 
important since it means that despite his military position, Panaka is not what Bogle 
calls a “Brutal Black Buck,” a stereotypical savage who is driven by base, often 
sexual, desires.  Rather than lusting for the white queen, though, he protects her.  
This of course emphasises the dominance of white authority by having a black 
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character sanction it.  Thus the film represents gender- and race-based structures 
of violence for much of the first two acts.  There are some exceptions to this.  Mace 
Windu, for instance, is a key Jedi figure played by black actor Samuel L Jackson.  
Although Windu is an obstacle for the heroes, he is not a villain.  Further, although 
his antagonism towards the heroes could be read as a subtle activation of the 
threatening Buck stereotype, it does not develop in that way as he always presents 
clearly articulated rationales for his opposition; he offers the audience a positive 
non-white character that challenges the structures of violence in the film even if it 
does not entirely overcome them.  However, even without a character like Windu, 
the final act of the film reverses the structural violence which surrounds the queen 
and Panaka in the first two acts. 
 
Figure 16 - Fighting stereotypes with direct violence in The Phantom Menace 
 
At the climax of the film, the main characters split off as the film develops four 
sequences of direct violence simultaneously.  In one of these, the queen and 
Panaka deploy direct violence to retake control of the planetary government from 
which the queen had been forcibly deposed, as shown in Figure 16.  In this 
sequence, both of the characters break free from the stereotypes that they had 
previously inhabited.  Although it requires direct violence for them to do so, the 
fact that they do transform subverts the structures of violence such that a social 
equity—an equal right to deploy direct violence—is achieved for both women and 
non-white characters.  Given the dominance of the white patriarchy in the rest of 
the film as well as in countless others, this could be viewed as a step away from 
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structural violence as it expands the notion of the Self.  However, since it is so 
heavily predicated upon direct violence, it cannot truly be considered structural 
peace.  Also of importance here is the consideration of whiteness itself. 
Anakin, the messiah of the film, is presented as the image of pure whiteness; he is 
blond-haired and blue-eyed.  This positioning evokes other science-fiction messiahs, 
such as Roy Batty (Rutger Hauer) in Blade Runner.  Of Batty, Richard Dyer writes 
that his “unmistakably Teutonic appearance” positions him “at the top of the 
Caucasian tree” (214), a statement which can also be applied to Anakin.  Thus, even 
as the film both traffics in and challenges racial stereotypes, it reinforces the notion 
of pristine and dominant whiteness.  Interestingly, the fact that Darth Sidious is also 
an extreme white suggests that only whiteness can truly pose a threat to whiteness, 
an idea which is not substantively developed in this film, but one which hold strong 
parallels to the already discussed position of the Nazis in Saving Private Ryan.  In 
both, a place upon the spectrum of whiteness exists that ultimately seeks to 
obliterate all that is not itself.  That the Self of both films essentially seeks the same, 
but in a less extreme fashion is not acknowledged.  Ultimately, then, the dream of a 
Self unified by religion that The Phantom Menace articulates is a dream which is 
undermined by structural violence.  However, by elevating the stakes of the 
religion-based conflict to extremes of direct violence—survive or perish—the film 
manages to conceal those structures.  This same process can be seen in the post-
9/11 era. 
Faith and Terrorism: Fighting The Phantom Menace after 9/11 
On the eve of the millennium, the post-Cold War identity crisis in the United States 
was joined by apocalyptic anxieties.  Between the two, the national Self seemed to 
fragment as Kaplan had predicted, with people indeed taking “psychological refuge 
in their insulate communities and cultures” (76).  There was not a clear national 
Self.  This was exacerbated by such events as the Clinton impeachment and the 
Columbine High School shootings; the fabric of the nation seemed to be 
unravelling.  The central dream of The Phantom Menace, however, is one of unity.  
As discussed above, it is heavily predicated upon religion, and interfaces with 
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multiple real-world corollaries.  Returning to the expanded notion of “wishing” 9/11 
drawn from the work of Jean Baudrillard (5), what The Phantom Menace seemed to 
provide the viewing public with was indeed, to borrow from Card, a return to world 
grounded by “a Deep Story that gives meaning to suffering and makes sense of the 
randomness of life” (n. pag.).  Thus the film deferred anxieties by dreaming of 
domestic unity against a common enemy again, a common Other.  Interestingly, 
although Baudrillard based his ideas upon the ruined cityscapes of the disaster films 
of the mid- to late-1990s, The Phantom Menace, despite depicting an empire in 
decline, does not actually show the empire in ruin.  So despite the titular menace, 
the film remains quite optimistic, even with the final shot, a victorious celebration, 
serving as a mirror of the final shot in the original film, with good having triumphed 
over evil.  This is a key detail as it suggests that in a morally justified struggle, 
particularly when the good side is properly aligned with a divine power, there can 
be a definitive victor.  The moral certainty afforded by a religiously-grounded 
worldview was overtly articulated by the Bush administration in its response to the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. 
In the days following 9/11, George W. Bush framed the conflict with the 
perpetrators of the attacks in religious terms when he remarked 
“This is a new kind of—a new kind of evil.  And we understand.  And 
the American people are beginning to understand.  This crusade, 
this war on terrorism is going to take a while” (“Remarks” n. pag.). 
While the larger implications of the use of the word “crusade” will be explored in 
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, the importance of the term to the current discussion 
is that it overtly frames the “war on terrorism” within a religious context, 
specifically the historical war between Christians and Muslims. 
Analysing the rhetoric of Bush in the immediate post-9/11 period, Debra Merskin 
concludes that his words were often “ground in universal notions of enmity” (172), 
but when joined with historical and cultural stereotypes ultimately were able “to 
revivify, reinforce, and ratify the Arab as terrorist stereotype” (172).  Of course 
stereotypes also framed the terrorists as Muslims as well.  The result was the 
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creation of a religion-based conflict wherein the Self and Other were not just 
implied to be Christian and Islamic respectively, but were overtly Christian and 
Islamic.  In other words, the Self and Other were constructed based on displays of 
faith.  Accordingly, Muslims practicing their faith in the wake of 9/11 were 
suspected of being part of the terrorist Other as numerous hate crimes from that 
period show.  The roles of Bush as president and a man of faith became blurred 
through his repeated invocation of the Christian God in his speeches.  This led 
some, such as journalist Ron Suskind, to describe Bush as having “created the faith-
based presidency” (47).  While there is much more to that claim than religion, the 
fact that the national Self was increasingly positioned within a religious binary 
meant that it was aligned with the notion of a Chosen People.  This is not a new 
conceit for the US Self as previous policies, such as Manifest Destiny, have 
privileged the nation in similar ways.  However, as with those previous policies, the 
elevation of the US above an Other legitimised the use of direct violence.  In the 
post-9/11 era, however, the fact that the Other was given a very specific face—
Arab Muslims—meant that direct violence would become legitimised against that 
particular population.  It is unsurprising, then, that the Iraq invasion, which had no 
real connection to the events of 9/11, was not met with outright protest by the 
American people as a whole since the Other was defined in such a broad way that it 
could be adapted to include Iraq and its leader, Saddam Hussein.  However, 
opponents of the Self were not limited to Arabs or Muslims.  This is because 
inherent in the definition of the Other were structures of violence which could be 
applied to numerous different demographics. 
For instance, those that decried the policies enacted by the Bush administration, 
such as the invasion of Iraq, were viewed as supporters of the Other.  This was 
certainly the case with the music trio The Dixie Chicks when they spoke out against 
Bush and experienced vociferous criticism as a result.  This particular example also 
raises the question of other attending structures of violence in the post-9/11 
period, such as sexism, many examples of which can be found in The Terror Dream 
by Susan Faludi.  The positioning of Bush as the religious patriarch of the national 
Self is an example of this, but just as the film challenged sexism to some degree 
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with the warrior figure of Amidala, so too were such gender-based structures of 
violence countered by Condoleezza Rice.  The similarities, both positive and 
negative, between the response to 9/11 and The Phantom Menace once again 
suggest a process of dreaming.  The film dreamt of a resolution to the identity crisis 
which the post-Cold War United States suffered through, and the Bush 
administration made those dreams a reality. 
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Chapter Five 
Insidious Acceptance in the New Millennium:  
Dr. Seuss’ How the Grinch Stole Christmas (2000) 
 
The passing of the millennium without catastrophe assuaged many anxieties, but at 
the same time it underscored the lack of coherent national identity in the United 
States.  As was the case with the pre-millennial period, many turned to the past to 
determine the future identity of the country.  For instance, on October 3, 2000, 
during the first presidential debate, George W. Bush, then governor of Texas, made 
the following critique of his opponent Vice President Al Gore.  He said: 
“The vice president and I have a disagreement about the use of 
troops. He believes in nation-building. I would be very careful about 
using our troops as nation-builders.  I believe the role of the military 
is to fight and win war and, therefore, prevent war from happening 
in the first place” (Bush et al, “First” n. pag.). 
Despite the dubious logic of that statement, Bush saw the identity of the country in 
its militaristic past.  While this was not an overt support of the concept of “victory 
culture” discussed previously, it certainly drew on past notions of military glory.  
This was underscored when he specifically remarked that “I want to rebuild the 
military power” (Bush et al, “First” n. pag.).  While the fact that Bush ultimately lost 
the popular vote of the 2000 presidential election despite being named the winner, 
the way in which he looked backward to the US past was indicative of a nostalgic 
trend in the country at that time.  This historical gaze is important as cinema is a 
primary location of nostalgia.  It is useful, then, to explore the idea of the “nostalgia 
film” advanced by Fredric Jameson. 
For Jameson, a nostalgia film is one which is “about the past and about specific 
generational moments of that past” (“Postmodernism” 18).  He argued that Star 
Wars was a nostalgia film which offered younger viewers a novel experience while 
older viewers were able to pacify a nostalgic desire for a previous era 
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(“Postmodernism” 19).  Though Jameson was writing about films from decades 
earlier, his description of Star Wars provides an explanation for the appeal of Dr. 
Seuss’ How the Grinch Stole Christmas, and for the phenomenal box-office success 
it experienced, grossing US260 million dollars and becoming the most successful 
film of the year (Box Office Mojo). 
At the turn of the millennium, The Grinch was already well established in popular 
US culture through its previous iterations.  The book, How the Grinch Stole 
Christmas!, by Dr. Seuss was one of the top 40 all-time bestselling books for 
children at the time the film was released, having sold over 3 million copies (Roback 
et al 25), and the 1966 adaptation into an animated television special became a 
holiday staple after its original airing.  Following the argument Jameson makes 
about nostalgia films, the movie version of this American experience allowed 
children to enjoy the story for the first time while adults were afforded the 
opportunity to return to an earlier period in their lives, specifically the period of the 
early Cold War. 
On the visual level, the film definitely evokes an America from the 1950s.  In the 
production notes of the film, this is made explicit through details about how the 
props for the film were simply modified versions of “1950s style appliances” 
(Universal 16).  The evocation of that era goes far beyond the set, as even the 
families and businesses are from a time long past.  The costume designer, Rita 
Ryack, says that a primary source of inspiration for her work was cookbooks from 
the 1950s.  She is quoted in the production notes saying that the main family of the 
film “was sort of a cockeyed version of the perfect ‘50s TV family” (Universal 19), 
which is reflected in their attire.  The result is that Whoville, the central location of 
the film, is brought to life as an American town out of a Norman Rockwell painting 
seen through the lens of Dr. Seuss; the American pieces are all there—a town 
square, a post office, cozy homes—but their Seussian geometry relocates them all 
within an imaginary past which attempts to recreate the experience of either 
reading the Grinch story or watching the previous adaptation.  Thus the historical 
details of that period are elided, leaving the audience with only the nostalgia-based 
memory of the period.  This is in keeping with the notion of the nostalgia film as 
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Jameson notes that they are “historicist rather than historical” (The Cultural 130), in 
that they reuse the visual motifs and styles of the era.  Pertinent to the discussion 
of violence, Jameson adds that 
“since *the nostalgia film+ is necessarily based on the recognition by 
the viewer of pre-existing historical stereotypes, including the 
various styles of the period, it is thereby reduced to the mere 
narrative confirmation of those same stereotypes” (The Cultural 
130). 
Accordingly, the recreation of an older America reactivates many stereotypical 
elements from the American past—as well as the violence associated with them.  
However, The Grinch expands the narrative far beyond both the original story and 
the television adaptation, adding violence which is grounded in American anxieties 
at the turn of the millennium.  At the same time, and likely because of the 
millennial concerns, the film remains firmly grounded in a Christian tradition.  Thus 
the veneer of nostalgia functions to conceal and communicate violence from 
multiple eras of American history. 
In this chapter I will argue that The Grinch subtly defines the Self along religious 
lines, covertly positioning the Other in terms of race and class.  While the presence 
of religious themes create an affinity between this film and the previous film, Star 
Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace, the engagement with religion changes as 
the heterogeneous faith of The Phantom Menace is replaced by a homogeneous 
construct in The Grinch; there is only one religion in The Grinch.  The result is a 
framework which supports a more binary worldview which, drawing on the work of 
Galtung, divides the Chosen and the Unchosen (“Cultural” 297).  It is my contention 
that the film does indeed build a binary diegetic world that contains structures of 
violence.  More importantly, these structures do not display an expansion of the 
Self, but reinforce violence against the Other.  This same process is again found in 
the response to the attacks of September 11, 2001, carried out by the Bush 
administration.  I will begin by looking at the conception of family in the post-
millennial period, suggesting that a desire could be seen for a return to a mythic 
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American definition of a traditional family structure, and how that return is 
mediated by religion.  Next I will show how The Grinch also conflates family values 
with religious values, specifically those of Christianity, by using materialism as a 
seemingly secular device.  With the Self defined upon religious lines, I will then 
explore the articulation of the Self, demonstrating how it adheres to numerous 
structures of violence including those based upon class, gender, and ethnicity.  With 
the Self/Other binary made clear, I will then show the ways in which that binary 
allows the conversion of the Grinch (Jim Carrey), an ostensibly peaceful ending, as 
one of violence where the Grinch is not converted, but tamed.  Connecting these 
ideas to the response to 9/11, I will argue that The Grinch dreams of a future return 
to a nostalgic past where the United States is driven by both whiteness and religion 
toward a future where the non-white, non-Christian Other is defeated and 
potentially tamed, which is one possible future offered by US government in the 
post-9/11 period. 
Religion and Family in the Millennial United States 
Kirsten Moana Thompson argues that in the 1990s “apocalyptic dread” “took 
explicit form in American cinema” (1).  For her, apocalyptic dread is a syndrome 
that includes the “social anxieties, fears, and ambivalence about global 
catastrophe” (1).  She also identifies what she refers to as the “twin” of apocalyptic 
dread, “millennial dread.”  She defines millennial dread in terms of Judeo-Christian 
eschatological beliefs. Specifically she deals with millennialism, the Christian belief 
that there will be one thousand years of peace before the end of times.  Although 
Thompson observes that both of these dreads are evident beyond the millennium, 
she acknowledges that the year 2000 was a key year in terms of pre-apocalyptic 
imagery, especially for millennialism.  The anxieties about the millennium found in 
film, Thompson argues, were driven by a widely perceived social crisis which found 
its base with “an increased cultural conservatism and (re)turn to fundamentalist 
religions” (7) in the late-twentieth century United States.  Therefore millennial 
anxieties grew along with the search for a post-Cold War identity in the United 
States, a parallel development which links the two.  This linkage is even clearer in 
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the fact that eschatological beliefs offered a solution to the lack of a national Self 
for many in the United States as apocalyptic scenarios conferred the status of Self 
onto the faithful.  Despite the lack of an actual apocalypse at the turn of the 
millennium, the cultural conservatism and revitalised religion that Thompson 
argues returned in the pre-millennial period remained in the post-millennium.  This 
was evidenced at the national level in the 2000 election, in which both candidates, 
George W Bush and Al Gore, espoused strong Christian rhetoric in their bids for 
election.  In terms of violence, then, what the presidential candidates in 2000 
evidenced was the existence of a strong Self-Other binary which was based upon a 
Christian, or in broader terms, religious world view. 
As discussed previously in regard to Star Wars: Episode I - The Phantom Menace, 
religion is one of the major cultural domains within which Johan Galtung sees 
cultural violence existing (“Cultural” 296).  Specifically, the Judeo-Christian-Islamic 
traditions permit the construction of a violent binary between Chosen and 
Unchosen people.  As he frames it, the “Occidental tradition of not only dualism but 
Manicheism [sic], with sharp dichotomies between good and evil” (“Cultural” 296) 
informs that split.  Of course this division is treated differently by different religions, 
but it is not uncommon for the structural violence to lead to direct violence. 
Despite the religious diversity of the United States, the post-millennial period, 
particularly with the victory of Bush in the 2000 election, was one dominated by a 
notion of Self based largely on Christian values.  However, as Thompson suggests, 
these religious beliefs were not new to pre-millennial America, but instead were 
something that the United States had returned to (7).  Specifically, the Self-Other 
dynamic they established was derived from the historical period between World 
War II and the Vietnam War.  The importance of this era to the religious return in 
the 1990s is best understood through the apparent crisis of the family that 
permeated 1990s discourses. 
Some of the key proponents of family values in the 1980s and 1990s in the United 
States were religious groups such as the Moral Majority and the Christian Coalition.  
For them, the disappearance of the so-called traditional family was tied to the 
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belief that religious values were no longer regarded as part of a dominant Self in 
the United States.  While this can be explained in terms of the fragmentation of the 
Self in the post-Cold War identity crisis the United States experienced, which Robert 
Kaplan predicted, the perceived crisis of the family was cited as the source of many 
problems from that period (76).  As Stephanie Coontz has argued, it became “the 
key to explaining the paradox of poverty amid plenty, alienation in the midst of 
abundance” (256).  The apparent dissolution of family values, then, coupled with 
the return of certain religious beliefs at the end of the millennium resulted in a 
large push for a redefinition of the Self in terms of a family founded on religious 
values if not beliefs.  Therefore the proponents of the family values movement in 
the 1990s sought a return to the nuclear ideal, which was the television family of 
the 1950s.  As Coontz notes, this family is best represented by the “Ozzie and 
Harriet or Leave it to Beaver model” (23).  However, as Coontz also observes, a 
return to that television type was not actually possible since it was never reflective 
of the American family in the first place.  One reason is that the depiction of the 
idealised nuclear family in the 1950s elided many socio-economic factors such as 
racism and sexism.  For instance, Coontz observes that “minorities were almost 
entirely excluded from the gains and privileges accorded white middle-class 
families” (30) in the 1950s and 1960s.  Ruth Westheimer and Ben Yagoda concur on 
this point, noting that while “25 percent of American people…were poor in the 
fifties” (46) that same statistic among black families was fifty percent, a difference 
that suggests a distinct inequality.  Coontz also argues, though, that the complaints 
about the contemporary “collapse of traditional family commitments and 
values…almost invariably mean the uniquely female duties associated with the 
doctrine of separate spheres for men and women” (41).22  However, according to 
popular television programs, the family was white, upper-middle class, and strongly 
patriarchal.  Thus, the desire in the 1990s for a redefining of the Self according to 
the mythical televisual family of the 1950s incorporates structures of violence 
which place the Self in an even more privileged position as it defined Others based 
upon values systems which are closely aligned with religion, specifically Christianity, 
                                                             
22
 See Westheimer and Yagoda, especially Chapter III, for a more statistic-based approach to the 
inaccuracy of the represented family in the 1950s. 
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and race.  It is within these boundaries that The Grinch defines the family, yet it is 
only religion, not race, that is dealt with overtly.  
“Where is Christmas”: Faith and Materialism in The Grinch 
At the beginning of the film, it is clear that the Whos, the inhabitants of the central 
location of the film, Whoville, are suffering from a crisis.  Specifically, the family 
structures which would normally be associated with the Norman Rockwell-esque 
environments are in jeopardy due to the impending arrival of Christmas.  As shown 
at the beginning of the film, Christmas is not an event which brings people 
together.  Instead, it is an orgy of consumption wherein family structures are 
acknowledged, but not supported.  This is evident in multiple shopping scenes 
where hordes of people writhe in lines trying to buy numerous gifts, but it is made 
clearer in the scenes involving the central character of the film, Cindy Lou Who 
(Taylor Momsen), the clear representative of the Self in the film.  Cindy Lou 
continually attempts to get others to realise that Christmas is about unity, but the 
other Whos, including her father, fail to fully grasp this.  At one point she is so upset 
that she sings a song called “Where is Christmas?”  The song questions the changing 
nature of Christmas from a holy day to a holiday, and ultimately suggests that the 
transformation has disrupted familial bonds.  In other words, the disappearance of 
Christmas has broken the family.  While this does reflect anxieties active in the 
United States in the post-millennial period, a more developed understanding of 
how Christmas is deployed as a religious concept in the film is needed to fully grasp 
the implications. 
The fact that The Grinch is a Christmas movie grounds it in a religion-based 
Self/Other binary.  What is more, the Chosen/Unchosen binary indicates a high 
potential for violence—cultural, structural, and direct.  However, it is important to 
consider that Christmas in The Grinch, despite the ties of the holiday to religion, is 
not solely a religious event.  As Paul V.M. Flesher and Robert Torry argue of the 
original story, the focus is “on the Santa Claus Christmas rather than the Christian 
Christmas” (31).  This is true of the film as well, as is readily apparent in the 
advertising materials for the film which often show the Grinch dressed as Santa 
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Claus, something he does in the final act of the film.  This “Santa Claus Christmas” is 
in keeping with the trend observed by Rowana Agajanian who argues that 
contemporary Hollywood films show a secular Christmas.  However, she also notes 
that they may “contain a degree of religious symbolism” (147).  This is made clearer 
in the discussion of the original Grinch story by Flesher and Torry who identify the 
use of the key Christian trope of conversion, which is also present in the film (31).  
They write that “Christian doctrine requires people to convert in order to become 
members of the church” (31).  The fact that the conversion of the Grinch from non-
believer to believer is the pivotal moment of the film shows that even though the 
Christmas of the film might be secularised, the larger relationship between the Self 
and the Other in the film remains firmly grounded in Christian values.  Accordingly, 
the Self/Other binary of the film is indeed based upon a structure of violence which 
privileges the Chosen People of the Self over the Unchosen People of the Other.  
However, the fact that the Other is seemingly able to join the Self via conversion 
introduces a new dynamic to the Self/Other binary in that it makes the boundary 
between the two permeable.   
In The Grinch, then, one is defined as Self or Other by choice.  One can change 
(convert) from Other to Self if one so desires.  This is something that is not evident 
in the films analysed thus far.  For instance, in Titanic, although Rose is able to 
transcend class boundaries, this is only because Self in the film is defined 
independently of class.  Rose is never shown to be a happy member of the 
aristocracy, and her interactions with the lower classes in the film simply provide an 
outlet for her hidden self to emerge.  In short, she is always part of the Self even 
though at the start of the film she seemingly belongs to a class which is primarily 
defined in the film as Other.  The Grinch, on the other hand, genuinely does not 
believe in Christmas, and spends almost the entire film actively trying to hurt those 
identified as Self, particularly Cindy Lou.  This results in the Grinch being the 
primary deployer of direct violence in the film.  It should be noted, however, that 
the direct violence does not seriously harm anybody.  If he killed somebody, for 
instance, his conversion might not be as easy as it ultimately is.  In fact, the Grinch 
is made a character even more likely to be converted through flashbacks to his 
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childhood, new additions to the story, which reveal he was the target of direct 
violence in the form of childhood bullying.  Interestingly, although the bullying of 
the Grinch is definitely presented as negative, the film does not explore this direct 
violence in a substantive fashion.  Regardless, the Grinch, positioned as a secretly 
vulnerable character, ultimately changes his ways, and he does so when he has an 
epiphany. 
The epiphany of the Grinch comes just after the Whos have recuperated Christmas 
as a holy day.  In so doing, the family structures which were previously broken are 
healed, and, so moved by the unity of Self, the hateful Grinch has his heart literally 
grow such that he realises the Self is actually the side he should be on.  This choice 
is immediately validated by the Whos who allow the Grinch to join them.  As Greg 
Metcalf observes the “reintegration of the outsider into a community or social 
consensus” (100) is a key trope, the trope of American Christmas films in the 1980s, 
and draws heavily from the seminal A Christmas Carol by Charles Dickens.  Although 
the novel was originally a nostalgic look at Christmas in England, it was readily 
adopted into American culture.  This is clear in many texts, including The Grinch, 
where the Grinch is a thinly veiled Ebenezer Scrooge, but also in the way that the 
film showcases Christian conversion connections.  What is more important, though, 
particularly in terms of the anxieties of the post-millennial era, is the reuniting of 
the Grinch with his lost childhood love.  Thus a religious return does not only mend 
broken families, but also forges new ones.  The need for a return, though, 
reinforces the difference between Cindy Lou and the remaining Whos that runs 
throughout most of the film. 
Most of the Whos seem to worship materialism.  They are seen glorifying objects of 
wealth, and Christmas decorations—golden calves, as it were—throughout much of 
the film.  However, materialism does not represent a complete fall from grace.  
Instead it shows that they have lost their way.  They still celebrate Christmas, but 
they have forgotten its meaning.  The ritual is carried out, but the meaning is gone, 
which is again underscored in the song, “Where are you Christmas?”  Thus while 
the Whos are all part of the Self, they are not as ideally positioned as Cindy Lou.  
The film makes it very clear that she is the model that everybody should emulate.  
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Conversely, the mayor of Whoville, Augustus May Who (Jeffrey Tambor) is 
positioned as the counterpoint to Cindy since he thrives in the materialistic nature 
of the holiday.  While this might make him a villain in another film, the fact that he 
still respects the holiday ensures that he remains part of the Self.  It does, however, 
suggest that the Self is not uniform throughout much of the film, fragmented by 
various levels of belief in materialism, and only healed through a return to religion 
by a symbolic rejection of consumerism.  Interestingly the sole Other of the film, 
the Grinch, also opposes materialism.  In that regard, he and Cindy Lou have much 
in common. However, the primary difference between the two characters is that 
unlike Cindy, the Grinch does not believe in Christmas, a thinly veiled 
representation of his disregard for religion.  In this way the film overtly presents the 
Self and Other as factors of religion.  However, the film subtly reinforces further 
divisions between Self and Other that actively engage with notions of structural 
violence, privileging upper and middle class characters as well as white characters. 
The “Choice” of Poverty: The Grinch as Other  
As discussed above, the film is critical of materialism.  The scenes of rampant 
consumption are paired with shots of Cindy Lou looking disappointed.  What is 
more, when the Grinch finally steals Christmas, the absence of gifts allows the 
Whos to realise that they are all part of the same Self.  While the film posits that 
the religious awakening of the people in town allows them to now accept the 
Grinch, factors of class seem also to play a role.  This is made clear in the fact that 
throughout the film the Grinch is the only citizen of Whoville who is clearly a 
member of the lower class, something which is evident in the contrast between the 
pristine cleanliness of Whoville and the squalor of the cave in which the Grinch 
lives. 
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Figure 17 – Superficial normalisation of the Grinch through redecoration of his cave  
in The Grinch 
 
In Whoville, everything is blanketed by clean, white snow, and everything is 
meticulously designed.  In addition, everybody seems to be quite wealthy in some 
way, the reason, perhaps, why materialism is such an easy temptation for the Whos.  
The only sign that there are really any negatives to this wealthy lifestyle are the 
numerous trash receptacles in the town.  They function by taking the trash and 
physically relocating it to the top of the mountain.  In fact the receptacles would 
not even garner attention in the film were it not for the fact that they are the 
primary means of transportation for the Grinch.  This is because his home is literally 
the garbage dump.  Everything he owns and eats comes from the waste of the 
pristine Whoville.  While this does not prevent him from owning things—though he 
is not entirely materialistic—it does position him as the only character in the film 
that lives in abject poverty.  This is made repeatedly clear in the film, but perhaps 
never as forcefully as when the Grinch is eating a meal of trash, including glass.  
While the film could use the contrast between the wealthy Whoville and the 
impoverished Grinch as a means of mounting a critique of class-based violence, it 
instead uses the disparity as a platform for comedy.  For instance, when Cindy Lou 
travels via the garbage disposal system the Grinch uses as a transit system, she 
laughs and smiles the entire time, making the trip look like an amusement ride, 
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which was likely intentional given the ride-aesthetics that are so crucial to 
contemporary blockbusters.  In addition, when the town ultimately joins the Grinch 
in his cave for a feast in the final scene of the film, the cave has been made over 
with ornate decorations so that it resembles the town proper, as shown in Figure 
17.   
 
The implication being that by realising the Self was superior, he could automatically 
rise from poverty; the power—and choice—was his all along.  In short, it validates 
the idea that the upper middle class is superior to the lower class.  Even though 
materialism is ostensibly condemned by the film—a message many critics have 
noted the irony of given the ostentatious production design of the film—the feast 
at the end of the film stands as a monument to consumption and the film presents 
it as happy since the Grinch has now been permitted to take part in it.  What is 
more, the scene is evocative once again of a Rockwell-esque gathering where the 
Self is bound by homogeneity, this time of class.  However, the permission is a 
guarded one.  The Grinch is not the same at the end of the film as he is at the 
beginning.  The Self of the film did not learn to accept him on his terms, but finally 
accepted him on their terms.  To understand the transformation of the Grinch, 
particularly in relation to structural violence, it is useful to once again, following bell 
hooks, look at gender and ethnicity as well (7-8).  While both racism and sexism are 
evident in The Grinch, it is ethnicity that the film puts on vibrant display even as it 
attempts to hide the fact that it does. 
“Greenface”: Ethnicity-based violence in The Grinch 
It is not uncommon for Hollywood films to obliquely engage with racial issues in the 
United States.  For instance, Andrew Ross observed of the 1989 version of Batman 
that “the Joker *the villain of the film+ plays his role in whiteface” (emphasis in 
original, 31).  Ross suggests that the film then deals with race, particularly issues 
facing blacks in the United States, by substituting an equivalent white figure and 
reducing actual racial elements to invisibility (33).  The performance of Jim Carrey in 
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The Grinch functions in a similar fashion.23  As Joe Morgenstern wrote in his review 
of the film, Jim Carrey was “Stuck behind a prosthesis that's part ‘Planet of the 
Apes’ and part Chewbacca as a minstrel in greenface” (“A ‘Grinch’” n. pag.)  While 
the references to Planet of the Apes and Star Wars connect The Grinch to a 
tradition of cultural violence in the United States where the Other is depicted as 
inhuman in some way, the use of the words “minstrel” and “greenface” connect 
The Grinch with a much larger tradition of ethnicity-based violence in the United 
States without actually representing the ethnicities that the violence targets.  Such 
obtuse connections with race—using green instead of an actual skin tone—are not 
unfamiliar in Hollywood.  For instance, in The Boy with the Green Hair, green hair on 
a white boy is used as a marker of Otherness.  Similarly in The Grinch, the otherness 
is more problematic since while the Grinch himself is green, the actor playing him, 
Carrey, is white.  Despite this removal of any racial representations, the “greenface” 
label of the performance accurately describes the ways in which the character 
activates pre-existing racial stereotypes.  To understand how those stereotypes 
function within the film, it is useful to first consider the way in which the 
articulation of the faith-based Self of the film relates to the ethnicity-based Self. 
As discussed above, the overt Self/Other relationship of the film is predicated upon 
a religion-based structure of violence.  The Grinch does not believe so he is the 
Other.  Those who do believe are positioned as part of the Self, but their 
relationship to materialism textures that Self to some degree.  That same division 
between the Whos and the Grinch is visible when dealing with race, but the 
nuances within the Self vanish.  Instead there is a plain binary, and the division is 
entirely race-based, as shown in Table 4, where the green Grinch is the only 
character relegated to the position of Other. 
 
                                                             
23 For a more detailed exploration of Carrey and his bodily performances, see Sobchack “Thinking.”  
She does not deal explicitly with his performance in The Grinch, but her discussion can certainly help 
to inform the ethnic stereotypes at play in it. 
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Self Other 
Cindy Lou Who 
The Grinch 
Martha May Who 
Mayor Augustus Who 
Citizens of Whoville 
 
Table 4 - The race-based Self and Other 
 
Although the Whos are not uniformly white, the only non-white Whos appear 
briefly, and even then usually just in the background.  The most prominent non-
white Who seen in the film is the proprietor of one of the shops who speaks as he 
operates his cash register, but is not involved in any proper dialogue with other 
characters after that.  Beyond that, the Whos are overpoweringly white with Cindy 
Lou once again presented as the ideal Self as she is pristinely white and blond.  
Thus, even as the Grinch is positioned as Other through his lack of faith, that 
division is reinforced by his lack of whiteness, articulating a strong ethnicity-based 
structure of violence.  This violence is made even clearer when considered in 
relation to theories surrounding representations of ethnicity in film. 
Drawing on critical race theory and science fiction films, Ed Guerrero observes that 
“the ‘monster’ always constitutes the return of the socially or politically repressed 
society, those energies, memories and issues that a society refuses to deal openly 
with” (43).  The result, he argues, is that “cinematic expressions of slavery have 
become sedimented into a range of contemporary film narratives and genres, and, 
specifically, into the symbolic or latent content of many films depicting African 
Americans” (43).  What Guerrero is describing is essentially cultural violence.  A 
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comparison with the work of Galtung makes this connection explicit as Galtung not 
only describes slavery when defining cultural violence, but he uses the same 
language Guerrero does.  For example, of slavery Galtung says that 
“This massive direct violence over centuries seeps down and 
sediments as massive structural violence, with whites as the master 
topdogs and blacks as the slave underdogs, producing and 
reproducing massive cultural violence with racist ideas everywhere” 
(295). 
For Galtung, racism is a structure of violence which perpetuates and propagates a 
systemic inequality between two or more races (“Cultural” 294-295).  In the slavery 
example above, whites are privileged over blacks through an unequal exchange 
which denies the blacks certain needs including identity, well-being, survival, and of 
course freedom.  While the Grinch is not denied all of these—he is neither killed 
nor exploited—his ethnicity is definitely a key factor, as it functions to deny him 
identity as a Self, instead relegating him to his position as Other.  This is clear in one 
of the main subplots of the film, which involves a love triangle between the Grinch, 
Augustus May, and a female Who, Martha May Whovier (Christine Baranski).   
According to the flashbacks in the film, the Grinch arrived in town and was a 
mischievous child.  Although his adopted parents—two women—took care of him, 
he is shown to be unfit for family life; he threatens the family structure.  This is of 
course reflected in the failure of the two-mother family, something that can easily 
be read as violence against non-hetero sexuality, or at least a reaffirmation of the 
need for patriarchal family units.  As for the hostility of the Grinch, it was only in 
school that he was finally pacified to some degree through his attraction to Martha 
May.  So while it is suggested by the film that a coupling with Martha May could 
ultimately tame his Otherness, the prospect of miscegenation is not something with 
which the film engages.  Instead the Grinch is segregated from Whoville with the 
implicit understanding that the pristine whiteness of the Whos, embodied to some 
degree in Martha May and aligned with the Self, needs to be protected from his 
green and corrupting touch, the grasp of the Other.  This relationship evokes the 
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discussion Guerrero engages in around the film Gremlins, writing, “…the white 
woman as the essence of whiteness, the most prized possession of the white man 
and the object of desire of all other races, is a powerful representational current 
running through Western literature and cinema” (64).  This is clearly seen in The 
Grinch in the way Augustus May feels entitled to Martha May since he is the mayor 
of Whoville, but also how he is threatened by the Grinch and the more animal-like 
sexuality.  This is evident since even as adolescents what Martha May is explicitly 
attracted to is the different colouration of the Grinch and his muscularity.  For 
instance, when recounting the moment when the child Grinch ran amok in school 
after being mocked by the other children, Augustus May and another Who, 
Whobris (Clint Howard) remark “the anger” and “the fury,” respectively while 
Martha May says in a lusty voice, “the muscles.”   This also points towards the 
sexualised presentation of Martha May, something the film overtly does when she 
is shown as an adult through revealing costumes, as shown in Figure 18.   
 
Figure 18 - The sexualised Martha May in The Grinch 
 
In so doing, it makes her ultimate coupling with the non-white Grinch even more 
problematic in terms of violence as it suggests only sexual (i.e. “bad”) women 
would do something like that, as opposed to the nicer more conservative Whos.  At 
the same time, however, the coupling with the Grinch tames her sexuality in the 
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same way it tames the Grinch.  However, the Grinch is reduced to a sexual being as 
well since, even as a child, he desires Martha May.  As Guerrero also noted, “It is 
the threat of white woman’s rape by the monstrous, black other that gives white-
black contrasts much of their social charge and meaning” (emphasis in original) 
(64).  The fact that the vibrantly green Grinch lusts after the pure white Martha 
May, and vice versa, absolutely draws on the threatening stereotypes of ethnic 
Others, specifically the one Donald Bogle identifies as the brutal black buck in his 
seminal volume Toms, Coons, Mulattoes, Mammies, and Bucks (13). 
Bogle argues that the brutal black buck stereotype has cinematic roots as far back 
as The Birth of a Nation where the animalistic Gus (Walter Long) pursued the 
virginal Flora (Mae Marsh) (10).  Bogle sees the brutal black buck as divisible into 
the black brute and the black buck.  While the black brute “was a barbaric black out 
to raise havoc” (13), the black buck is a “psychopath” who is “oversexed and 
savage, violent and frenzied” and constantly thirsts for white women in a way that 
confirms the assumption that the “white woman was the ultimate in female 
desirability, herself a symbol of white pride, power, and beauty” (13-14).  Addison 
Gayle frames the stereotype in even more dire terms, observing that the “‘brute 
Negro’ who, out of lust and hatred, presents a clear and present danger to the 
purity and sanctity of white womanhood and civilized America as well” (qtd. in 
Guerrero Framing 13).  Both of these descriptions point towards traits of the 
Grinch, particularly the notion that he is a violent and frenzied savage.  However, 
given the family nature of the film, his sexuality is more repressed than would be 
with a more traditional version of the stereotype.  In action, though, the Grinch as 
Other very closely parallels an Other like Gus, since both share a desire to destroy 
whiteness even as they lust after it and are drawn towards it.  Gus manifests his 
hatred by pursuing the white woman who is the symbol of “civilized America,” and 
the Grinch directs his hatred towards the idealised whiteness of Whoville, which is 
also the symbol of contemporary America.  Thus the Grinch becomes an ethnic 
Other who is attempting to destroy the white self of the proxy United States.  
Within this Self-Other paradigm, the stealing of Christmas becomes racially charged 
as a Black buck figure has robbed white America of its cultural traditions.  A 
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connection can clearly be drawn here to the anxieties surrounding the post-
millennial family discussed above.  Further, given the “sedimentation” of issues 
surrounding slavery, the Self-Other construction of non-whites assaulting white 
America not only evokes images of historical groups such as the Black Panthers, but 
also foreshadows conflicts to come with the obvious connection to the ethnically-
based violence in the post-9/11 period, particularly the War on Terror. 
However, if the Grinch were only the stereotypical brutal black buck, the 
conversion/assimilation narrative would not function because that stereotype could 
be neither assimilated nor tamed.  According to its cinematic precedents, that 
stereotype can only properly be controlled in death.  One of the key cinematic 
examples of this would be the black body of the eponymous character in King Kong 
which, overcome with lust for the white woman, must be killed.  It is worth noting 
that in 2005, while the War on Terror and its attending structures of ethnicity-
based violence raged on, King Kong was remade and met with considerable 
although not overwhelming success.  Unlike Kong, though, the Grinch does not die, 
but is instead converted.  Therefore, the most threatening aspect of his character, 
his lust for the white Martha May and the metaphoric danger that he represents is 
coupled with a buffoonish likeability, which emerges from the fact that the Grinch is 
assaulting the materialism of the holiday in a way that is threatening but largely 
benign.  The Grinch is therefore a menace, but simultaneously an idiot.  This bears a 
noteworthy parallel to the assessment Guerrero makes of another film that subtly 
deals with racism, Little Shop of Horrors, wherein he argues that a large, and again 
green, plant is representative of symbolic threats to whiteness (59).  The plant, 
Audrey II (Levi Stubbs), is “dangerous but simultaneously entertaining and likeable” 
(59), which is exactly how the Grinch is presented.  The Grinch, therefore, as 
Guerrero suggests of Audrey II, is both “Sambo and brute” (59). 
The Sambo figure is the same as the racist coon figure that Bogle identifies (8), and 
which was discussed in the previous chapter in relation to Jar Jar Binks.  For Bogle, 
the coon stereotype has multiple variations including the pickanniny, the pure 
coon, and the uncle remus.  The Grinch is most closely aligned with the pure coon, 
which Bogle describes as “unreliable, crazy, lazy, subhuman creatures good for 
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eating watermelons, stealing chicken, shooting crap, or butchering the English 
language” (8).  While the Grinch definitely does not have some of these traits—his 
use of English, for instance, is often quite witty—he still strongly resembles this 
stereotype as he is often seen lazing about in his filthy home speaking to himself 
like a buffoon.  While this characterisation is certainly included for comic relief, it 
also functions to make his ultimate acceptance into white culture possible.  
However, as noted above it is the Grinch who must change so that the white 
Whoville will bring him in.  This change comes not through assimilation, but through 
a transformation from the buck and coon to the tom. 
Taming as Conversion: Structural Violence in The Grinch 
As was also discussed previously, the tom stereotype describes a black character 
that is willingly and eternally subservient to a white master.  As Bogle describes it, 
the tom character will “keep the faith, ne’er turn against their white massas, and 
remain hearty, submissive, stoic, generous, selfless, and oh-so-very kind” (6) all of 
which helps to “endear themselves to white audiences and emerge as heroes of 
sorts” (6).  The transformation for the Grinch from rejected Other to accepted 
Other, as shown in Table 5, comes when he hears that the Whos celebrate 
Christmas even without the presents he has stolen.  As Table 5 also shows, the 
rejected Grinch has the qualities of the brutal black buck, with some elements of 
the coon stereotype.  The accepted Grinch, however, shares qualities almost 
entirely with the tom figure. 
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Table 5- Traits of the Grinch as Rejected Other versus the Grinch as Accepted Other 
 
When the Grinch does begin to change, writhing about in pain, he finally articulates 
to his dog that he is “feeling,” which indicates his conversion.  His first act is then to 
try to keep the giant sleigh of presents he has stolen from sliding off the 
mountaintop he lives upon.  He is failing in this, and is about to give up when he 
realises that Cindy Lou is sitting on top of the presents.  In essence, his theft of 
Christmas has not imperilled the white woman, but the even purer white girl.  He 
redoubles his efforts to keep the sleigh from falling in a demonstration that shows 
he now also believes, as Bogle describes, that the white woman/girl stands as “a 
symbol of white pride, power, and beauty” (13-14) that must be protected.  
Through a miraculous feat of strength, the Grinch not only stops the sleigh, but lifts 
it over his head in a computer generated “money shot” which shows him 
triumphant at the top of the mountain.  Of course the ideological implications of 
the Other literally elevating the Self reinforce the race-based structural violence 
which informs the Self/Other binary of the film.  In terms of stereotypes, at this 
moment the uncontrolled strength associated with the brutal black buck is not only 
reined in, but is deployed in service of the whiteness that the brutal black buck is 
shown to endanger.  The Grinch is thus tamed.  Moreover, he realises that the 
traditions of the whites are of the utmost importance so, along with Cindy Lou, he 
returns Christmas to Whoville.  He even goes so far as to offer himself up to a police 
officer in town, shown in Figure 19, further displaying his newfound subservience to 
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the white system.  That act endears him both to the Whos, who forgive him, and to 
the audience as well since the threat the Grinch represents has been sterilised.   
As a reward he finally wins the hand of Martha May.  At first this seems to suggest 
growth beyond the standard structural violence of the racial stereotypes which 
define the Grinch, but the coupling is not entirely normal.  For instance, the 
coupling is not sealed with physical contact—a kiss or even a hug—but instead by 
Martha May returning to Augustus May the engagement ring he had earlier given 
her.  She then proclaims her love of the Grinch.  So while the coupling of the two 
still suggests the threat of miscegenation, this tom Grinch cannot even kiss her.  In 
fact, the only kiss he receives is one of respect from Cindy Lou.  The implicit 
message is that this tom Grinch has been desexualised, neutered in a way, which 
thus allows him to coexist with the Self, and, not taint the Self by reproducing.  This 
is, of course, coupled with the notion that Martha May has been tamed as well, 
ensuring that she will not reproduce either.  This arrangement, however, is 
contingent upon the fact that the Grinch continually acknowledges his subservience 
to the Self.   
 
Figure 19 - The Grinch throwing himself before the law, and the Self in The Grinch 
 
While this situation resembles the anxieties felt about racial tensions in the United 
States in the pre-9/11 era, especially between blacks and whites, it is worth 
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exploring the fact that the stereotypes that inform the structural violence of the 
film and frame the Grinch as Other are not isolated to blacks, but apply also to 
Arabs.  In his examination of Arab stereotypes in Hollywood films, Jack Shaheen 
identifies multiple stereotypes of Arabic people which are used repeatedly (15).  
These include the villain and the sheik, and include traits such as bumbling fools, 
dangerous threats to American values, animals.  What is more, he observes that “in 
the mid-1980s, studios presented notable African-American actors facing off 
against, and ultimately destroying, reel Arabs” (15).  In these films, the black 
characters were thus allowed to “defeat” the stereotypes which were (and often 
still are) associated with them, but this victory came by way of remapping many of 
those stereotypical traits onto the Arab characters.  What makes the correlation 
between the black and Arab stereotypes so important is that although The Grinch 
could be read as structurally violent in the way it creates a coded black Other, the 
Other in the film could easily be read as Arab as well.  Reconfigured in that way, the 
Self-Other paradigm of The Grinch becomes defined as a conflict between white 
America and Arabs, which perfectly presages the 9/11 conflict. 
The Ethnic Other after 9/11 
The coming of the millennium was surrounded by anxiety, but by hope as well.  The 
fears were largely grounded in apocalyptic scenarios which suggested the world 
would catastrophically end while the hopes saw the twenty-first century as a 
symbol of a new age, one perhaps free from the post-Cold War identity crisis which 
had plagued the United States.  The passing of the millennium without incident left 
the identity crisis untouched.  What is more, its persistence was clearly seen in the 
turmoil surrounding the 2000 presidential election.  In that election, faulty 
procedures led to what many have subsequently considered a stolen presidency.  
What is relevant to this discussion is the fact that the election and its controversy 
seemed to highlight both the division of the nation and the desire for a unity at the 
national level.  Both candidates, Al Gore and George W. Bush, offered a version of 
Self which their supporters saw as mending the lost national identity.  With Gore, 
this was through his liberal social policies such as those which supported gay rights.  
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For Bush, this was by way of his “compassionate conservatism,” which articulated a 
desire to resolve social issues, but absolved the government from any 
responsibility.  While the precise implementation of the policies Gore proposed will 
never fully be known since he was not named victor of the election, what is clear is 
that his policies seemed founded on the notion of an expansion of the Self to define 
marginalised groups that many might describe as Other, such as the homosexual 
population in the United States.  Conversely, Bush, using compassionate 
conservatism as a means of avoiding certain issues, seemed to articulate a much 
more traditional concept of Self, one grounded in mythic ideals, such as the 
idealised American family.  Of the two, it is the latter of which The Grinch dreams. 
 The Grinch is a story not of progress, but of regress.  As discussed above, it is 
suffused with nostalgia for a mythic American past, and the ultimate resolution of 
the film—a reformed family structure—suggests it is a past which is drawn largely 
from media which propagated those myths.  However, when the relationship 
between the Self and Other is articulated, it is clear that only through an assault by 
the Other, the literal theft of Christmas, is the Self able to heal itself.  The Grinch 
once again shows that the notion of wishing that Baudrillard articulates is useful, 
but only when reappropriated.  This is because The Grinch, like the films previously 
analysed, ends with the affirmation of the United States as a dominant Self.  In 
particular, The Grinch dreams of a unification of the Self in a traditional fashion in 
the wake of a traumatic event, and that is precisely the dream the Bush 
administration attempted to realise. 
In the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, Bush scored the highest 
approval rating in recorded history for a president in the United States at 90% 
(“President Bush’s Approval” n. pag.).  Although this would continually drop 
throughout his two terms in office, it reflected a remarkable amount of unity in 
support of the president.  This was bolstered by his rhetoric which, again, directly 
connected him with Franklin Delano Roosevelt via the Four Freedoms.  While the 
support Bush garnered was for his response to the attacks of 9/11, it applied to 
both the peaceful and violent aspects of the response to 9/11.  This meant that in 
addition to engendering a sense of Self on a national scale, it also fostered a strict 
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Self/Other binary based on multiple structures of violence.  This is most evident in 
the characterisation of the Other along ethnic and religious lines, particularly 
through the rhetorical framing of the War on Terror as a “crusade.”  In that regard, 
the Self becomes defined as white and Christian while the Other is non-white and 
non-Christian, a definition which comes from the mythic past of the United States, a 
past dominated by the whiteness of the founding fathers and the violent 
expansionist policies that Othered populations such as indigenous American 
people.  This return to a nostalgic past, one which is “historicist rather than 
historical,” to borrow from Jameson (The Cultural 130), functions in the same way 
as the dreams of The Grinch.  At the same time, however, implicit in the idea of a 
crusade is the notion that ultimate victory will defeat and potentially even tame 
that Other.  In that way, The Grinch could be said to articulate a vision of that 
future.  Thus, even though Bush may have lost the popular vote in the election, his 
post-9/11 policies, which were different from his campaign platform, won him 
broad acclaim as it repositioned the United States as the Chosen Nation, so to 
speak, while the Arab and Islamic nations were reinforced as the Other.  Indeed, it 
was of such a national unity that The Grinch dreamed. 
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Chapter Six 
A Paranoid Turn for a New Crusade: 
 Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone (2001) 
 
In the aftermath of the events of 9/11, the post-Cold War identity crisis that the US 
faced as the sole superpower disappeared almost entirely.  The Soviet Other was 
forgotten in the face of a new conflict with a new Other.  Despite the shift from the 
Cold War paradigms, the United States found itself in a binary opposition again, one 
which was defined by the Bush administration as a struggle against terror.  The 
United States was now a Self defined against the Other of the nebulous terrorists.  
However, the initial framing of the conflict was more textured than the eventual 
use of the War on Terror moniker suggests.  As noted in Chapter Four, in the days 
after the attacks that took place on September 11, 2001, President Bush described 
this new paradigm as a “crusade” (“Remarks” n. pag.).  Although Bush would not 
use the word “crusade” in later speeches, the religious connotations of his use of 
the word are clear given the fact that the perpetrators of the attacks of 9/11 were 
Islamic.  Following Johan Galtung (“Cultural” 296-298), the Self/Other paradigm, 
grounded as it was in religion, became very clear.  The United States became a 
Chosen Self tasked with scouring the planet of the Unchosen Other, using whatever 
violence was necessary.  However, the activation of the term “crusade” adds a new 
dimension to this relationship.  James Carroll observes, one of the “key pillars of the 
Western mind that put the Crusade in place” (24) is the fact that, “mobilization 
against an enemy outside inevitably led to a paranoid fear of enemies within” (25).  
This meant that “The war against Islam abroad became a war against dissent at 
home” (25).  In short, the crusade mentality disrupts the boundaries between the 
Self and Other. 
In the films already analysed in the pre-9/11 era, there is a very clear distinction 
made that the enemy is an external force.  The films show a definite demarcation 
between the Self and the Other.  While there are nuances to this, the crisis of 
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involvement Private Upham faces in Saving Private Ryan being a prime example, 
there is no actual questioning of allegiance in any of the films.  What is more, in 
some films, such as Dr. Seuss’ How the Grinch Stole Christmas, the Other submits to 
the Self.  In the post-9/11 era, there is a shift in the Self/Other dynamic away from 
concrete divisions to a more nebulous separation.  In this new era, the Other might 
be hidden within the Self.  This is evident in the first blockbuster in the post-9/11 
period, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, the highest grossing film of 2001 in 
the United States. 
At one level, The Sorcerer’s Stone presents a very standard Self/Other relationship.  
Like the pre-9/11 films analysed so far, the Self is mindful of others, particularly 
those who are marginalised, but it is also able to deploy direct violence when 
needed.  Conversely, the Other is quickly established through a hierarchical order 
based on various structures of violence including ethnicity.  What differentiates the 
relationship in The Sorcerer’s Stone from that found in pre-9/11 cinema is that the 
ultimate Other is revealed to (literally) be part of somebody who was thought to 
belong to the Self.  This unveiling relocates the standard fantasy paradigm within 
the realm of paranoia.  Screen paranoia, of course, was not unique to the post-9/11 
era.  Not only was it prevalent in Hollywood cinema during the Cold War, film noir 
being a key example, but, as Wheeler Winston Dixon (2009) observes, it was also 
present in the 1990s “in such films as The Usual Suspects, Bound, and Red Rock 
West” (iv).  What makes the post-9/11 paranoia different is that it played out on 
screen in ways that paralleled its socio-political development in the United States 
during the first years of the War on Terror.   
My analysis will aim to show the ways in which The Sorcerer’s Stone operates within 
a paradigm of paranoia that is predicated upon traditional structures of violence 
such that a familiar Self/Other relationship is ultimately articulated despite the way 
in which the plot of the film diverges from trends seen in the pre-9/11 films already 
analysed.  Accordingly I will begin by looking at the tradition of paranoia in the 
United States with specific attention paid to its resurgence in the 1990s and the 
applicability of the concept to post-9/11 culture.  While my analysis will ultimately 
read The Sorcerer’s Stone in term of paranoia, it is necessary to understand the 
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mythic qualities of the film first.  Therefore my analysis will next read the mythic 
and folkloric qualities of the film drawing on the works of both Roland Barthes and 
Vladimir Propp respectively.  It is my contention that the film utilises mythic villains 
in conjunction with a narrative device I term the “false villain” in a way that creates 
an atmosphere of paranoia within the film, particularly for those already familiar 
with the narrative either through previous viewings of the film or through 
foreknowledge from reading the books.  I will explore the ways in which this 
paranoia breaks down the traditional Self/Other relationship by making the 
formerly discrete boundary permeable.  The result of this process is that it makes 
structures of violence which privilege the white male less conspicuous.  Lastly, I will 
connect that discussion of The Sorcerer’s Stone with the rhetoric and politics of the 
Bush administration in regard to 9/11.  Specifically I will show the ways in which the 
film dreams, to once again build on the work of Jean Baudrillard (7), the 
deployment of the Bush doctrine in the post-9/11 culture of paranoia. 
Paranoia, USA: The Post-9/11 Crusade 
Throughout the 20th century, paranoia has been a consistent theme in US media.  
Wheeler Winston Dixon (Film Noir 90) notes that the post-World War II period was 
a time of paranoia in domestic culture.  As American society recovered from the 
war, and the Cold War began, noir echoed that transition.  Dixon argues that 
foundations of noir were “to trust no one, to believe nothing as truth, to expect the 
worst in all possible situations, [and] to realise that deception was an integral 
feature of social discourse” (Film Noir 90).  In short, one had to suspect everybody 
because the Other could be anywhere, attempting to infiltrate the Self.  As Dixon 
questions, “Weren’t the Russians our allies in World War II” (Film Noir 90).  Thus 
cinema at that time reflected the anxieties of the period with paranoia being the 
central concern.  This is unsurprising given the climate of US politics during that 
period, which Richard Hofstadter described as having a “paranoid style” (77).  
Interestingly, in his discussion of this style, Hofstadter contends that the enemy, the 
Other, is akin to a “projection of the self” (85).  As he argues, despite the clear 
Otherness of the enemy, there is an affinity between the Self and Other.  Although 
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Hofstadter does not take his thinking to the level of an irrational fear of the Other 
passing as the Self, it can be inferred from his closing statement:  
“We are all sufferers from history, but the paranoid is a double 
sufferer, since he is afflicted not only by the real world, with the rest 
of us, but by his fantasies as well” (86). 
In short, the “fantasies” of the paranoiac could explain developments such as 
McCarthyism and the Red Scare of the 1950s.  While paranoia remained prevalent 
throughout the Cold War, it also persisted in the post-Cold War era.  Dixon observes 
that films in the 1990s which fall into the category of neo-noir, examples he gives 
being The Usual Suspects and Bound, preserve the core of noir cinema, but do so by 
responding to a new set of fears.  His analysis of noir films during the 1990s and 
2000s shows that paranoia was a key part of US culture in this period.  Douglas 
Kellner expands upon the concept of paranoia in the 1990s by distinguishing 
between critical paranoia and populist paranoia (“The X-Files” 205).  As he 
describes it, the former “is rationally suspicious of hegemonic institutions like the 
state, the military or corporations,” while the latter “demonises irrationally 
dominant institutions and often projects evil onto occult and supernatural figures” 
(“The X-Files” 205).  While this distinction is developed further in the analysis 
Kellner conducts, it highlights the fact that paranoia is a multi-faceted concept.  
More importantly, it shows that paranoia is tied very closely to power relations.  
Since violence is largely predicated upon those same connections, it can be argued 
that paranoia is similarly aligned as well.  In his analysis of The X-Files, Kellner 
constructs an argument relevant to paranoia in the post-9/11 era when he remarks 
that the show “combines rational social critique and mistrust with occultist 
projection onto the supernatural that deflects attention from the real sources of 
social oppression” (205).  Combining this with the work of Johan Galtung on cultural 
violence where Galtung argues that cultural violence legitimises and conceals 
structural violence (“Cultural” 294-296), it can be argued that screen paranoia 
obfuscates structures of violence.  This is because, like cultural violence, screen 
paranoia legitimises violence, both structural and direct, against an Other. 
167 
 
Patrick O’Donnell views paranoia in the 1990s in a similar way, suggesting that “it is 
a symptom of cultural identities negotiated within and in apposition to ‘history’” 
(viii).  He clarifies by remarking  
“the manifestations of paranoia in contemporary literature and 
culture are inextricably bound up with the conceptions of identity 
and history that are being lived out within the epistemic conditions 
of—to use the epochal shorthand—late capitalism” (x). 
The link O’Donnell makes between paranoia and late capitalism is an important one 
since it shows, as he writes, that “paranoia did not die with the fall of the wall and 
the liberation of Bucharest” (viii), but it is also a statement which reflects the time 
period in which O’Donnell was writing, which was before 9/11.  This is evident in 
the fact that his work is only able to consider the “epistemic conditions” of pre-9/11 
late capitalism; the events of 9/11 provided a new set of “conditions” within which 
paranoia was grounded. 
As mentioned above, five days after 9/11 Bush referred to the struggle against the 
terrorists who staged the attacks on the United States as a “crusade.”  The word 
crusade immediately situated the Self and the Other in an ideologically fuelled 
binary; one is either part of the Self, the crusader, or the Other, the infidel.  While 
the religious connotations are clear, the deployment of the term by Bush in the 
political arena of the United States gives it a secular grounding too since the Chosen 
and Unchosen labels apply not just to religious groups, but to US and its allies, and 
those who are either openly opposed to the United States or have not made their 
allegiance clear.  This position was made explicit by Bush nine days after September 
11, 2001, when he remarked, “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” 
(“Address” n. pag.).  While this does potentially ground the opposition in nationalist 
terms—enemies of the state—the historic context of crusades prevents it from 
being divorced entirely from a religious reading.  Thus, with the rhetoric of the 
crusade mobilised in such a way, one is either Self or Other.  Despite this clear 
division, actually identifying the Self and the Other is a problematic endeavour. 
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The most obvious—and obviously flawed—means of identifying the Self from the 
Other relies upon differences, usually those which are based upon structures of 
violence.  In the post-9/11 world, these structures were both race-based and 
religion-based.  Thus, as Michael Welch repeatedly details in Scapegoats of 
September 11th, the Other was superficially defined by many US citizens as both 
Arabic and Islamic.  This was evidenced by the rise in hate crimes against Muslims 
and Arabs.24  Again, the use of the word “crusade” by Bush supports this notion as it 
draws upon the historical conflict between Christianity and Islam.  What makes 
paranoia relevant here, though, is the obvious fact that not all Arabs and Muslims 
are terrorists and not all terrorists are Arabs and Muslims; the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995 stands as testament to the latter of the two points while the 
former is self evident.  Accordingly a paranoid search for the enemy began in the 
immediate post-9/11 era.  As noted above, Carroll observes that the “mobilization 
against an enemy outside inevitably led to a paranoid fear of enemies within” (25) 
and this was indeed the case in the United States as everybody eventually fell under 
the gaze of suspicion, not just those who adhered to the racial or religious 
stereotypes.  Of course it is absolutely the case that those who did match racial and 
religious stereotypes were under far more suspicion than those who did not, but as 
noted above, the paranoia which targeted the Other—that the Other could be 
anybody—concealed the presence of similar structures of violence so that the 
illusion of equal treatment was put forth despite the existence of discriminatory 
practices, racial profiling for instance.  Fear of the Self becoming Other, though, was 
exacerbated by events such as the capture of John Walker Lindh, an American 
fighting for the Taliban, during the Afghanistan invasion in 2001. 
Carroll also notes of the original crusades, “The war against Islam abroad became a 
war against dissent at home” (25), and the widespread paranoia of a hidden Other 
led the United States to become a battleground of patriotism wherein questioning 
the country or its leadership became tantamount to treason.  As mentioned earlier, 
this was evident in 2003 when the country music trio, The Dixie Chicks, openly 
criticised Bush for the impending Iraq invasion and suffered critical and popular 
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 See Welch, especially Chapter Five, for more on post-9/11 hate crimes. 
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backlash, including a boycott, as a result.  Accordingly violence became increasingly 
based upon a rigid Self/Other binary that was defined by the Bush administration 
and abstracted from reality.  This is clear in the idealised version of the Self Bush 
offered when he evoked the Four Freedoms to define the Other, saying that “They 
hate our freedoms—our freedom of religion, our freedom of speech, our freedom 
to vote and assemble and disagree with each other” (“Address” n. pag.).  Thus, 
those who support terrorists hate a nebulously defined freedom, and, by extension, 
the United States as well.  However, the domestic response to 9/11 was actually to 
actively curtail freedoms in the United States.  This was evidenced by the signing of 
the USA PATRIOT Act into law on October 26, 2001, an act whose stated objective 
was “To deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, 
to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes” (n. pag.) 
and aims to meet that goal through a variety of ways, some of which have been 
challenged as unconstitutional.25  Yet the complexity of the USA PATRIOT Act and 
the multitude of tactics employed to locate and attack the Other suggest that the 
terrorists were not as easily categorised as Bush indicated in his rhetoric.  In fact, it 
reveals the ways in which the enemies Bush identified were mythic constructions. 
The rhetorical terrorists were not real terrorists.  The mythic terrorists Bush 
described hated the freedom of America.  That was their sole motivation for 
mounting attacks against the United States.  Those terrorists were not responding 
to decades of US foreign policies particularly those which directly and indirectly 
affected the Middle East.  Of course many, including Chalmers Johnson who 
popularised the term “blowback” in the post-9/11 era, argue that this is the precise 
reason why the terrorists attacked the United States on September 11 (vii-xvii).  The 
divorcing of the terrorists from history once again evokes the work of Barthes on 
myth, particularly in his remarks that myth is the “privation of history” (151).  Thus 
the terrorists imagined by Bush in his rhetoric are ahistorical; they are the 
bogeymen which haunt the post-9/11 United States.  Of course the construction of 
the United States as a beacon of freedom is itself a mythic conceptualisation that 
                                                             
25 The acronym USA PATRIOT Act stands for: Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism.  See Whitehead and Aden for a 
comprehensive analysis of the constitutionality of the USA PATRIOT Act. 
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relies heavily on disregarding domestic history.  This is clear in the fact that the 
1990s were rife with major instances of inequities, as evidenced by the race-based 
violence—cultural, structural, and direct—which events such as the trial of OJ 
Simpson made clear.  However, this notion of the United States as the “City on a 
Hill” perpetuated by Bush, but also by the pre-9/11 films already discussed, 
suggests a culture receptive to a revitalised notion of American Exceptionalism, but 
also one that was vigilant against threats to that aspect of the United States.  It is 
unsurprising, then, that in the post-9/11 world Bush redefined the world in terms of 
a Self and Other relationship based upon notions of good and evil.  This was the 
case in his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, when he labelled Iraq, 
Iran, and North Korea as the Axis of Evil (“President” n. pag.).  It is this same mythic 
approach to good and evil, the Self and the Other, that has already been discussed 
with the pre-9/11 films, and it is the same approach used in The Sorcerer’s Stone. 
Mythic Beginnings: The Violence of Plot in The Sorcerer’s Stone 
At one level, The Sorcerer’s Stone seems an unlikely candidate for an American 
blockbuster.  To begin, it is set in the United Kingdom, starting in the fictitious town 
of Little Whinging.  Most of the action then takes place in an English boarding 
school for young wizards and witches called Hogwart’s.  All of the actors in the film 
are British, and while most of the adult cast are well-known British actors, including 
Richard Harris, Maggie Smith, Alan Rickman, and Robbie Coltrane, the feature 
players are unknown British child actors.  While the producer and co-producer of 
the film, David Heyman and Tanya Seghatchian respectively, are both English, the 
director and screenwriter, Chris Columbus and Steve Kloves respectively, are from 
the United States.  Of course the resounding success of the stories with US 
consumers long before the film was released cannot be discounted entirely, yet 
other popular adaptations, such as The Chronicles of Narnia: The Lion, the Witch, 
and the Wardrobe, were not as successful as The Sorcerer’s Stone.  I contend that 
this is because The Sorcerer’s Stone, which was released in November 2001, 
resonated with the immediate post-9/11 need of the American people for a mythic 
story which simplified notions of good and evil in the same way that Bush did with 
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his rhetoric.  Accordingly, part of the success of the film can be seen as a response 
to the very traditional formula the original story followed, and which the film 
adaptation preserved and presented on screen. 
 As with Star Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace, The Sorcerer’s Stone is a fable 
of sorts.  It tells the story of a young orphan boy who is told he has unexpected 
abilities and then uses those abilities to fight against evil in the world.  Also like The 
Phantom Menace, The Sorcerer’s Stone is easily mapped into the framework 
established by Propp which identifies the key tropes of fairy tales, specifically the 
seven spheres of action he delineates: the villain, the donor, the helper, the 
princess and her father, the dispatcher, the hero, and the false hero (79-80).26  
Propp makes it clear that these spheres are not discrete, and that multiple 
characters can share the various roles identified by each (80).  This is evident in The 
Sorcerer’s Stone.  For instance Albus Dumbledore (Richard Harris), the headmaster 
of the school, operates within the sphere of the donor, helper, and arguably the 
dispatcher as well.  Of course some characters are located more firmly in a single 
sphere.  Harry Potter (Daniel Radcliff) clearly functions within the sphere of the 
hero and his friends Ron Weasley (Rupert Grint) and Hermione Granger (Emma 
Watson) act as helpers.  While the fact that the film is so traditional in this regard 
can offer an explanation as to why it was so readily received by American 
audiences, and indeed audiences worldwide, which had previously made hits out of 
movies which followed similar folktale formulae, it is the particular deviations from 
the Proppian model that bear closer scrutiny in the paranoia of the post-9/11 era. 
As previously mentioned, Bush split the world into a binary structure with his 
remark that “Either you are with us or you are with the terrorists” (“Address” n. 
pag.).  It is important to note, though, that this was not a sentiment restricted to 
the Bush administration as days earlier Hillary Clinton made similar remarks during 
an interview with Dan Rather on the CBS Evening News.  In both cases the binary 
worldview is reinforced.  This same logic applies to the Proppian morphology as the 
spheres of action break down into those which support the hero and those which 
stand in opposition.  This is not to suggest that the US response to 9/11 is akin to a 
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 For more details on the spheres of action in folktales see Propp, Chapter VI. 
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fairy tale, although such an investigation might prove illuminating.  Instead it is to 
suggest that characters in fairy tales, the film included, are often grouped into a 
Self/Other binary with the Self being Us, the hero, and the Other being Them, those 
opposed.  As seen in Table 6, the character roles segment into those which benefit 
the hero (including the hero) and those which hinder the hero.  While exploring the 
structures of violence utilised to define the Other in the film is crucial, first the 
effects of this binary logic on the plot must be understood.  Specifically, it is 
necessary to understand the way in which the film plays on expectations of villainy. 
 
Table 6 - Division of Proppian character spheres along Self/Other boundary 
 
In the film, the ultimate villain is Lord Voldemort.  He is an evil wizard who the 
audience is informed killed many wizards and witches including the parents of 
Harry Potter.  He was somehow defeated by the infant Harry and has returned to 
exact his revenge.  Voldemort, however, only appears in a single scene at the end of 
the film when Harry confronts him, and even then he lacks full corporeality, existing 
merely as a face on the back of the head of another villain, Professor Quirinus 
Quirrell (Ian Hart).  However, Quirrell is not revealed as a villain until this scene 
either.  Before this point, the main characters believe the real villain is Professor 
Severus Snape (Alan Rickman).  The film intentionally misleads the viewer to believe 
the same thing, showing various encounters that support that conclusion, such as 
Snape presumably casting a hex on Harry during a sporting event.  The hex is 
ultimately discovered to be Snape protecting Harry, but again this is not revealed 
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until the end of the film.  Thus what emerges is, to use the same terminology as 
Propp, a false villain, a character who appears to be a villain but is not. 
It is important to make immediately clear that the false villain is not a sphere of 
action in the Proppian sense.  Also, despite the similar nomenclature it is not an 
analogue of the false hero that Propp identifies.  The difference is that while the 
false hero is a sphere of action that certain characters operate within—Draco 
Malfoy (Tom Felton) is a false hero in The Sorcerer’s Stone as he wants to reap the 
success of the victory won by Harry—the false villain is simply a plot device; at the 
end of the story the false hero remains while the false villain disappears, having 
been revealed to belong to another sphere of action.  In the case of Snape, he is 
shown to be a helper.  The false villain, then, has to do with how the story is told 
rather than the story itself.  For The Sorcerer’s Stone, the false villain encourages 
the audience to suspect Snape.   
 
 
Figure 20 - Severus Snape under suspicion in The Sorcerer’s Stone 
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From the moment Snape, shown in Figure 20, is introduced in the film, he adheres 
to traditional codes of cinematic villainy.  His costume is entirely black, his 
complexion is pale, and his flowing robes suggest a certain ambiguity to his 
sexuality.  It is worth noting that these elements, the dark black and pale white, 
both draw upon existing structures of violence which marginalise characters based 
on ethnicity and sexual orientation.  The marginality of Snape is underscored when 
contrasted with the more fatherly Dumbledore, who wears warm colours, and the 
uncle-like Rubeus Hagrid (Robbie Coltrane), who wears earthen tones.  What is 
more, the way Snape behaves suggests villainy as well.  Not only is he the head of 
the Slytherin House at the school, the house the characters note is notorious for 
producing evil wizards and witches including Voldemort, but he actively hates the 
hero.  Through his overt opposition to Harry, then, he seems to be part of the 
Other.  As already mentioned, despite his appearance he is actually part of the Self, 
actively protecting Harry from the unrevealed villains.  Initially this seems like it 
combats structural violence.  Looking like a villain, the film suggests, does not make 
one a villain.  It indicates that persons should not be judged based on preconceived 
notions and that others should be receptive to new people and ideas, seemingly 
supporting a system of structural peace wherein equity is maintained between all 
members of society.  Of course, the fact that characters marginalised by structures 
of violence are allowed to be part of the Self is not new.  In The Phantom Menace, 
for instance, Jar-Jar Binks (Ahmed Best) was part of the Self despite being a racial 
and ethnic stereotype.  That being said, inclusion into the Self does not make one a 
hero, and neither Binks nor Snape are truly heroic figures.  The major difference 
between The Sorcerer’s Stone and pre-9/11 films, then, is not the fact that the 
seemingly evil Snape is actually good, but that the false villain device calls into 
question the entire Self/Other binary. 
The False Villain: Structural violence in The Sorcerer’s Stone 
In the pre-9/11 films discussed, the Self/Other was not compromised.  As 
mentioned above, there were some moments that showed weakness in the Self, 
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but the Self was never actually questioned.  For instance, in Saving Private Ryan the 
failure of Upham to save Mellish from his death at the hands of the Nazi SS officer 
questions the fortitude—physical and emotional—of the men fighting for the Self, 
but it never casts doubt on their underlying allegiances.  There were even moments 
when the line between the Self and the Other blurred, as was the case in The Grinch 
when the Grinch shifted from Other to Self.  However, as I have discussed, that 
transition was not so transgressive at it seemed since the Grinch was only allowed 
to join the Self on its terms rather than gain acceptance on his own terms.  In The 
Phantom Menace, where the audience knows Anakin Skywalker will ultimately 
become a villain, there is not any overt indication that will happen.  Even when the 
film reduced the heroes to micro-selves, as was the case with the religion in The 
Phantom Menace, the film maintained a core sense of Self and Other.  In those 
films, the villains are villains and the heroes are heroes.  At a broader level, then, 
the Self and the Other are clear.  None of the pre-9/11 films analysed thus far 
contained a false villain device.  What is more, the inclusion of it in The Sorcerer’s 
Stone creates an atmosphere of paranoia that functions retroactively on the plot. 
Professor Quirrell, the true villain, bears many of the same traits as Professor 
Snape, the false villain.  Like Snape, Quirrell is characterised as an effeminate 
character, so much so that he periodically resembles the stereotype of the sissy.  
This is clearest when he faints upon the arrival of a troll in the dungeon of the 
school, but it is also evident in his constant cowardice and fearfulness when 
teaching the students.  By having Quirrell adhere to such stereotypes, it challenges 
the apparent structural peace engendered by having Snape be a part of the Self. 
However, Quirrell bears additional markers which marginalise him ethnically.  Most 
noteworthy is the fact that his wardrobe includes a purple turban.  The inclusion of 
this item of clothing may seem easy to dismiss as an important point to analyse in 
terms of 9/11 because the book, and even the movie, were completed before the 
events of September 11th.  What is more, the turban as presented in the film is 
likely analogous to those worn by Sikhs rather than Arabs, something which would 
seem to distance the representation from 9/11 even further.  However, even 
though the film was planned and completed well before 9/11 and the turban might 
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not be directly connected with Arab attire, the film was released after that date and 
it is in that post-9/11 paradigm that the audience received it.  The turban, then, 
becomes enmeshed in a larger cultural trend that existed before 9/11 of vilifying 
Arab characters, a trend explored by authors such as Jack Shaheen (28-33).  This 
means that it becomes a very important signifier of structural violence.  That 
signification, however, shifts dramatically after the betrayal is revealed at the end 
of the film. 
Throughout almost the entire film, Professor Quirrell is presumably part of the Self.  
He is seemingly an active member of the magic community.  He holds a prestigious 
position at the school, and is trusted by the well-respected headmaster, 
Dumbledore.  Although he is not shown to be the nicest of teachers, he offers 
neither the children nor the audience any reason to suspect him through his 
behaviour.  As a villain he is virtually invisible. This invisibility achieves the effect of 
normalising his markings of the Other, specifically his turban.  To point, if Quirrell 
were not ultimately a villain he would be an example of structural peace since he 
was a non-villain character that bore traits often associated with a marginalised 
population.  However, because he is revealed as a villain, the audience is essentially 
chastised by the narrative for ignoring the signs of marginalisation with the 
conclusion of the film suggesting that the Self must be probed to see if it is really 
the Self or if it is the Other passing as the Self.  While the film does not have any 
form of investigation into the loyalties of other members of the Self after the 
betrayal and death of Quirrell, its conclusion does nothing to suggest that there 
could not be further Others concealed within the Self.  The probing, then, comes 
not from the text itself, but from a re-examination of the text through repeated 
viewings.  As Barbara Klinger notes, “When a film becomes a blockbuster, a large 
part of its success is generated by audience members who return to see it again in 
theatres” (135).  Accordingly, The Sorcerer’s Stone likely had a number of repeat 
viewers not only in the theatre, but on DVD and video as well.  In addition, a large 
number of viewers will have watched the film the first time with foreknowledge 
about the plot from reading the book.  Thus the audience watches or re-watches 
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the film with suspicion since they are aware from the beginning that Quirrell, 
shown in Figure 20, is the Other disguised as the Self.   
In such a viewing, with close scrutiny being paid to Quirrell, his actions, which might 
seem innocent when viewed without knowledge of his ultimate betrayal, suddenly 
gain a sinister quality.  When he is seen in a chance appearance at a popular 
shopping destination, watching a sporting event, or being accosted by the false 
villain, Snape, the audience is able to look beyond the façade of innocence and see 
Quirrell as the concealed Other, masquerading as the Self.  They are effectively 
asked to adopt a paranoid approach to viewing, to look beyond the surface and to 
see the enemy within.  With paranoia as a guiding ethos, signs of betrayal are 
looked for and it is at this point that the markers of Otherness that Quirrell gains 
greater importance.  Thus, his marginalised masculinity might be important to some 
viewers while his turban would stand out to others particularly due to the fact that 
the turban literally conceals the face of evil that Quirrell bears.  What is more, the 
turban would have additional ideological meaning to audiences at the time in light 
of the events of 9/11 and the subsequent popular rhetoric which activated anti-
Arab and anti-Islamic sentiment.  In this way, the film validates structural violence 
in multiple ways since Quirrell is marginalised for his gender performance as well as 
his attire, the latter of which carries both ethnic and religious meanings. 
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Figure 21 - Quirinus Quirrell, the actual villain of The Sorcerer’s Stone 
 
As mentioned above, paranoia has the ability to obfuscate violence.  In this case it is 
specifically accomplished by marking Quirrell as the Other, effectively guiding the 
attention of the viewer towards him.  The result is that the other characters in the 
film, and the structures of violence which define them, go unmarked, which 
implicitly condones them.  This is very clear with gender-based structures of 
violence in the film which privilege traditional notions of masculinity. 
Harry proves his worth repeatedly through masculine deeds, including both 
defeating a troll and becoming a star athlete.  Characters that are less able than 
Harry, such as his classmate Neville Longbottom (Matthew Lewis), are often 
presented as comic relief as is the case when Neville mounts his broom and, unable 
to control it, is carried away.  As for the female characters, although some of the 
professors are women, they all generally fit into existing stereotypes.  For instance, 
Professor McGonagall (Maggie Smith) is always fretting over the children in a 
motherly way while Madame Hooch, the broomstick instructor, is characterised as 
butch and adheres to the stereotype of the masculine, potentially lesbian, female 
physical education teacher.  As for the main characters, Hermione is repeatedly 
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demonstrated to be very smart, but physically inept and dependent upon Harry for 
protection as is clear in the aforementioned troll sequence where she is reduced to 
a damsel in distress.  Lastly, the father figure Dumbledore, who talks to Harry about 
his deceased parents, essentially passes on the patriarchal authority to Harry.  In 
this way, there is a structure of violence in the film which privileges men over 
women.  There is a similar privileging of whiteness in the film. 
There are non-white characters in the film, but they are generally reduced to non-
narrative token parts.  For instance there is a black student who works as the 
announcer during the quidditch match, a full-contact sport for witches and wizards.  
There are, however, white characters that are clearly marked as others, most 
notably Hagrid, who is a human/giant hybrid.  His position of Other is additionally 
marked by his affinity for and communion with other marginalised creatures such 
as centaurs and dragons.  While his job as groundskeeper of the school would 
logically have him reside outside of the school, the fact that this ethnically different 
figure lives beyond the walls of the school itself is quite telling of the racial 
elements of the film as Hagrid is essentially Uncle Tom living in his cabin, 
perpetually faithful to his white master Dumbledore.  In the same way patriarchal 
authority is passed from Dumbledore to Harry, so too is the authority of whiteness.  
As for Quirrell, his whiteness is called into question through his concealment of a 
monstrous face.  In this way, the film subtly supports structures of violence in much 
the same way as pre-9/11 films which also tended to privilege the white male.  
However, unlike pre-9/11 films, The Sorcerer’s Stone ultimately directs the viewer 
away from the normalised characters—those that adhere to the structures of 
violence—and towards the deviant characters, such as Snape and Quirrell, through 
its deployment of the false villain device and the resultant paranoia.  The structures 
of violence within the film are thus concealed even further.  It must be noted here 
that readers of the books would have brought an additional layer of knowledge to 
the film as racial discourses are developed much further in them, as they are in the 
subsequent Harry Potter films; in Harry Potter and the Chamber of Secrets, for 
instance, the term “mudblood” is introduced as a racial slur.  However, these issues 
are not developed in any substantive way in The Sorcerer’s Stone.  Regardless, the 
180 
 
film still articulates multiple structures of violence which are essentially concealed.  
What makes this process even more problematic is its relation to direct violence. 
Throughout the film, direct violence is shown to be a viable means of success for 
the Self.  For instance, when Harry is playing quidditch, he succeeds not just by 
outwitting his opponents and displaying exceptional athleticism, but also by 
periodically fighting the players on the other team.  An even clearer instance of the 
deployment of direct violence is when a troll invades the school and Harry manages 
to defeat it by attacking it with his wand.  His actions here seem justified in the fact 
that the troll is trying to kill his friend, Hermione.  Although Harry is scolded 
afterwards by teachers at the school for doing something so dangerous, he is also 
rewarded for his deeds, an action which ultimately condones the use of direct 
violence against those identified as the Unchosen Others.  Given the paranoid 
atmosphere of the film, the probing of the Self to find the Other becomes a search 
for a target of direct violence.  The fact that such a response is merited is reinforced 
by the way the film characterises the villain. 
Before Quirrell is revealed as the villain, he is a cowardly figure.  Once he is 
unmasked—or “unturbaned”—he becomes a bloodthirsty madman intent on killing 
anybody to achieve his goals, even children, as the climax of the film demonstrates 
when he tries to kill Harry and his friends.  Thus, through Quirrell, the film positions 
the Other as one who can only be defeated through death.  Interestingly, when 
Harry ultimately kills Quirrell, he does so simply by placing his hands on him.  
Despite the fact that the franchise has been plagued by criticisms that argue it 
supports evil through witchcraft and wizardry, a claim originating from religious 
communities long before the release of the film (Blume n. pag.), the laying on of 
hands in this scene is an act suffused with Judeo-Christian traditions as it is the act 
which appears in multiple Biblical passages.  While the connections are not 
developed in a substantive way in this film, there are potential messianic 
connections that could be made.  Unlike the benevolent laying on of hands 
associated with religion, though, it is clear that Harry does so to kill Quirrell.  
Despite this important difference, though, and regardless of whether Harry is read 
as a messiah figure or not, the laying on of hands functions to identify the Chosen 
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and the Unchosen.  In short, it supports a structure of violence.  In this case, that 
structure is fused with direct violence as it results in the immediate death of the 
Unchosen.  The fact that Harry is highly lauded for his actions suggests that the film 
sanctions both structural and direct violence when it targets the Other.  What 
makes this process additionally problematic is that it is predicated upon a system 
which condones scrutiny of the Self, particularly by way of profiling people in order 
to flush out, as it were, the hidden Other before that Other can harm the self.  
More telling is the fact that Harry commits all of this violence in direct opposition to 
the school rules because he believes he is right.  The film of course bears out that 
he is indeed right; by following his instinct, he saved the school.  This approach 
towards violence holds strong parallels to the Bush response to 9/11. 
The Unilateral Wizard: The Bush Doctrine and The Sorcerer’s Stone 
Even in his first few months in office, the Bush administration was driven by what 
commentator Charles Krauthammer identified as a policy of unilateralism.  
According to Krauthammer, the administration had begun a process of “reversing 
the premises of Clinton foreign policy and adopting policies that recognize the new 
unipolarity and the unilateralism necessary to maintain it” (n. pag.).  In short, while 
the Clinton administration attempted to downplay the position of the United States 
as the sole superpower in the wake of the Cold War, the Bush administration 
embraced it by beginning to act unilaterally “to maintain *US+ pre-eminence” (n. 
pag.).  Additionally, Krauthammer argued that according to Bush administration 
policies, the US might eventually need to adopt a policy of “pre-emption.”  
However, there is no substantive engagement with the concept.  Writing in June of 
2001, Krauthammer could not have guessed the application these principles of 
what he termed “the Bush doctrine” would have. 
After 9/11, unilateralism and pre-emption became hallmarks of the Bush foreign 
policy as wars were launched in both Afghanistan and Iraq without approval from 
the United Nations.  In the case of the Iraq invasion, it was primarily justified by 
arguing the United States was under imminent threat from Saddam Hussein who, it 
was claimed, possessed and would use Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) 
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against the United States.  The fact that key evidence which supported the notion 
that Iraq had WMDs has come under considerable questioning—the Downing 
Street Memo and the Plame/Wilson scandal being key instances of doubt—as well 
as the lack of any exit strategy from Iraq suggest ulterior motives for the invasion, 
specifically occupation of the country for oil.  Interestingly, Krauthammer states 
that the United States has “no particular desire…to conquer for the extraction of 
natural resources” (n. pag.).  Regardless, the salient points of this discussion are 
that the Bush doctrine essentially revitalised the concept of victory culture that 
Tom Engelhardt claimed died with the Cold War (x-xi).  Engelhardt of course revised 
his position after 9/11 since the United States once again played the role of a noble 
defender even as it was the aggressor and instigator of multiple conflicts including 
the Second Iraq War.  This image is embodied in the figure of George W Bush who, 
in his construction of his own image as a cowboy, attempted to play the role of a 
world sheriff, ostensibly protecting smaller nations from “rogue” nations.  This is 
important because it is ultimately that role that Harry Potter himself assumes as he 
essentially adheres to the Bush doctrine, in letter if not entirely in action. 
As discussed in Chapter Three, the primary principles of the Bush doctrine as laid 
out by Krauthammer are that the United States acts as enforcer of the peace, 
maintainer of the peace, and extender of the peace (n. pag.).  Despite the 
proliferation of the word peace here, it is important to acknowledged that the 
policy is predicated on much violence—direct, structural, and cultural--as the 
policies are designed around overt and implicit assertion that the United States is 
the “top dog,” to use the language Galtung does (“Cultural” 295), in relation to all 
other nations.  In The Sorcerer’s Stone, Harry enforces the peace, doing so at one 
point by openly confronting classmate, Draco, who is harassing other students.  The 
most striking similarity between the actions Harry takes and the Bush doctrine, 
however, is when Harry eschews the rules and regulations of the school, and even 
the authorities of the school, to unilaterally and pre-emptively break into a 
forbidden part of the school to defeat the villain.  The rationale is that if he does 
not do this the enemy Other will obtain an object of immeasurable importance, the 
titular sorcerer’s stone, which can be used to mount a campaign of direct violence.  
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This cavalier approach to crisis, of course, succeeds wildly in the film and in so doing 
it validates it as the approach towards maintaining peace suggested by the Bush 
doctrine.  It is worth returning then to the idea of “wishing for” 9/11 advanced by 
Baudrillard (7), wherein he argued the disaster films of the 1990s articulated a 
dream for the end of the hegemony of the United States. 
As I have asserted in previous chapters, the popularity of certain films outside the 
disaster genre, and even those within it, showed that those which resolved the 
post-Cold War identity crisis of the United States resonated with domestic 
audiences.  In that same way, I contend that the attacks of September 11 created a 
desire for a simplified Self/Other relationship that the Bush administration 
addressed by creating a binary world of good and evil.  Along those lines, The 
Sorcerer’s Stone resonated with viewers not simply because of the represented 
struggle between good and evil, but because good triumphs.  What is more, the 
process by which evil was defeated in the film—pre-emptively and unilaterally—
strongly resembled the policies of the Bush administration even before September 
11.  With that dream, however, comes its nightmarish underside, which is paranoia.  
Accordingly, it is necessary to return to the concept of the crusade here. 
As mentioned above, the notion of 9/11 being the start of a crusade against evil 
began just days after the events of September 11 with remarks made by Bush.  
With the nebulous identifications of the enemies, the Other, subsequently made, a 
domestic search started for the Other within the Self, thus showing how a discrete 
Self/Other relationship was no longer viable.  The USA PATRIOT Act once again 
demonstrates how this is the case as it provided the legislative groundwork from 
which constitutionally questionable tactics, such as domestic-wiretapping, were 
facilitated.  The justification for this paranoia was the threat of harm; the Other 
could strike at any moment.  In The Sorcerer’s Stone, this same paranoid logic was 
at work, with the Other hiding within the Self, ultimately striking and nearly killing 
the hero.  When Harry kills Quirrell with his touch, the explanation given for this 
miraculous moment is not magic, but instead it is love.  Quirrell, apparently, was so 
evil that love killed him.  As fantastic as that sounds, it is virtually the same as 
saying it was because of freedom that the terrorists attacked the United States.  In 
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both instances, the mythic nature of the conflicts draws attention away from 
accompanying structures of violence, ultimately supporting white patriarchal 
authority. 
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Chapter Seven 
Atoning for Sins Past: Spider-Man (2002) 
In 2002, the “crusade” that George W. Bush led against terrorists transitioned from 
Afghanistan to Iraq.  Although many have subsequently argued that Iraq was the 
target even before the attacks of 9/11—Joyce Battle (2010) asserts that 
“September 11 was not the motivation for the U.S. invasion of Iraq – it was a 
distraction from it” (n. pag.)—Iraq became a formal target in early 2002.  As I have 
already noted, this was evident in the 2002 State of the Union Address where Bush 
identified Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, as the “axis of evil” (“President” n. 
pag.) and claimed that they were “arming to threaten the peace of the world” 
(“President” n. pag.).  Additionally, he argued that given the threats these states 
posed to the United States, “the price of indifference would be catastrophic” 
(“President” n. pag.).  He also added that “The United States of America will not 
permit the world’s most dangerous regimes to threaten us with the world’s most 
destructive weapons” (“President” n. pag.).  In essence, he reiterated the principles 
of the Bush Doctrine, suggesting that the United States had an obligation to depose 
the leadership of those countries, and alluded to the potential for pre-emption.  
What all of this rhetoric hinges upon is a Self/Other paradigm that positions the 
United States as a victimised Self, and the nations which support and harbour 
terrorists as part of a monolithic evil Other.  However, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, the nature of the crusade and its binary worldview engenders a shift in the 
actual shape of the relationship between the Self and the Other. 
Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone was predicated upon paranoia.  The Other, 
the film warned, could be hidden within the Self.  To convey this message, the film 
utilised the false villain device.  This device concealed the identity of the true villain 
until the end of the film.  The revelation of the villain encouraged the audience to 
look upon the Self with suspicion to find a potentially concealed Other.  In May of 
2002, seven months after the premiere of The Sorcerer’s Stone in the United States, 
Spider-Man was released, and it solidified that shift.  Unlike The Sorcerer’s Stone, 
186 
 
Spider-Man dispensed with the false villain device and openly presented the Self as 
having been infiltrated by the Other.  Since that device was key to concealing major 
structures of violence within the film, its lack in Spider-Man opened the film up to 
more diverse readings, particularly with regard to the events of 9/11. 
In a blatant effort to capitalise on the sympathies of post-9/11 audiences, Spider-
Man flaunts its patriotism, and overtly and covertly plays to the reawakened 
national pride found in that population.  This is evident not only in something as 
simple as the colouration of Spider-Man, a red and blue which is directly connected 
to that of the American flag in the film (as it has been in the comic), but it is also 
clear in the self-censorship of the film.  Specifically, an early teaser trailer, which 
prominently featured the World Trade Center buildings, was re-edited to omit them.  
Similarly, the World Trade Center buildings are absent from the numerous skyline 
shots found in the final film.  The result is that even though the film never directly 
references the attacks of 9/11 and the destruction they caused in New York City, 
the traces of the event of 9/11 are felt throughout the film regardless.  This is 
particularly true of the story itself, which tells how Spider-Man gained his powers 
and ultimately uses them for good, after suffering a harsh loss for failing to use 
them.  This lesson is driven home through the repeated utterance of the key line in 
the film: “With great power comes great responsibility.” 
My analysis in this chapter will focus on the ways in which the refined articulation 
of Self and Other ultimately can be read as condoning the 2003 invasion of Iraq 
while simultaneously condemning its critics as Others within the Self.  The key to 
understanding how Spider-Man positions its Self/Other relationship in that fashion 
is the historical context of its release.  Accordingly, the first element of my analysis 
will be an examination of how the events of 9/11 and the subsequent wars 
responded to the policies of the pre-9/11 United States.  Specifically, I will look at 
how the “end of victory culture,” as Tom Engelhardt labels it in his book of the 
same name, engendered a sense of shame which plagued the US military, 
something often associated with the Vietnam syndrome as well (10-15).  This 
discussion suggests that the events of 9/11 transformed the shame over military 
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intervention into shame over military non-intervention.  That argument, which is 
developed further at the conclusion of the chapter, serves as a means of 
understanding how Spider-Man defines its Self and Other.  This is important 
because it is the articulation of Self and Other which normalises the internalisation 
the Other; the Self may contain a hidden Other.  What is more, it shows how the 
standard structures of violence utilised to mark the Others in films thus far are not 
precisely the same structures that define the Self and the Other in this film.  Instead, 
both are defined by their relationship to the central theme of the film, which is 
power necessitating responsibility.  To understand how this relationship connects 
to the historical moment of its release, my analysis will approach the concept of 
atonement, which the film deals with extensively.  I will then draw that discussion 
into a broader context by comparing the process of atonement in the film to both 
the Clinton and Bush Doctrines with my analysis here fully developing the argument 
that the pre-9/11 shame was transformed by the events of 9/11 while at the same 
time depicting a shift from the Clinton Doctrine to the Bush Doctrine.  My analysis 
will then conclude by showing how this transformation is dramatised in Spider-Man 
in such a way that it essentially articulates the “dream” of a situation where a noble 
invasion serves as a means of atonement for a shamed nation. 
Sins of the US Father 
When discussing the victory in the first Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush 
remarked that, “It's a proud day for America. And, by God, we've kicked the 
Vietnam syndrome once and for all” (“Remarks” n. pag.).  As mentioned previously, 
Douglas Kellner describes the Vietnam syndrome as “the shame concerning the loss 
of the war and overcoming the reluctance to again use U.S. military power” (Media 
28).  The words of Bush Sr., then, seem to present the First Gulf War as a noble act 
which served to atone for the Vietnam War such that the stature of the US military 
would return to the glory it won in World War II.  However, the record of military 
interventions during the 1990s shows that US military power had not been fully 
recuperated.  For instance, the American involvement in the Kosovo War in 1999 
was criticised despite the supposedly noble intentions President Clinton argued for, 
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including preventing genocide.  The opposition to US involvement in Kosovo 
supports the argument made by Engelhardt (10-15) that the Vietnam syndrome and 
the avoidance of using military power was part of a larger movement away from 
“victory culture.”  As the failed bid for re-election Bush Sr. made in the wake of the 
First Gulf War shows, the war did not bathe all of his acts in the “purifying glow” 
Engelhardt argues accompanied militaristic endeavours in victory culture (4).  Thus, 
the atonement of the US military for Vietnam and other post-World War II 
interventions was incomplete.  As Engelhardt observes, though, in the wake of 9/11 
victory culture returned. 
After the Cold War ended, Engelhardt noted that the United States was plagued by 
being the only superpower in a world built by the struggle between two 
superpowers.  Without the Soviet Other, the US did not have an enemy against 
which to define itself.  This began to change even in the pre-9/11 period of the 
presidency of Bush Jr.  As Charles Krauthammer observed when he defined the 
Bush Doctrine in 2001, stating that the major difference between the Clinton and 
Bush administrations was that the Clinton administration sought to placate the 
other major players in the world despite the fact that they were all inferior to the 
United States (n. pag.).  The Bush administration, Krauthammer claims, finally 
accepted the role the United States had as the most powerful nation on the planet 
(n. pag.).  Based on that suggestion, it can be argued that the Clinton era was 
associated with further shame for being the victor of the Cold War given the high 
costs needed to reach that level, such as the Vietnam War.  The Bush 
administration, according to Krauthammer, cast off the shame of being the sole 
super power in a number of ways, most notably by acting unilaterally.  What began 
to take shape, then, was a binary world which was divided between the United 
States and all other nations—which were implied to be inferior.  According to Johan 
Galtung, this is a form of ideologically-driven cultural violence (“Cultural” 298-299).  
Specifically, the nation becomes the Chosen one while that which is not the nation 
becomes the Unchosen one.  The result is that the Chosen nation, in this case the 
United States, is seen to be more worthy of everything, a position which creates a 
global inequity which favours the United States.  While the ideology behind the 
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violence in the Bush presidency both pre- and post-9/11 is the same, the exact 
formulation is different. 
Before 9/11, Bush attempted to define a national imaginary.  He constructed a 
cowboy/rancher persona, but in terms of the mythological nature of that figure, he 
lacked an evil Other.  He was a cowboy without purpose.  What is more, despite the 
fact that his government acted unilaterally in its responses to 9/11, he did not have 
full public support in the United States.  This is primarily due to the highly contested 
nature of the 2000 election which brought him to office.  In that election, disputes 
surrounding the votes in the state of Florida led to a delayed election result that 
cast a pall over the victory Bush ultimately claimed.  This was underscored by the 
fact that Al Gore, the Democratic candidate, actually won the popular vote.  Thus 
during the first months in which Bush was in office, the nation was divided as the 
enemy was not foreign, but domestic.  Although the red state/blue state paradigm 
would truly take hold during the 2004 election cycle, divisiveness was present 
throughout the country.  In terms of the state system described by Galtung, the 
United States was essentially a multi-national system where the national sphere 
would be stratified along various lines such as race and class.  Thus, the capacity for 
violence in the domestic sphere—cultural, structural, and direct—was high (Galtung 
Peace 66).  For the nationalistic cultural violence to take hold, a unified domestic 
space is required, and for that a common Other is needed, which is exactly what the 
attacks of 9/11 provided. 
Although Bush only referred to the conflict as a “crusade” once, the label 
established a conflict wherein the United States and its allies were in diametric 
opposition to the terrorists and those who would harbour and support them.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, the conflict carried with it obvious religious 
connotations, but it also bore a nationalist quality as Bush claimed that the reason 
the United States was a target was because of its democratic ways, as evidenced in 
definition of the Other via the Four Freedoms.  That comment served the double 
purpose of identifying the Other as well as the Self in mythic terms.  However, the 
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attacks provided more than just a redefinition of Self as they also redefined shame 
for the nation. 
As discussed above, the Vietnam syndrome refers to a pervasive sense of shame 
felt by many in the United States in the wake of the Vietnam War.  Again as Kellner 
observes, that shame led to a “reluctance to again use US military power” (Media 
28).  What the attacks of 9/11 suggested was that the post-Cold War era had been 
one of leniency and complacency.  Bush Sr. did not depose Saddam Hussein and 
Clinton, despite urging a regime change in Iraq and noting the significance of Osama 
bin Laden as a threat to the United States, did not properly safeguard the nation 
through military action.  What is more, the World Trade Center bombing that took 
place in 1993 indicated the value of the target to terrorists, yet no counter-
terrorism precautions were maintained (Lipton “Giuliani” n. pag.).  Thus, it is my 
contention that 9/11 took the shame over military power and transformed it into 
shame over not using military power.  It is no surprise, then, that the War in 
Afghanistan began on October 9, 2001, less than a month after September 11.   
It is important to note again that just before the war in Afghanistan Bush held an 
approval rating of 90% (“President Bush’s Approval” n. pag.).  Similarly, the policies 
being pushed through the US government were well received.  The USA PATRIOT 
Act, for instance, which is constitutionally questionable (Whitehead & Aden 
“Forfeiting” 1083-1086), passed on October 25 in the Senate with a margin of 98 to 
1 with 1 abstention.  Thus in the immediate wake of the events of 9/11, the United 
States was largely unified, in the early stages of a crusade where, as Bush remarked 
on September 20, 2001, “Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” 
(“Address” n. pag.).  However, such a strict division between Self and Other led to 
the realisation of what James Carroll argues is a peril of a crusade, which is that 
“mobilization against an enemy outside inevitably led to a paranoid fear of enemies 
within” such that “The war against Islam abroad became a war against dissent at 
home” (25).  Accordingly, the Other within the Self served as a reminder of the 
shame the nation felt, and was as threatening as the external Other.  It is this same 
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articulation of the Other as both a foreign and domestic threat that Spider-Man 
utilises. 
Old Glory: Patriotism, Self, and Other in Spider-Man 
With Spider-Man, it is clear from the promotional materials alone that Spider-Man 
(Tobey Maguire) is the hero and that the Green Goblin (Willem Dafoe) is the villain.  
Despite that clarity, it is not as easy to define the Self and the Other.  This is 
because both Spider-Man and the Green Goblin have alter-egos.  Spider-Man is also 
the average lower-class kid, Peter Parker, and the Green Goblin is also the ultra-
wealthy military manufacturing magnate, Norman Osborne.  While Parker and 
Spider-Man are both part of the Self, and the Goblin is Other, Osborne straddles the 
line between the two.  This is mainly due to the fact that he is not initially entirely 
aware that he is the Green Goblin.  Accordingly, he is both Self and Other.  
However, unlike The Sorcerer’s Stone which conceals the penetration of the Self by 
the Other using a false villain device, Spider-Man makes this configuration clear 
from the outset, opting instead for simple dramatic irony; the audience knows that 
Osborne is also the villainous Green Goblin even though Spider-Man does not until 
the end of the film.  Thus, instead of the plot revealing to the audience that the 
Other might be hiding within the Self, the film shows that the Other is expected to 
be within the Self.  A cultural paranoia, which was reliant upon surprise in The 
Sorcerer’s Stone is thus normalised in Spider-Man.  While that continues to suggest 
that the Self should be probed, it also directs the suspicions of the audience, 
focusing them directly on the characterisations of both Spider-Man and the Green 
Goblin.  In more specific terms, the viewer is guided by the film to observe the ways 
in which these characters are aligned, for both good and evil.  One of the most 
overt connections made between both characters is their connection with the 
United States. 
 
Patriotism is a key factor in the identity of both the hero and the villain.  For the 
hero this is clear from the opening and closing shots which feature the flag of the 
United States.  The first shot identifies the neighbourhood that Peter Parker comes 
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from as being a generic, all-American place—one of the boroughs of New York 
City—which has the US flag prominently hanging from the front of a local business.  
The final shot shows a triumphant Spider-Man swinging around the city until he 
finally lands atop a building where he poses for a moment on a flag pole with his 
red and blue costume harmonising with the flag.  He then leaps away, leaving the 
US flag waving in the wind, as seen in Figure 22.  Spider-Man is thus equated with 
heroic America, and with all that the flag represents.  Interestingly, these shots are 
very similar to the literal flag waving found in the opening and closing shots of 
Saving Private Ryan (1998) as well as the opening shot of Independence Day.  Unlike 
those films, however, where the flag is in peril—from Nazis and aliens 
respectively—in Spider-Man it is a valiant symbol suggesting that the prediction 
made by Robert Kaplan, that “the traditional symbols of American patriotism” (76) 
would wane, had expressly not come to pass.  The connection between Spider-Man 
and the United States is made even more explicit when Spider-Man is fighting the 
Green Goblin near the end of the film.  He is trying to save both the girl he loves 
and a cable car full of children while the Goblin is attempting to kill them all.  
Citizens of the city intervene at the last moment, stopping the Goblin and allowing 
Spider-man to save everybody.  As they do this, one of the people shouts “Mess 
with Spidey and you mess with New York!”  Given the position of New York City in 
the wake of 9/11 as “America’s City,” the equation between Spider-Man and New 
York makes the connection between him and the United States is even stronger.  
Thus, the United States is positioned as a heroic entity, embodied in Spider-Man, 
which will defend its citizens at all costs as its citizens will defend it.  Yet even as 
Spider-Man is so forcefully paired with the United States, so too is the Green 
Goblin. 
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Figure 22 - New glory and Old Glory: the final moments of Spider-Man 
 
Norman Osborne is a prime example of capitalism.  According to the film, he 
founded the company, Oscorp, and grew it into a powerful government contractor 
that is the number one supplier for the US military.  While this could be framed in a 
positive way, the film uses his position to mount a mild critique of capitalism.  For 
instance, Oscorp is developing a super-soldier serum which is not working as 
planned so Osborne tests it on himself in an effort to expedite research and secure 
funding.  This goes predictably awry and turns Osborne into a homicidal madman.  
While it could be said that Osborne is a victim of his own ambition, it is equally the 
case that he is driven by the strictures of society.  In a psychoanalytic reading of the 
film, Robert Peaslee suggests that the Green Goblin “is a clear representation of the 
unbridled ego” (n. pag.) which serves as a counterpoint to the “Protestant values” 
held by Osborne “such as a rigid work ethic, advancement and accumulation 
through wisdom and frugality, and responsibility” (“With” n. pag.).  This analysis 
from Peaslee largely supports the notion that the system is what has driven 
Osborne mad, not his aspirations. 
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However, it should be noted that in testing the product on himself, Osborne 
perfectly plays the role of the mad scientist defined by Susan Sontag in her 
discussion of science fiction disaster films of the 1950s, since he uses science to 
create something which could ultimately threaten humanity itself (45).  While the 
attacks of the Goblin are not shown to be threatening on a global level, the fact that 
the US military is interested in acquiring the technology suggests a darker underside 
to it all.  The US military is of course saved from being demonised as they search for 
another more responsible supplier—one that Sontag would describe as being able 
to “administer the same scientific discovery better and more safely” (46)—and in so 
doing become victims of the Green Goblin.  Thus the Goblin essentially represents 
the military-industrial complex and capitalism having (literally) gone mad.  This is 
underscored even further when the board of directors votes to sell the company 
and to oust Osborne as CEO, thereby provoking the Goblin again, who kills them.  In 
terms of Self and Other, the Goblin is clearly the Other as he is attempting to 
destroy not just an American city, but what was at that time the American city.  
Norman Osborne, however, is caught between Self and Other since he is a victim of 
corporate capitalism.  Even so, being a blockbuster film heavily dependent upon 
corporate support, it does not critique corporations too thoroughly.  The salient 
point of the critique remains the double position of Norman Osborne as victim and 
perpetrator.  This is important not only because it normalises suspicion and 
paranoia, but also because it makes the identification of the Other more 
challenging.  This is on account of many of the traditional structures of violence that 
would mark one as an Other not being present in Osborne. 
The villain of Spider-Man, Norman Osborne, stands in stark contrast to both the 
villain and the false villain in The Sorcerer’s Stone, who were effeminate, with the 
villain additionally being marked as an ethnic Other by way of various stereotypical 
traits including his turban; Osborne is a virile white male.  While this is by no means 
a sign of goodness—white men are often villains as evidenced in Titanic with 
Caledon Hockley (Billy Zane)—the whiteness and masculinity displayed by Osborne 
are not dramatically different from the whiteness and masculinity which Spider-
Man possesses.  The prominence of men in the story, of course, reasserts the 
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power of patriarchal authority.  The result is a privileging of men over women.  
Mary Jane Watson (Kirsten Dunst) is the girl that Peter Parker loves.  However, his 
relationship with her is one of silent yearning and, to Spider-Man, Mary Jane is 
simply a woman that needs to be rescued from a man by a man; her fate is not her 
own.  The fact that masculinity is privileged, however, is not mobilised against the 
Green Goblin as his masculinity is not challenged in standard ways such as by 
making him effeminate, despite the fact that he poses as an injured woman in one 
scene to lure Spider-Man into a trap.  Instead, the major differences between 
Spider-Man and the Green Goblin can be found in the oft-repeated line in the film, 
“With great power comes great responsibility,” which is first uttered by Uncle Ben 
(Cliff Robertson), the uncle and surrogate father of Peter Parker, just before he dies.  
Interestingly, Norman Osborne is presented as a potential surrogate father after 
Uncle Ben dies.  Koh observes further that the Green Goblin, in offering Spider-Man 
“a Faustian apprenticeship” (743), reinforces a larger structures of Oedipal themes 
in the film.  While the issues of fatherhood certainly merit closer scrutiny, which 
Koh gives them, the larger point here is that what differentiates the hero and the 
villain in the film is their stance on the statement of responsibility: Spider-Man 
heeds it and the Green Goblin does not.  This is most evident in the way they are 
defined in relation to both class and technology, which will be explored in turn. 
Norman Osborne is a wealthy man.  As stated above, he is the head of a major 
corporation, and lives a lifestyle filled with mansions, chauffeurs, and apparently 
limitless wealth.  It seems in the film that his wealth, again like the villainous 
Hockley in Titanic, is only spent on himself and his immediate family.  Although his 
wealth is scorned by his son, Harry Osborne (James Franco), Harry makes use of the 
wealth for his own benefit throughout the film and ultimately replaces his father, 
who dies at the climax.  What makes this a particularly negative quality is that he 
uses the wealth to win over Mary Jane, the girl Peter Parker loves, though he is too 
shy to admit his feelings.  Again, this patriarchal situation denies Mary Jane any 
agency.  In terms of class, though, Peter Parker is just the opposite of the Osbornes.  
He is shown to come from meagre, but hardly impoverished beginnings.  Initially he 
sees power as a means of gaining personal wealth.  This is evident when he enters a 
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wrestling contest to win money so he can buy a car to impress Mary Jane.  
However, when his lack of respect for his power results in the death of his uncle, he 
understands that class mobility is inconsequential and that his duty to society, 
which might relegate him to a permanent life of poverty, is of the utmost 
importance.  Thus, the film does not criticise the accumulation of wealth or power, 
but it does assert that the Self is selfless while the Other is selfish.  A similar 
paradigm emerges when the positioning of technology is examined in the film. 
 
 
 
Figure 23 - The techno-terror of Spider-Man 
 
As with many of the films analysed thus far, Spider-Man exhibits both technophobia 
and technophilia, although it displays these traits in a covert fashion.  In terms of 
technophobia, the film shows particular wariness toward military technology.  This 
is evident in the fact that the Green Goblin, his glider, and his weaponry, are all the 
product of military research, and explicitly exhibit a machine aesthetic, as shown in 
Figure 23.  It is, the film suggests, research for the armed forces which drives the 
Green Goblin mad.  However, Spider-Man himself is the product of technology as 
well.  Peter Parker gets his super powers from the bite of a genetically-modified 
spider.  Unlike the technology which produces the Goblin, however, the spider is 
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produced at a university.  Furthermore, while the technology Spider-Man uses is 
internalised and becomes a part of his body, the internal transformation of the 
Goblin becomes externalised in the form of an armoured flight suit.  In this way, the 
more natural technology of Spider-Man emphasises his humanity while the 
mechanical technology of the Goblin diminishes his own.  This double position of 
technophilia and technophobia is summed up by Wilson Koh, who remarks that the 
technology “is presented as miraculous and monstrous by turns” (737).  Given the 
fear of technology, it is useful here to engage again with the position on technology 
which is articulated by Michael Ryan and Douglas Kellner in their discussion of 
technophobic science fiction films.  The argument they make is that technophobia 
is often a conservative position and that films which exhibit it suggest that  
 
“technology represents artifice as opposed to nature, the 
mechanical as opposed to spontaneous, the regulated as opposed 
to the free, an equalizer as opposed to a promoter of individual 
distinction, equality triumphant as opposed to liberty, democratic 
living as opposed to hierarchy derived from individual superiority” 
(245). 
 
While first half of the argument accurately captures the anxieties surrounding the 
Green Goblin and his lack of regard for humanity, the second half does not suit the 
film.  This lack of parity suggests that the film articulates a technophobia which is 
not conservative in that way.  Instead, the technophobia seems to be driven by 
patriotic ideals.  Accordingly, the film echoes the individualistic principles of the 
United States which suggest that things such as technology and wealth are not 
inherently evil, and instead it is up to each person to decide whether they will use 
them for good or for evil.  Interestingly, for both the Self and Other, power is 
equated with direct violence.  Granted Spider-Man responds to direct violence 
rather than initiating it, the result is still that direct violence is praised as heroic 
even as it is condemned as villainous.  To again cite the key line of the film, “With 
great power comes great responsibility,” and Spider-Man, the Self, ultimately heeds 
these words in all aspects of his being while the Green Goblin, the Other, respects 
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them in none.  As for Osborne, it is when the concept of Self and Other is 
approached in this way that he clearly becomes the Other since he lacks concern 
for the greater good.  Thus when Spider-Man ultimately defeats the Green 
Goblin/Norman Osborne, it is actually a purging of American society of those 
elements which take the position of America for granted.  Spider-Man, then, 
effectively purifies the nation.  
Eternal Vigilance: Spider-Man, Atonement, and Presidential Doctrines 
Atonement is a key trope in cinema.  As Christopher Robert Deacy observes, “While 
not all films which are produced by Hollywood may be carriers of religious 
significance, it is in the medium of film that prominent expressions of religiousness 
and fertile models and exemplars of redemptive activity can be seen to abound” 
(“Redemption” n. pag.).27  That having been said, Spider-Man is a film very 
concerned with atonement.  The central plotline sees high-school nerd Peter Parker 
gaining super-powers after being bitten by a genetically engineered spider.  Later, 
when he fails to use them to stop a criminal, his uncle is killed as a result.  His 
subsequent actions, fighting crime at all levels from petty theft to grand larceny, are 
undertaken in an effort to atone for his failure to use his great power responsibly.  
Niall Richardson argues that the film is “on various levels, a Biblical allegory” (694).  
Apart from overt religious references, Richardson finds this allegorical reading of 
the film in the way it deals with guilt and shame.  Drawing on the separate 
theoretical works of Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Steve Connor, Richardson defines 
guilt as an objective quality attached “to specific deeds or actions” (698) such that a 
person can be guilty of having done something.  Shame is an internal quality.  
Richardson remarks that “a subject cannot be separated from his shame; he is his 
shame” (698).  This leads him to conclude that “Christianity is such a popular and 
convenient religion because it offers the opportunity of transcribing shame into 
guilt and temporarily expunging it” (698).  Whether or not one agrees with that 
assessment of Christianity, the ultimate conclusion Richardson reaches is that 
“Spider-Man is constantly atoning for his guilt for the death of Uncle Ben” (699).  
                                                             
27
 For a more comprehensive look at redemptive themes in Hollywood cinema, see Deacy Faith in 
Film. 
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Thus, the film can be seen to exist in two parts with the death of Uncle Ben serving 
as the point of demarcation between the two.  Before that point, Spider-Man is 
selfish, and after that point he is selfless.  In the second half, his selflessness is 
driven by a need to “expunge” his shame for his behaviour in the first half and its 
consequences.   
Wilson Koh argues that the film is a nostalgic film in the sense articulated by Fredric 
Jameson, which is that it is “historicist rather than historical” (The Cultural 130).  In 
other words, Koh sees the mise-en-scène of the film actively creating “idealized 
interpretations of the past” (737) such that the film ultimately avoids identification 
with the post-9/11 trauma the city—and indeed the nation—suffered, such that the 
film “provides its audiences with an appealing better-than-real illusion to escape 
into” (738).  While there is certainly a nostalgic feel throughout much of the film, 
even Koh acknowledges that there are still overt connections to the events of 9/11 
and the aftermath.  For him these connections are limited, yet his citation of a 
comment which establishes connections between the film and 9/11 shows that 
audiences did indeed notice such parallels (744).  It is arguable, however, that the 
film bears pervasive traces of the events of 9/11, and it is precisely because it does 
that it resonated so strongly with US audiences.  In order to understand why 
audiences responded to the film, it is necessary to consider the narrative split with 
regard to the United States during the 1990s, particularly with regard to the Clinton 
Doctrine. 
On February 26, 1999, President Bill Clinton delivered a speech that has been 
interpreted as signposting the key principles of his presidency.  In that speech, 
Clinton made the following remarks: 
“The question we must ask is, what are the consequences to our 
security of letting conflicts fester and spread. We cannot, indeed, 
we should not, do everything or be everywhere. But where our 
values and our interests are at stake, and where we can make a 
difference, we must be prepared to do so. And we must remember 
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that the real challenge of foreign policy is to deal with problems 
before they harm our national interests” (“Remarks” n. pag.). 
While it does have some similarities to the Bush Doctrine, it does not position the 
United States as a guardian of the world; the United States is not the Chosen nation, 
to use the language of cultural violence.  Instead, it suggests that the United States 
will absolutely intervene in foreign affairs—with military force even—provided 
there is a clear benefit for the nation.  This is not a selfish position, so to speak, 
especially when considering that at the time of the speech the United States was 
comprised of almost 300 million people.  However, when treated as a single 
entity—the United States—the Clinton Doctrine can be seen as self-serving.  The US 
will do only that which threatens its “national interests,” which are nebulously 
defined.  In terms of Spider-Man, then, the selfish first half of the film is the 
equivalent of the Clinton Doctrine. 
The US emerged from the Cold War as the sole super-power, and Clinton, according 
to Krauthammer who chastised him for it, sought to appease lesser nations rather 
than act unilaterally and bear the mantle of power proudly (n. pag).  The Clinton 
Doctrine bears this out, as rather than asserting the (super) power of the United 
States onto the nations of the world, ostensibly to defend them, it guards its power.  
This is, of course, in direct contrast to the Bush Doctrine which, as defined by 
Krauthammer, overtly seeks “to extend peace by spreading democracy and free 
institutions” (n. pag.).  It is necessary, though, to note the links between the two.  
For instance, the Clinton Doctrine essentially legitimises military interventions, a 
stark shift from the positions informed by the Vietnam syndrome which made 
warfare shameful.  In fact, the Clinton Doctrine so clearly advocated the strategic 
use of the US military that commentators such as Michael T. Klare, defense 
correspondent for The Nation, cautioned of the ultimate end it might lead to.  As 
Klare wrote in 1999, in the wake of the bombings during the Kosovo War,  
“If the newly hatched Clinton Doctrine is not repudiated, the 
bombing of Yugoslavia may be only the first in a series of recurring 
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overseas interventions—a prospect that should galvanize peace and 
disarmament groups across America” (n. pag.). 
While the Bush Doctrine has ultimately proven those concerns to be quite valid, the 
military aspect of the Bush Doctrine only began in earnest in the wake of 9/11, and 
it was primarily motivated by shame. 
While many have attempted to place blame for the attacks of 9/11 on people on 
both sides of the political spectrum, there is no definitive locus for blame; the 
attacks happened due to any number of interrelated issues.  However, the 
ambiguity of the rationale is not sufficient to appease the immediacy of the feelings 
awakened by the images of destruction the attacks produced—fear, anger, hate, 
and more.  These feelings were exacerbated by suggestions that the attacks may 
have been preventable.  For instance, in 2005 the United States, via the Justice 
Department Office of the Inspector General, released a report that assessed the 
pre-9/11 performance of the FBI and concluded that “*their+ review found 
significant deficiencies in the FBI’s handling of intelligence information relating to 
the September 11 attacks” (A Review Chapter 6, n. pag.).  From this, it can be 
argued, a sense of shame arose.  While that shame includes regret over not using 
military force more proactively—or pre-emptively to use the language of the Bush 
Doctrine—it is not predicated upon military involvement.  Instead, the shame, 
much like the Bush Doctrine, is predicated upon the notion that the United States 
has both great power and great responsibility.  Being the bearer of that power, then, 
the United States is obligated to work in any capacity it can to prevent events like 
the attacks of 9/11 no matter where they might happen on the globe, in order to 
atone for the shame of 9/11.  The response to 9/11, then, particularly the invasion 
of Iraq in 2003, was a response to that shame, and Spider-Man, released in mid-
2002, represents an articulation of those dreams before they came to pass.  One 
major difference between the Bush Doctrine and Spider-Man that must be 
addressed is the concept of pre-emptive direct violence.  Spider-Man fights crime, 
but he only uses his powers in response to direct violence, as is seen in a montage 
where he stops robberies and other crimes.  Even when he is being bullied in school, 
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he only attacks after he has been attacked.  Conversely, as spelled out in the Bush 
Doctrine, it is expected that the United States will sometimes need to strike first, 
particularly if the stakes are high enough.  Despite that difference, the film still 
dreams of the application of the Bush Doctrine. 
Spider-Man and Iraq: Guilt After 9/11 
As noted above, Richardson argues that Spider-Man is able to “expunge” shame by 
turning it into guilt (698-699).  To do this he claims that Spider-Man “must 
therefore continuously protect the innocent from the thugs and criminals of the city” 
since he has “pleaded guilty to the death of his Uncle Ben” (699).  Richardson builds 
a larger argument, then, that the shame that led to the death of Uncle Ben was his 
shame over pursuing his selfish (and base) desire for Mary Jane (699).  In terms of 
the two halves of the plot, then, the first half is retroactively one of shame, while 
the second is one of guilt, with a sense of atonement as well.  The pre-9/11 period 
of the Clinton Doctrine was a time of shame, which was largely an extension of the 
Vietnam syndrome.  During this time the US monitored its own well-being and, as 
discussed above with the Clinton Doctrine, acted selfishly, so to speak.  This shame 
was largely retroactive since what it failed to do was to prevent 9/11.  Whether or 
not 9/11 was actually preventable is not important here since there has been 
sufficient doubt cast on the argument that it was unpreventable.  It is important, 
however, that the doubts surrounding the preventability of 9/11 are focused on the 
military.  Thus, the shame of the Vietnam syndrome and “victory culture” as a 
whole became a major factor in considering the events of 9/11.  This was 
particularly the case in the rhetoric utilised by the Bush administration which 
brought military intervention to the fore.  Engelhardt ties this directly together with 
victory culture when Bush said he wanted bin Laden “‘Dead or Alive’” (313).  In 
terms of deeds, the almost immediate invasion of Afghanistan in October of 2001 
showed that rhetoric and action were quickly joined.  As with Spider-Man, the 
violence in Afghanistan could be interpreted as a transcription of shame into guilt.  
The United States felt shame for not securing its borders.  However, as with the 
crime-fighting Spider-Man performs, invading Afghanistan allowed the shame to 
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become an admission of guilt.  Yet as with Spider-Man, the protection must be 
continuous and explicit.  Thus the war in Afghanistan, which is still being waged a 
decade later, was not sufficient since the visibility of the protection ebbed.  
Accordingly a new target needed to be named, which is to say a new threat had to 
be offered to the public.  Along those lines, Bush remarked in his 2002 State of the 
Union Address that in the new world of us versus them, “the price of indifference 
would be catastrophic” (“President” n. pag.).  Iraq was presented as the next major 
threat, and for much of 2002 the Bush administration pushed for war.  However, as 
Carroll writes, “The war against Islam abroad became a war against dissent at home” 
(25).  While many debates have taken place which ask whether the Iraq invasion 
was a “war against Islam”—indeed many of the anxieties that Spider-Man 
addresses are about targeting a foreign Other—the duality of Norman Osborne as 
both Self and Other suggests that the anxieties in the film are simultaneously about 
the fear of an internal Other.  Specifically, through the defeat of the Green 
Goblin/Norman Osborne, the audiences of the film were able to “dream” of a 
United States where dissent against the mythic United States, both foreign and 
domestic, was quashed. 
As discussed above, the true Other of Spider-Man is not a figure who would 
traditionally be positioned as an Other, but instead has nearly all the same qualities 
of the hero.  The key difference is with regard to their positions on power.  Peter 
Parker/Spider-Man chooses to use his responsibly for the good of society while 
Norman Osborne/Green Goblin wants to use his for his own gain.  While the Self 
and Other in the film are not directly analogous to the Bush and Clinton Doctrines 
respectively, there are strong similarities.  For instance, the Self, Spider-Man, seeks 
to impose his ideology upon the citizens of New York City.  Those citizens are 
roughly divided into upstanding citizens and criminals.  Due to this binary 
opposition then, those who would not support Spider-Man would essentially be the 
same as those who oppose him, an echo of the us-or-them statement made by 
Bush on September 20, 2001.  Of course the ideology Spider-Man advocates is the 
central tenet of the film, that power demands responsibility, and it is quite different 
from the three principles of the Bush Doctrine which position the United States as 
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enforcer of peace, maintainer of peace, and extender of democracy and free 
institutions (Krauthammer “The Bush Doctrine” n. pag.).  However, the key 
connection remains that both Spider-Man and the Bush Doctrine aim to use their 
power, ostensibly, for good.  Again, this connection is based upon a mythic version 
of the Bush administration rather than a realistic assessment, but it is the mythic 
version that was often dealt with in mainstream media, media which perpetuated 
myths such as the image of Bush as a cowboy.  As for the Other, the Green Goblin, 
his agenda is the accumulation of power for personal gain.  This frame was similar 
to the one used to position Saddam Hussein as a mad tyrant.  However, the internal 
threat was not a power mad tyrant.  Instead, the Other within the Self would be 
those that opposed military action in Iraq.  In terms of atonement, they would 
effectively prevent the shame of non-intervention from being transcribed into guilt.  
This would theoretically leave the country doubly shamed as it would feel shame 
for non-intervention, but it would also, paradoxically, still feel the shame for 
intervention.  Thus, those who opposed the war would be treated as Others, and 
indeed this was the case. 
This was made clear in the 2002 controversy surrounding the director of the 
National Economic Council, Lawrence B Lindsey.  After initial estimates of the cost 
of the Iraq War were announced, Lindsey, speaking with the Wall Street Journal, 
estimated that the 50 billion USD estimate was far below what the actual cost 
would be, which he calculated would be at least 100 to 200 billion USD (Davis “Bush 
Economic Aide” n. pag.).  Although other reasons were given for his resignation just 
a few months after his criticism of the budget, the Christian Science Monitor 
observed that “the White House was certainly displeased with his comments” 
(“West Wing Loyalty” n. pag.).  However, given the binary world that Bush defined 
in his rhetoric after 9/11, it is reasonable to suggest that the comments made by 
Lindsey about the budget of the invasion of Iraq essentially established him as an 
opponent of the nation, an impediment to the continuous process of expunging 
shame.  Whether or not his resignation was motivated by that particular statement, 
the fact that other members of administration criticised his statements suggests 
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that his dissenting voice needed to be quelled.  History has, of course, proven 
Lindsey to be correct in his criticism of the budget. 
What ultimately emerged, then, was a system that attempted to be a unitary state 
system in which Galtung argues the cultural violence of nationalism was combined 
with “steep Self-Other gradients” which resulted in “the ugly ideology of the nation-
state” (“Cultural” 299) where “killing in war is now done in the name of the ‘nation’” 
(“Cultural” 299), something very clearly evidenced in the official rationale behind 
the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In terms of the state system articulated by 
Galtung (60-69), despite the overt patriotism that led many to see the United States 
as the type of unitary system Galtung describes, this apparent unification was the 
result of the Bush administration defining the Self.  As noted previously, a key 
aspect of that definition was its mobilisation of the crusader mindset.  Accordingly, 
although the crusade was a war abroad, it engendered a sense of paranoia at home.  
Again, as Spider-Man shows, that paranoia had been normalised by mid-2002 as, 
unbeknownst to the hero, the villain was both Self and Other.  Since the country 
was not actually unified in its support of Bush and the Iraq invasion, violence—
largely cultural and structural—was the result, as predicted by the state system 
model Galtung builds.  Beneath that violence, though, remained the struggle with 
shame and guilt that Spider-Man depicted and, more importantly, showed 
audiences a dream of resolving. 
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Chapter Eight 
The Failure of the King:  
The Lord of the Rings: The Return of the King 
(2003) 
 
In 2002, Spider-Man articulated the dreams of a nation embroiled in a worldwide 
conflict that President George W. Bush had labelled a “crusade.”  The film showed 
the hero triumphant and the glory of the United States was restored through the 
defeat of external enemies who were simultaneously internal.  The double-victory 
of Spider-Man pointed towards a recuperation of nationalism such that the United 
States was once again a noble Self defined in opposition to an evil Other.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, however, the film did not end in a world free of 
violence.  At the conclusion, Spider-Man is perched high above the streets of New 
York City vigilantly waiting for an Other to assault the city once again and to 
possibly infiltrate the Self.  For him to be in that position, though, it was crucial that 
he had first defeated the Green Goblin.  Even if only temporary, it showed that a 
war against evil could actually be waged.  Thus Spider-Man ended with a sense of 
vigilance and suspicion; the Other could strike at any moment, and in countless 
devious ways in this new world order.  Yet there is no sense that the war against 
evil would ever be won.  The watchful eye of Spider-Man—or one like him—it is 
suggested, always will be needed.  However, this seemed to stand in contrast to the 
rhetoric that framed the War on Terror as a long, but ultimately finite struggle.  On 
May 1, 2003, it seemed that the first major battle against terror had been won. 
On that day, Bush landed on the aircraft carrier, the USS Abraham Lincoln, and 
made a speech in which he announced that “Major combat operations in Iraq have 
ended. In the Battle of Iraq, the United States and our allies have prevailed” 
(“President Bush” n. pag.).  Praising the US military, he said to them that “Because 
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of you, our nation is more secure. Because of you, the tyrant has fallen, and Iraq is 
free” (“President Bush” n. pag.).  However, Bush added that: 
“The war on terror is not over, yet it is not endless. We do not know 
the day of final victory, but we have seen the turning of the tide. No 
act of the terrorists will change our purpose, or weaken our resolve, 
or alter their fate. Their cause is lost. Free nations will press on to 
victory” (“President Bush” n. pag.). 
Thus, unlike the narrative of Spider-Man, which presented a dream of eternal 
vigilance, Bush argued that a long period of vigilance would ultimately end, a fact 
reinforced by the allusions in this speech—“the turning of the tide”—that 
Engelhardt argues proves it “had World War II on the brain” (311) .  That World War 
II had such a victorious end in Europe—eliding, of course, the atomic bombing of 
Japan—suggests that the speech articulated a desire for total victory.  This is the 
same dream that The Lord of the Rings films presented. 
The Lord of the Rings trilogy was finally unveiled in December of 2001 when the first 
film, The Fellowship of the Ring, premiered.  A year later, The Two Towers was 
released, and in December of 2003, the final film, The Lord of the Rings: The Return 
of the King, opened theatrically.28  While the initial two films were the second-
highest domestic grossing films in 2001 and 2002 respectively, the franchise would 
only take the highest spot with the final instalment.  In that film, the dream of a 
state of peace was shown to be earned after a crusade against evil.  The conflict in 
the film followed the trends established by the films already discussed, namely the 
shift of the Other towards, and within the Self.  However, The Return of the King 
changed the landscape even further by making the Self a multi-faceted entity.  It is 
this element which forms the foundation of both the dreams and nightmares 
articulated by the film. 
                                                             
28 Extended editions of all three films were subsequently released on DVD.  Since the scope of this 
analysis is the theatrical release of various films, the extended editions and all supplementary 
footage will not be the direct focus of analysis. 
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Despite the escapist nature of The Return of the King, it has been noted that the 
film bears strong connections to the War on Terror (Gelder 105-109; Kellner “The 
Lord” 19).  The analyses which draw those parallels, however, do not take into 
consideration the ways in which the film dreams of a world that a victory in the War 
on Terror promised to deliver.  Accordingly, my analysis of The Return of the King 
will discuss the ways in which the dream of peace articulated by the film resembles 
a Pax Americana which was presumed to be the goal of the War on Terror, the 
“crusade” Bush saw himself as leading.  I will begin, then, by examining the concept 
of Pax Americana as it informed the War on Terror as well as the Bush Doctrine.  
The focus will be on determining how the notion of a Pax Americana relates to the 
tripartite concept of violence established by Johan Galtung, particularly cultural 
violence (“Cultural”, Peace).  With that relationship explored, the concept of Self 
and Other in The Return of the King will be studied using the work of Vladimir Propp 
on folktales.  Given the fact that this conception deviates from the trends 
established by both pre- and post-9/11 films in terms of the definition of the Self, 
particular attention will be given to that divergence.  To emphasise the importance 
of that change, it is useful to understand how typical the film otherwise is in terms 
of violence.  Accordingly, my analysis will then focus on the violence of the film 
itself.  This will primarily involve an exploration of direct and structural violence, 
showing how the redefinition of Self does not noticeably affect those 
representations.  Instead it implies a new avenue of violence.  Lastly, I will show 
how the different path of violence suggested in The Return of the King is one which 
the Bush administration had already utilised in the post-9/11 wars.  Unlike the film, 
though, which is largely sanitised in this regard, censoring of the War on Terror 
would only succeed for a limited period of time.  What is more, since that war 
lacked the truly definitive victory of which the film dreamed, it was one which could 
not be perpetually sustained.  Accordingly, this chapter will conclude by arguing 
that the War on Terror ultimately broke from the dreams articulated in the film. 
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Pax Americana: Planning for a New World Order 
In 1997, several prominent conservatives including William Kristol, formed The 
Project for the New American Century.  The Project is very closely related to the 
Bush Doctrine in its goals, emphasising military strength and interventionist foreign 
policy.  The similarities between the two are unsurprising given the fact that future 
Vice-President Dick Cheney was one of the signatories on the 1997 Statement of 
Principles issued by the Project.  In that document, the Project articulates its 
aspirations for the American government as follows: 
“America has a vital role in maintaining peace and security in 
Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.  If we shirk our responsibilities, 
we invite challenges to our fundamental interests. The history of 
the 20th century should have taught us that it is important to shape 
circumstances before crises emerge, and to meet threats before 
they become dire. The history of this century should have taught us 
to embrace the cause of American leadership” (“Statement” n. 
pag.). 
In short, the Project argues that because the United States was the sole super-
power in the post-Cold War era—making it the sole super-power of the world—it 
essentially has a claim to that world.  Accordingly, the United States is defined as a 
Self to all other nations in the world in an unequal relationship.  Other nations may 
join that Self, but only in submissive positions where they concede to US authority.  
Those that do not make that concession remain the Other.  This stance is made 
even clearer in a report released by the Project in 2000 titled Rebuilding America’s 
Defenses.   
In that document, four missions are established for the United States, all designed 
to assert the military prowess of the United States.  They are defending the 
homeland, maintaining a standing army prepared to “win multiple simultaneous 
large-scale wars” (Rebuilding 6), conducting “constabulary duties” (Rebuilding 6) in 
foreign nations, and “*transforming+ U.S. armed forces” (Rebuilding 6) by 
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integrating new technologies into the military.  These missions are explicitly driven 
by the geo-political landscape of the post-Cold War era, which the report defines as 
unipolar, reasserting the dominance of the US Self.  Most important, all of these 
goals fall under a single “strategic goal,” which is to “preserve Pax Americana” 
(Rebuilding 2).  Of course the very notion of a Pax Americana is one which is 
underpinned by violence. 
As discussed in previous chapters, Johan Galtung defines some cultural violence as 
being ideologically driven (“Cultural” 298-299).  In describing the United States as 
the only super-power in opposition to the rest of the world, the ideology of that 
claim is one of nationalism.  The United States is the Chosen Nation, so to speak, 
while all others are Unchosen.  In this configuration, they may choose to align 
themselves, in a subservient fashion, with the United States, but until they do so 
they are the Other and not the Self.  If they do not, and if they remain the Other, 
then they risk being defined as a threat by the United States and structures of 
violence against them might ultimately legitimise direct violence.  This 
conceptualisation of the world is very similar to the one argued by Noam Chomsky 
where he asserts that US foreign policy only makes sense when paired with the 
notion that the United States owns the world (“We Own” n. pag.).  The result in 
that case resembles violence founded in the concept of the “nation-state” that 
Galtung (“Cultural” 299) articulates.  As the list of missions compiled by the Project 
for the New American Century suggests, particularly with regard to their 
predication upon foreign military interventions, the nation-based violence 
described by Galtung is sanctioned by the Project.  It is important to consider, 
though, that this violence is not just direct.  As the Project warns in Rebuilding 
America’s Defenses, “the failure to prepare for tomorrow’s challenges will ensure 
that the current Pax Americana comes to an early end” (13).  Preparing for those 
challenges does not simply entail military involvement, but an information 
campaign that these same reports show the Project itself conducted.  Thus, the 
violence encouraged by the Project encompasses the direct, structural, and cultural 
aspects of violence, all designed to assert and protect the global inequities which 
maintain the United States as a worldwide Self.  Given the fact that cultural and 
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structural violence are also necessary, it is unsurprising that connections have been 
made between Pax Americana and US hegemony.   
Hegemony itself is a multifaceted concept.  As David Grondin notes, “the term 
‘hegemony’…has the capacity to encompass both the Gramscian concept of 
consensus and persuasion as well as the classical view that highlights the role of 
military power and coercion in the evolution of US foreign policy” (1-2).  While the 
former framing of the term is important to this thesis as it heavily informs the 
diagnostic critique of Douglas Kellner (1995), it is the latter conception of 
hegemony that is most useful here as the Pax Americana is heavily predicated upon 
militarism.  As Grondin also observes, September 11 provided the justification for 
policies aimed at expanding the American empire.  Of the attacks of 9/11 he writes, 
“neoconservative analysts could now trumpet a new-found political will intended to 
translate the vision of global dominance into reality” (15).  What is more, he argues 
that 
“With the obvious evidence of American vulnerability, it became 
easy to legitimize a course of action that, absent the terrorist 
attacks on the country, would have smacked of old-fashioned 
imperialism” (15-16). 
Thus 9/11 served as a gateway toward a global Pax Americana.  Grondin directly 
connects the push towards that goal to the 2002 document, The National Security 
Strategy of the United States of America, which echoes many of the same ideas 
which had been put forward previously by the Project for the New American 
Century.  
Like the earlier Rebuilding America’s Defenses, the 2002 National Security Strategy 
report defined the United States as the sole Self in the world.  However, rather than 
protecting the interests of the United States, the report focuses on the idea of 
freedom, an angle which had more public appeal.  This is evident early in the report 
through the following statement: 
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“People everywhere want to be able to speak freely; choose who 
will govern them; worship as they please; educate their children—
male and female; own property; and enjoy the benefits of their 
labor. These values of freedom are right and true for every person, 
in every society—and the duty of protecting these values against 
their enemies is the common calling of freedom-loving people 
across the globe and across the ages” (The National Security iv). 
In short, the document presents the mythic US Self, one of unbridled liberty, as the 
appropriate model for the world to follow.  The means by which the expansion of 
this model will be accomplished are suggested in the statement which immediately 
follows the previous one: 
“Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military 
strength and great economic and political influence. In keeping with 
our heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for 
unilateral advantage. We seek instead to create a balance of power 
that favors human freedom: conditions in which all nations and all 
societies can choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of 
political and economic liberty” (The National Security iv). 
The mention of the strengths of the United States, particularly its military prowess, 
points toward multiple forms of violence.  The most prominent, though, remains 
the reiteration of the United States as a global Self despite the apparent advocacy 
of a “balance of power that favors human freedom” (The National Security iv).  
Given the push for a Pax Americana, it would seem that unbalanced power is what 
is desired.  Accordingly, the nation-based structures of violence discussed above, 
such as the privileging of the United States, are maintained despite their reframing 
within an apparent context of structural peace.  This rhetorical hypocrisy is even 
more apparent considering the passage of the USA PATRIOT Act in 2001 as it 
actively curtailed the freedoms of the citizens of the United States, significantly 
challenging key elements of the Bill of Rights, including those protecting citizens 
from illegal search and seizure as provided by the Fourth Amendment to the US 
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Constitution.  This would ultimately manifest itself in debate over illegal 
wiretapping authorised by the Department of Justice.  What these issues suggest, 
however, is that the binary Self/Other relationship established by the Bush 
administration in its rhetoric was not as transparent as it seemed. 
In his rhetoric, Bush positioned the enemy Other in binary opposition to the United 
States by casting them as haters of freedom.  However, the USA PATRIOT Act 
suggests that to effectively fight the Other the government must restrict the 
freedoms of the Self.  Logically this would mean that the Self is engaging in the 
same behaviour which it uses to define the Other.  Furthermore, the imposition of 
American military authority around the globe indicates that the United States is 
curtailing international freedoms by forcing other nations into positions of 
subservience in acknowledgement of the US as Self.  It is important to note that in 
both instances, the differences between the Self and the Other are diminished.  
This is a position reinforced by some commentators such as John Milbank  who 
observed that the War on Terror is “a new sort of war without aim or a foreseeable 
end, often to be fought in secret” (310).  While the “endless” nature of the war 
merits further discussion below, the key point here is the idea that a “secret” 
aspect of the war suggests that some behaviour must be hidden from the Self.  
Thus, to preserve a Pax Americana, it is suggested that the Self may need to engage 
in tactics that are not befitting of the Self.  This is clear in the legislation signed into 
law by Bush, such as, but not limited to, the USA PATRIOT Act, which brought the 
Self and Other into close alignment by way of violence.  The increasing parity 
between Self and Other that such laws created were justified by the fact that, as 
Bush said on the USS Abraham Lincoln, the “war on terror…is not endless” 
(“President Bush” n. pag.), meaning that sacrifices must be made to reach the 
ultimate state where the mythic US Self stands alone.  While the question of 
whether the war to achieve that end can ever actually be won is highly debated, the 
fact that the Self was overtly becoming like the Other was clear, and it is that same 
movement of Self toward Other through violence that is dramatised in The Return 
of the King. 
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Becoming like “them”: Heroes, Villains, and the Self and Other 
The Return of the King is a very traditional story.  This was intentional as its original 
author, J.R.R. Tolkien, drew heavily upon mythological and folkloric constructs.  
While the film has changed some of the elements of the books—the character 
Arwen (Liv Tyler) plays a minor role in the book, but is a featured player in the 
film—the structure of the film maintains the roots the story holds in traditional 
storytelling.  Specifically, the seven spheres of action identified by Vladimir Propp 
(79-83) and discussed earlier in Chapter Six, can all be found in various guises in The 
Return of the King.  Some of the protagonists of the film, Aragorn (Viggo 
Mortensen) and Frodo Baggins (Elijah Wood), for instance, are both heroes, while 
others, Samwise “Sam” Gamgee (Sean Astin) and Gandalf the White (Ian McKellan), 
though heroic, are primarily helpers.  Again, though, Propp makes clear that these 
categories are not discrete, so there is often overlap between characters and 
functions (80-83).  This is the case in The Return of the King, particularly given the 
fact that the film tells two concurrent and interrelated narratives.   
It should be noted first, though, that the film is not an “American” film per se.  
Tolkien, the original author, was English, while the film production itself was 
located in New Zealand and was helmed by New Zealand director Peter Jackson.  
Although the production crew was populated with talent from around the world, 
these factors are not as important as they might seem.  This is because The Return 
of the King, like Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone, holds such strong ties to the 
universal elements of folktales and mythology that it was something US audiences 
had embraced again and again; it was not foreign.  What is more, it fit into the 
blockbuster format, and as the domestic box office grosses for The Return of the 
King have showed, it worked with the form admirably.  Thus, despite its 
international pedigree, audiences in the US were familiar with the journey the 
heroes in the film undertake, and how they face severe trials which test their 
mettle each step of the way.  However, even as the key narrative elements of the 
film are preserved, certain other aspects have changed, namely the articulation of 
the Self and Other.  To understand those changes, it is useful to re-examine the 
spheres of action defined by Propp. 
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The Return of the King finishes the saga of The Lord of the Rings, concluding its two 
major narratives.  One is a story of military glory; the other is about the destruction 
of the enemy by way of the central focus of the film, a ring.  The first details the 
journey of Aragorn (Viggo Mortensen) as he returns from the wilderness to assume 
his rightful position as king of Gondor, also called the White City, the capital of the 
free nations.  To do so, he must lead the armies of those nations to victory against 
the forces of Sauron, an evil sorcerer and warlord.  The latter story tells of the quest 
of Frodo and Sam as they attempt to destroy the One Ring, which Sauron wants 
back as it will give him ultimate power.  While both strands of the plot serve the 
same goal of defeating the Other, the ways in which they articulate the relationship 
between the Self and the Other are very different.  In the story of the return of 
Aragorn, the Self is very traditional: a warrior, masterful with direct violence, but 
careful in its use.  Conversely the Other is less adept at direct violence, but more 
numerous and more willing to use it to defeat the Self.  This relationship is similar 
to that seen in many of the films already analysed, particularly those in the pre-
9/11 era, such as Saving Private Ryan, Star Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace, 
and in particular Independence Day, whose president returns to power in much the 
same way as Aragorn does.  Like those films where the Other is decisively defeated 
by the end, so too is the Other vanquished in The Return of the King.  However, the 
direct violence which achieves that end is only partially responsible for the final 
victory in this film.  The triumph is found primarily through the other narrative and 
it is there that the Self and Other come together. 
In their quest to destroy the One Ring, Frodo and Sam join up with Gollum (Andy 
Serkis), a character suffering from multiple personality disorder.  In terms of his 
Self/Other dynamic, Gollum strongly resembles the Green Goblin from Spider-Man.  
Sméagol, the other personality, is conflicted about his position regarding the Self 
while Gollum is clearly constructed as evil.  In Proppian terms, Gollum and Sméagol 
are both villains since they, like the Green Goblin, ultimately join the side of the 
Other.  This is not the case in the previous film as Sméagol has moments where he 
genuinely attempts to help Frodo.  In The Return of the King, though, the evil nature 
of Gollum/Sméagol is clear when they lead Frodo into a cave inhabited by a giant 
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female spider in the hope that Frodo will be killed so that Gollum can have the Ring.   
Additionally, while the audience and Sam are both aware that Gollum is planning to 
betray Frodo, Frodo is not aware of this until it is almost too late.  Again, this does 
engender a sense of paranoia, but given the overt markings of Gollum, who is a 
shrivelled monstrous figure, he is clearly distanced from the good protagonists.  The 
reasoning behind the trust Frodo places in Gollum, then, is that Frodo has ceased to 
be able to recognise those signs.  This is because Frodo, in effect, is a Self that 
begins to behave like an Other.  
Throughout the film, Frodo increasingly becomes aligned with Gollum.  At one point 
Sam attacks Gollum, accusing him of treachery, but Frodo intervenes.  Sam remarks 
that Gollum “is a villain,” and Frodo responds by chastising Sam, telling him that 
they need Gollum because “We can’t do this by ourselves.”  This need increases as 
Frodo begins to become more like Gollum, coveting the ring and distrusting Sam.  
At one point he even goes so far as forcing Sam to leave their group.  Ultimately 
Frodo is so much like Gollum that he chooses to keep the ring instead of destroying 
it.  Despite that choice, Frodo lives while Gollum dies.  This happens because 
Gollum, driven by greed, steals the ring from Frodo and, in careless celebration, 
falls to his death destroying the ring in the process.  Frodo, though, because he is 
still part of the Self despite his proximity to the Other, is saved by Sam.  Accordingly 
it is important to note that Frodo never reached the same level of Otherness that 
Gollum did.  As a sequence at the beginning of the film revealed, Gollum murdered 
his best friend to get the One Ring from him.  For Frodo to truly be like Gollum he 
would have had to kill Sam, but of course he does not, and that is who saves him.  
Even so, by choosing to keep the ring, he betrays the Self in a way that aligns him 
with the Other even if he does not fully become the Other. 
In all of the films analysed so far, pre- and post-9/11, there have been no instances 
of the Self aligning with the Other in this way.  There have been moments where 
the Self was weak and caused harm as a result—Private Upham (Jeremy Davies) in 
Saving Private Ryan is the key example of this.  There have been instances of the 
opposite, as discussed in the chapters on the post-9/11 films where the Other 
masqueraded as Self, but in both The Sorcerer’s Stone and Spider-Man the Other 
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was found out and purged from the Self by a noble agent of the Self.  That discovery 
re-established the division between Self and Other, but the very fact that such a 
passing was possible created an atmosphere of paranoia.  This related directly to 
the concept of the crusading mindset detailed by James Carroll (24-25).  That 
paranoia, though, was not directed at the hero, but the ancillary characters of the 
Self, such as Gollum.  While the positioning of Gollum in the film in an alliance with 
the Self suggests suspicion is still crucial, the fact that the hero himself is like the 
Other points not to an increased paranoia, but to a completely new perspective on 
the relationship between the Self and the Other.  
The Self in the Return of the King is not uniform.  While all elements of the Self are 
devoutly opposed to the Other, they exist in various positions and proximities to 
the Other.  These variations are largely defined by the tactics the characters choose 
to employ in combating the Other.  For example, Aragorn wages a just war against 
the evil armies of Sauron, always remaining a beacon of hope for the free people.  
While he does enlist the help of the Army of the Dead, a group of spirits who 
abandoned a king in a previous battle and were cursed as a result, his allegiance 
with them is one of duty and oath such that his own Self is not compromised.  
Further, when the Army of the Dead fulfils their obligation to him, he releases them 
from their servitude, maintaining his honour.  Gandalf is more of a marginal figure.  
While he is clearly aligned with the good Self, helping to lead the armies of the free 
peoples, his knowledge of the enemy brings him closer to the Other, but, as a 
result, makes him a more potent foe.  At the same time, though, it distances him 
from the pure Self.  Frodo, of course, is very close to the Other, almost becoming 
the Other at the climax of the film.  Thus, a spectrum of Self emerges that sees the 
protagonists at various distances from the Other even as they remain identified 
with the Self, as shown in Figure 24.  Otherwise stated, the Self/Other paradigm 
becomes detached from the Hero/Villain paradigm detailed by the Proppian 
spheres of action. 
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Figure 24 - Main characters on Self/Other spectrum 
 
According to Propp, the Hero is the one who “*departs+ on a search” (80) and 
“*reacts+ to the demands of the donor” (80), who in turn is the one that prepares 
the hero for a journey or gives him or her a magical item, in this case the Ring; the 
hero may also be involved in a wedding.  The villain is the one who fights or 
struggles with the hero (79).  In the case of Frodo, he is a hero for every moment of 
the film even when he attempts to keep the ring.  It should be noted that while 
some, such as Christine Brooke-Rose, argue Frodo is on an anti-quest, she also 
argues that this “does not affect the quest structure” (235), and subsequently 
maintains the status of Frodo as a hero.  Thus the Proppian model still applies.  So 
even when Frodo puts on the ring and is not acting in the best interests of the Self, 
by drawing on the larger concept of functions in the fairytale that Propp details (79-
80), it is clear that the decision to keep the Ring could be seen as a struggle 
between the hero and the villain, with the Ring representing the villain.  What is 
more, it is through this struggle that Frodo is branded, another key function, when 
Gollum bites off one of his fingers. 29  This marking ultimately leads to the defeat of 
those characters who inhabit the sphere of the villain—Gollum and Sauron—as it is 
through that process that Gollum gains the ring and destroys it.  This construction 
suggests a binary division between heroes and villains, as seen in Figure 25.   
                                                             
29
 See Propp, Chapter III for more on the functions of characters within fairytales. 
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Figure 25 - Main characters on Hero/Villain spectrum 
 
What this dissociation between Self/Other and Hero/Villain indicates is a validation 
of behaviour that would not normally be associated with the noble Self.  Again, in 
the film itself none of the characters who are identified with the Self do anything 
that would truly locate them within the realm of the Other—Frodo does not 
murder Sam and Aragorn always remains noble—yet the mobility of the Self along a 
spectrum toward the Other suggests a dramatic difference in the way the Self is 
defined.  Specifically, Frodo, one of the heroes, behaves in a way that the film itself 
condemns, but the film maintains his position as hero regardless; his transgression 
is permitted as it serves the greater good.  Thus, the film establishes an ethic 
wherein the ends—a peace dominated by the Self—justify the means even if the 
means cause the Self to be like the Other.  It is important to be mindful of the fact 
that the film condones violence in a variety of ways already, structural in particular, 
but the redefinition of Self in this way expands the range of that support to forms of 
violence which are condemned.  That having been said, it is necessary to 
understand that within the film, violence remains bound within the standard lines 
already present in the films previously analysed.  To understand the significance of 
this expansion, it is useful to first examine the structures of violence the film 
condones as they reinforce the resemblance of the film to those that preceded it. 
“The Days of the Kings”: Structural Violence as victory in The Return of the King 
When the One Ring is destroyed and the heroes triumph over the villains, the 
bifurcated plot is unified.  All of the characters come together and slowly they bid 
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farewell to one another.  That point of narrative unification marks another key 
juncture for the film, which is the point at which direct violence disappears from 
the film.  Before that point, the characters thrive on combat and are even defined 
by it.  Both Meriadoc “Merry” Brandybuck (Dominic Monaghan) and Peregrin 
“Pippin” Took (Billy Boyd), two of the hobbits, become heroic through their deeds 
on the battlefield, with Merry helping to slay the Witch King.  Furthermore, as 
noted above, Aragorn is only able to reclaim the throne of Gondor by raising and 
leading an army.  Although Sam and Frodo do not participate in any of the major 
battles of the film, they still often engage in direct violence; they must do so to 
escape from a giant spider and a tower full of orcs, as well as to overcome Gollum 
at the climax of the film.  After the ring is destroyed, though, an image of apparent 
peace, albeit a peace haunted by the spectre of militarism, is pervasive.  This is 
clearest in the coronation ceremony of Aragorn, shown in Figure 26. 
 
Figure 26 - “The Days of the King” in Return of the King 
 
At the ceremony, Aragorn, now king of the free peoples, is crowned by Gandalf.  At 
this point Aragorn speaks to the gathered crowds, saying, “This day does not belong 
to one man but to all.  Let us together rebuild this world that we may share in the 
days of peace.”  This remark clearly signals the shift in the film, something also 
marked by the change in its visual palette from dark colours to bright whites.  After 
singing a song in Elvish, Aragorn is reunited with his Elven lover, Arwen.  Then he 
approaches the hobbits, who begin to bow, but he stops them, insisting instead 
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that everybody bows to them. The hobbits are left standing as all the people 
around them bow.  This sequence can be read in terms of structural peace as it 
suggests that in these “days of the king,” as they are called in the film, inequities 
between races have been abolished, and that everybody, regardless of race, is 
equal.  However, this apparent peace, much like the rest of the film, is filled with 
structures of violence, particularly those based upon gender, ethnicity, and class. 
Throughout the film, the character of Eowyn (Miranda Otto) stands as a figure of 
resistance against patriarchal oppression.  She wants to fight with the men of her 
nation, but is repeatedly denied.  She is told by her father and brother that direct 
violence is for men and not women.  She defies the patriarchal order and fights in 
the major battle of the film, ultimately killing one of the chief villains, the Witch 
King.  When she does so, she asserts her femininity by removing her helmet and 
proclaiming her gender.  Kellner argues that in this moment she “*achieves] phallic 
power” (“The Lord” 35).  Although direct violence is the means by which she 
overcomes the inequity of patriarchal order, which is problematic in terms of 
establishing peace, she does manage to establish gender equity.  In fact, this points 
to a further issue of the film which is that direct violence is sign of power.  Kellner 
articulates a similar notion when he writes that in the film “militarism is the 
privileged route to manhood and virtue,” and that “the manly character takes up 
the sword” (“The Lord” 36).  The equality Eowyn thus achieves is predicated upon 
performing in a stereotypically “manly” fashion, which entails performing acts of 
direct violence, something seen in previous films such as The Phantom Menace.  As 
problematic as that might be in terms of direct peace, it is nonetheless a situation 
which supports structural peace, which is to say equality.  However, the earned 
equity is thrown into question at the coronation of Aragorn where she is paired 
with warrior male, Faramir (David Wenham), as part of a traditional heterosexual 
couple.  While there certainly could be nuances to the relationship that are not 
expressed in the brief shot of the couple, the image of Eowyn, no longer a warrior, 
but essentially subdued and domesticated through the relationship with Faramir is 
one which challenges structural peace even if it does not overtly support the 
structural violence of a patriarchal system.   
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Interestingly, Lianne McLarty suggests that the film does not advocate a unified 
masculinity.  She argues that “patriarchy is destroyed and replaced by male 
characters who do not seek power as a means of controlling others” (182), 
ultimately producing “anti-patriarchal heroes” (182).  While some characters can 
indeed be read that way, Frodo in particular, it does not change the fact that their 
ascent to heroism is accomplished through direct violence, something strongly 
linked with traditional masculinity.  As Kellner observes, “the trilogy on the whole is 
a celebration of military valor and heroism linked with valorizations of patriarchy, 
whiteness and hierarchy” (“The Lord” 31-32).  This point is crystallised in the 
moment that Aragorn is coronated as leader of the free people.  Whether he 
sought to have that power or not, the film suggests that he is the only rightful heir 
to the throne, thus reinforcing notions of patriarchal authority.  This violence, which 
is again problematic, is not atypical of blockbuster cinema, as previous chapters 
have shown. 
In terms of ethnicity, the film points towards a resolution of racial and ethnic 
tensions via the hobbits because they are presented as ethnic Others even though 
they are clearly included as part of the Self.  The praise and acceptance they receive 
at the end of the film, then, suggests an overcoming of ethnic boundaries and a 
new age of ethnicity-based structural peace.  However, a deeper analysis of the 
sequence reveals that it actually reinforces structural violence. Although the 
original stories do not indicate any particular ethnicity for the hobbits, the film 
presents them all as white.  In fact, the only difference between them and the good 
humans in the film is their height.  Thus a spectrum of whiteness is established, 
again similar to that articulated by Sander L. Gilman when discussing the painting 
by Edwin Long (221).  Lianne McLarty connects the racial formations in the film to 
class observing that:  
“the more a Middle Earth race is associated with the privileges 
accrued through learning and knowledge and with the refined 
cultural production, the whiter they are, almost whiter than white 
in the ethereal light of the Elves” (176). 
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Conversely, she notes that “the lower levels of this hierarchy of whiteness are 
invoked through working class imagery (the Dwarves are miners)” (176).  
Embedded within racial issues, then, are those of class, which is precisely one of the 
connections bell hooks suggests (7-8).  While privileging whiteness in this way is 
problematic, it is made even more so in the way the film presents the inequity 
between the humans and non-humans as representative of all racial inequities, 
comparable, for instance, to the tensions between whites and blacks in the United 
States.  By making a substitution in this way—a spectrum of whiteness in place of 
actual racial diversity—the film reinforces rather than challenges racism.  As many, 
including McLarty (176), have observed, this is because the film maintains ethnic 
divisions.   
In his assessment of the racial depictions in the film, Kellner emphatically 
comments, “Never before has Whiteness had such extravagant visual apotheosis, 
nor has it triumphed so completely in cinematic spectacle” (“The Lord” 34).  This is 
evident in the fact that not only are all the heroic characters white, but whiteness is 
highly privileged by them.  For instance, Gandalf the Gray dies in the first film and is 
reborn in a stronger and purer form as Gandalf the White, or the White Rider, as he 
is sometimes called, shown in Figure 27.  Later, he is tasked with defending the 
White City.   
 
Figure 27 - The White Rider in battle in Return of the King 
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Similarly, Kellner notes that Sauron is “described as a Dark Lord who lives in a Black 
Land and unleashes Black Riders, including a faceless Witch King dressed in black, 
possessor of a black flying dragon” (“The Lord” 34).  In addition to these overtly 
black figures, the soldiers of Sauron include the black-skinned orcs, who are 
primitive and bestial, as well as the Southrons and Easterlings, characters who 
appear to be Middle Eastern that arrive riding olyphaunts, giant elephant-like 
creatures.  While the characterisation of the orcs makes them resemble stereotypes 
of black characters, specifically the Black Buck figure articulated by Donald Bogle 
(13-14), the depiction of the Southrons and Easterlings is similar to stereotypes of 
Arab characters, such as those discussed by Jack Shaheen (15).  As discussed in 
Chapter Five, those stereotypes are closely related.  These dark characters are 
absent almost entirely from the denouement of the film, suggesting that they were 
only evil Others who have no place in the peaceful time dominated by the Self.  The 
result is a strengthening of the structural violence which privileges a white Self over 
a non-white Other.  As Kellner remarks of the film, “Whiteness is affirmed as the 
sign of good and virtue while black is the color of evil and villainy in a passion play 
between the forces of Light and Darkness” (“The Lord” 34).  An interesting 
extension of this is the “dirtying” of Frodo as he behaves like the Other, as shown in 
Figure 28.  Many characters of course have their whiteness sullied in combat, but 
for Frodo it carries additional implications, as discussed above.  However, the 
whitest character of the film, Gollum, functions much the same way as the Nazis in 
Saving Private Ryan and Darth Sidious in The Phantom Menace, which is again as 
whiteness having gone too far.  As with the gender-based structural violence of the 
film, this implicit racism is not atypical for the films analysed thus far.  Similar to 
some of the films analysed previously, The Return of the King even makes some 
efforts to establish structural peace. 
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Figure 28 - Frodo darkened as corruption nears in Return of the King 
 
Although the film reinforces heteronormativity through the multiple couplings at 
the end of the film—Aragorn with Arwen, Eowyn with Faramir, Samwise with 
Rosie—the sexual orientation of some characters is left largely ambiguous. 30   This 
is particularly the case with Frodo, as well as with Merry and Pippin.  For Frodo, 
many of his scenes with Sam suggest an underlying affinity between the two.  For 
instance, after the ring is destroyed Frodo and Sam share a moment where they 
reflect on their home and the time they spent together.  Had the scene remained 
the same, but one of them were female, they would likely have kissed.  As for 
Merry and Pippin, they can easily be read as lovers, particularly when they have to 
part ways before the major battle of the film.  At that parting they lament that they 
might not see one another again.  While the film does not develop these potential 
readings in any explicit way, it is possible to see it as an effort to include non-hetero 
sexualities into the film.  However, the film only ever engages with these issues 
implicitly.  While that does indicate some level of structural peace, the lack of a 
more developed—or even consistent—message restricts its efficacy. 
 
The larger point to be made by this discussion of structural violence and peace is 
that the film is similar in many respects to the pre- and post-9/11 films that came 
before it.  Structural violence driven by gender and ethnicity-based inequities were 
                                                             
30
 See Ruth Goldberg and Krin Gabbard for a more detailed reading of the sexuality in the film, 
particularly the homosexual elements. 
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found in nearly every film analysed.  Although the hints at a challenge to 
heteronomativity are unusual, they are not forceful enough to mark a major 
difference.  This violence, then, is not unusual for a blockbuster film.  This is true for 
Frodo as well, who commits direct violence almost entirely out of self-preservation.  
Even his actions which position him close to the Other, such as the casting out of 
Sam, involve minimal direct violence.  The film itself, then, does not dramatise the 
violence of the Self acting as Other.  Instead, the transformation of the Self shows 
very little indication of violence, yet that transformation is what ultimately 
produces the “peaceful” world that is seen at the end of the film.  To justify the 
transformation, then, the film needed to position the characters in a supreme peril 
where the stakes were either the domination or destruction of the Self.  Thus, the 
presentation of that dream in the film was realised by the all or nothing approach 
that was presented in the build-up to the Iraq War. 
Quagmire: Self and Other Disjunction in Iraq 
The 2003 invasion of Iraq was sold to the American people through techniques 
which played on the fears and anxieties of the nation.  The attacks of 9/11 were 
presented as a harbinger of violence to come, of the imminent peril the Self was in 
if it did not respond.  That response, however, was not predicated upon an 
evaluation of facts.  Writing about the relationship between the response to 9/11 
and previous US reactions to attacks, Christopher Sharrett observes that media in 
the United States did not scrutinise potential factors that might have led to the 
events of 9/11, such as the funding of the mujahideen (129).  Rather than 
interrogating the Self, Sharrett notes that “Ignoring historical processes, the media 
*concentrated+ instead on fomenting rage against a supernatural villain” (129).  
While Sharrett specifically refers to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda, the building up 
of Iraq as a similar threat, particularly in the shape of its leader, Saddam Hussein, 
was also part of the rhetorical strategy of the Bush administration.  For instance, on 
September 8, 2002, National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice, spoke about the 
potential for Hussein to acquire or build nuclear weapons.  At one point she said 
“there will always be some uncertainty about how quickly he can acquire nuclear 
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weapons. But we don't want the smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud” (“CNN 
Late” n. pag.).  This statement became a key point in the case for war, and was 
reinforced by similar remarks, particularly those made on February 5, 2003, to the 
United Nations Security Council by Secretary of State Colin Powell.  Again the thrust 
of the argument was that Iraq presented an imminent threat to the world due to its 
possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs).  Interestingly, the threat of 
attack was reinforced in various entertainment media.  Dennis Broe, for instance, 
observes that the show 24 engages in a process of “promoting and rationalising the 
endless war,” and that it “keeps the audience afraid of terrorists, nuclear bombs, 
and viruses” (101).  Furthermore, the hero becomes justified in “*ignoring+ legal 
rights…in his battle to save humanity (with humanity here reduced to the United 
States only)” (101).  In short, 24 exhibited movement of the Self towards the Other.  
Again, though, that transition was justified through the protection of the Self. 
In a similar fashion, the questionable nature of a pre-emptive strike became 
justified by the dual goal of protecting the “homeland” (i.e. the Self), and spreading 
the ideology of the United States.  It is unsurprising, then, that in the speech Bush 
delivered aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln to announce the end of major combat in 
Iraq, he again reiterated the importance of WMDs to the mission and stated the 
expanded importance of the mission.  Both of these elements are similar to The 
Return of the King.  In the film, the homelands of all the free peoples of Middle 
Earth are in peril and must be saved.  At the same time, the means of saving them is 
by uniting them all under the banner of the king.  Returning once again to the 
notion of “wishing” 9/11 that theorist Jean Baudrillard advances (7), the film very 
much dreams the equivalent of a Pax Americana.  This is evident at the conclusion 
when Aragorn is crowned king, and all the free people implicitly swear allegiance to 
him.  With Aragorn serving as the corollary of US leadership, he now controls all the 
lands of the free people, a nebulously defined entity.  The dream, then, is that the 
period of war functions as a crucible which eradicates the impurities of the Other, 
leaving only the Self, the Chosen Ones, to rule.  While the speech aboard the USS 
Abraham Lincoln seems to have made that dream a reality seven months before the 
film was even released, the fact that the war in Iraq was still being fought by the 
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time the film premiered at the end of the year suggests that the failure of Bush to 
deliver a golden age of peace only intensified the desire for it.  At the same time the 
dreams of the deliverance of that peace, though approving of the Self being like the 
Other, did not sanction the Self actually being the Other. 
As discussed, the transformation of Frodo from Self into Other in The Return of the 
King was sanitised.  Frodo temporarily hurt Sam by asking him to leave, but no 
major violations of the Self occurred even when Frodo tried to keep the ring; 
everybody remained part of the Self.  The larger implication, again, is that the Self 
will need to do things that it would not normally do if it is meant to triumph.  The 
sanitised version of this presented in the film, however, gave no indication as to 
how far this could be taken.  As the USA PATRIOT Act shows, there was initially 
great support placed behind acts which restricted freedoms of US citizens.  
However, as time progressed the tolerance of people for displays of the Self 
becoming the Other decreased significantly, even if that process was in the name of 
eventual liberty.  This is clear in the response to the Abu Ghraib prison scandal in 
2004.  Early in that year, reports began to appear regarding prisoner abuse at the 
Abu Ghraib detention facility in Iraq.  These reports persisted until April of that 
same year when photographs appeared which graphically depicted the 
dehumanisation of the prisoners by US soldiers.  The acts of direct violence towards 
the prisoners included rape, physical beatings, and humiliations both sexual and 
otherwise, and were legitimised by structures of violence which positioned the 
prisoners as sub-human.  These images, which showed the Self as Other, provoked 
much dissent.  While the reason for this is apparent given the fact that basic human 
rights were being violated, the important factor to consider is that the Abu Ghraib 
scandal did not veer far from the dream of The Return of the King.   
In the film, the dream was that an age of peace would follow a period of sacrifice.  
Part of the sacrifice would be the Self necessarily behaving like the Other.  As noted 
above, that behaviour did not involve explicit acts of becoming the Other, instead it 
simply required resembling the Other.  The Abu Ghraib scandal, however, showed 
the process going much further.  For the Bush administration, though, the failure 
was not so much deviating from the dreams of the film, but it was the inability to 
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censor the war.  To draw on the words of John Milbank, the government could not 
keep the secret fighting secret (310).  The failed attempts at censorship extended 
beyond outright atrocities, though, as the government sought to prevent 
photographs of American caskets being published as well.  As Engelhardt observes, 
these “near biblical injunctions” even led to the lack of “body counts” (320).  In 
short, the image of a war being won could not be maintained.  The further away 
victory seemed, the further away the arrival of an age of peace became.  The 
dreams of the people, as identified via cinema, no longer harmonised with the 
dreams of Bush and his supporters, a disjunction that rattled the entire agenda of 
the administration.  While it was not sufficient to prevent Bush from being re-
elected in November, 2004, it did ultimately build up to the Republicans losing 
control of both the House of Representatives and the Senate in the mid-term 
elections in 2006 as the American people grew tired of the continually rising death 
toll in Iraq.  Thus, the dream found in The Return of the King of a pristine Pax 
Americana, one forged by clean and noble deeds, did not come to pass.   
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Conclusion 
Blockbuster Cinematic Violence and 9/11 
Although film theory throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries has 
revealed the complexity and depth present when a film is projected onto a screen 
in a darkened room, the theoretical models and frameworks cannot take away the 
magic of the screen.  Films still carry with them a sense of wonder, and for many 
audience members, that wonder is like a dream.  The images on the screen 
entertain, excite, terrify, worry, depress, and elate viewers, who are bathed in the 
ethereal glow of flickering light.  While many theoretical approaches have been 
taken which apply psychoanalytic theories to the screen—Christian Metz, Laura 
Mulvey, and Kaja Silverman, for instance, have all made seminal contributions to 
the field—such theories often focus more on spectatorship than the historical 
context.  Douglas Kellner eloquently sums up the relationship between the images 
on screen and that context in front of it by arguing that, “popular media culture 
taps into existing fears, hopes, fantasies, and other concerns of the day” (Media 
105).  Mike Chopra-Gant makes a similar point, arguing that popular cinema best 
responds to the general trends in society due to the large number of viewers such 
cinema attracts (11-12).  Following from these statements, then, it is reasonable to 
assume that when a film is successful at the box-office, it is because it is relevant in 
some way to the audience.  In that way, the cinema screen becomes a site of 
dreams.  When the American blockbuster inhabits that space, as it pervasively did 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, it dreams of violence.  It 
dreams of direct violence; it dreams of structural violence, and, in so doing, it is 
cultural violence.  Yet not all films have dreams that are collectively embraced.  
Some films fade into oblivion; the dreams they present are similar to most others, 
yet they lack something essential to the violent imagination.  Other films, however, 
articulate dreams that resonate with large numbers of people.  Audiences go again 
and again to see the film and its dreams.  Such films capture something in their 
dreaming—a need, a hope, a fear—and audiences choose to participate in that 
dream again and again.   
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This thesis has had two tasks.  The first was to expand upon the idea suggested by 
Baudrillard of a relationship between blockbuster cinematic violence and its 
historical moment, specifically that of films surrounding 9/11.  The second was to 
establish a larger methodological framework that can reliably link history and 
blockbuster cinematic violence.  While the latter is the larger goal of the thesis, it is 
the former that has been the primary objective of this work.  As this thesis has 
repeatedly shown via the violence-calibrated diagnostic critique, the films that were 
most successful in the 1990s repeatedly “tapped into” the anxieties of the post-
Cold War United States.  Films continually dreamed of a world wherein the Self was 
no longer without opposition, and had a definite identity.  To that end the violence 
of American blockbuster cinema in the pre-9/11 period was deployed to first 
identify an external Other, which simultaneously defined the Self.  This same 
approach was taken in the US response to 9/11 when the Bush administration 
articulated an Other through terrorism, albeit vaguely, against which direct, 
structural, and cultural violence were directed so that the United States once again 
had a distinct Self; peaceful means were not utilised.  The pre-9/11 films dreamed 
of a return to a binary world, and the response to 9/11 did just that.  However, the 
War on Terror, despite having clear sides—the United States versus the terrorists—
did not actually exist in a binary world; the Other could pass as the Self.  Thus as the 
post-9/11 films also tapped into the zeitgeist of the period, anxieties that were very 
different from those found in pre-9/11 cinema emerged.  The post-9/11 films 
dreamed paranoid dreams where the Other had penetrated the Self, and was 
always potentially concealed as the Self.  Despite this distinct shift, violence is 
legitimised in all the films analysed through the oppositional positioning of a Self 
and an Other along traditional sites of violence in society, including gender, 
ethnicity, and class.  Throughout this thesis, then, the answer to the first task—the 
relationship between 9/11 and dreams of blockbuster cinematic violence—has 
been charted. 
In Chapter One, the creation of an alien Other in Independence Day dreamed of a 
return to a binary, Cold War-style conflict that would permit the United States to 
achieve a military victory, bringing the Cold War to the never-realised state of a Hot 
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War.  In Chapter Two, which looks at Titanic, the resilience of the United States via 
the American Dream is presented, and the analysis shows how the identity of the 
nation remained steadfast in the face of the external Other composed of the 
Edwardian Era supporters who sought to uphold class-bed structural inequality.  In 
Chapter Three, Saving Private Ryan dreams of a return to a hot war in which the 
Self is clearly defined through the US military in opposition to the Nazi Other.  In 
Chapter Four, Star Wars: Episode I – The Phantom Menace pits the Self in 
opposition to an external Other that is attempting to commit genocide.  Lastly, in 
the final film analysed from the pre-9/11 period, The Grinch, an external Other, is 
attempting to destroy the Self.  That the Other is ultimately accepted into the Self 
suggests the previously static Self/Other binary has become dynamic.  What this 
change suggests is that the dream of a return to a Cold War binary of Self versus 
external Other seen in the previous four films gave way to a changing sense of 
acceptance where the Other is not so villainous as it might seem.  Of course the 
change in The Grinch is one which only occurs alongside structural violence that 
continually marginalises the Grinch, it remains one which potentially moves 
towards peace rather than violence.  The event of 9/11, however, seems to have 
disrupted this shift, as the dynamism of The Grinch appears in post-9/11 films, but it 
“taps into” the post-9/11 anxieties and inscribes the dynamic Self and Other within 
the paranoia of the post-9/11 period.  The highest grossing films of 2001, 2002, and 
2003, explored the permeability of the border between the Self and Other.   
In Chapter Six, a false villain device is used in Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s Stone 
to engender a sense of paranoia throughout the entire film.  In so doing, the Self 
and Other are once again pitted in a struggle of direct violence where the Other is 
ultimately uncovered within the Self and defeated.  In Chapter Seven, the false 
villain device was replaced by simple dramatic irony in Spider-Man with the 
audience aware of the infiltration of the Other, but the cinematic Self dangerously 
unaware.  Of course when the Self finally realises this penetration, the Other is 
defeated, leaving the Self vigilant against future incursions.  Finally, in Chapter 
Eight, the relationship between Self and Other is transformed to such a degree in 
The Lord of the Rings: Return of the King that the Self was able to emulate the 
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behaviour of the Other without losing its status as Self.  In so doing, the dire 
struggle between Self and Other was resolved with not only the total elimination of 
the Other, but also of the elements of the Self which resembled the Other.  In short, 
the film dreamed of cataclysmic violence which would purify the Self.  This struggle 
against a hidden Other was both realised and unrealised in the response to 9/11.  In 
all three post-9/11 films the binary between Self and Other was destabilised.  
However, even as they tapped into the anxieties of the period, but dreamed of 
solutions that could not come to pass; the mission was not accomplished in the Iraq 
War, and terrorism—an idea rather than an opponent—could not be eliminated.   
By applying the violence-calibrated diagnostic critique to the films within the range, 
the first task of this thesis has been completed.  The blockbuster cinematic violence 
of pre-9/11 films dreamed not of the event of 9/11, but of the revitalisation of the 
US Self that occurred through the response to 9/11, and the post-9/11 film 
violence, drawing on the anxieties of the period, wished for an end to terrorism, but 
no such end could be reached.  The second task of this thesis, which is to create a 
reliable methodology that, to borrow from Kellner (Media 116), allows history to 
read blockbuster cinematic violence, and blockbuster cinematic violence to read 
history, has been implicitly explored throughout this work.  In order to process the 
findings, though, it is necessary to revisit the methodology used to complete the 
first task, particularly the concept of violence articulated by Johan Galtung which 
underpins it all. 
The Violence-Calibrated Diagnostic Critique 
In each chapter, the thesis has articulated the ways in which the Self/Other binaries 
are firmly supported by multiple structures of violence that produce eruptions of 
direct violence; the films legitimise both forms of violence.  In other words, these 
chapters have repeatedly shown that blockbuster American cinema is culturally 
violent.  This is not a surprising conclusion, though, given the proliferation of 
studies both inside and outside of film theory which focus on violence in that 
cinema.  However, rather than focusing on the ways in which direct violence might 
prompt some viewers to emulate it, this thesis has deployed a methodology which 
235 
 
focused on the broader scope of violence as articulated by Galtung to provide an 
historical perspective.  From this vantage, what is most noteworthy is the fact that 
the cultural violence on display in these films so strongly resembles the violence—
both direct and structural—that was centrally located in the response to 9/11 
articulated by the Bush administration.  The explanation for this is simple, however.  
The pre-9/11 films dreamed of a resolution to the post-Cold War identity crisis, and 
the Bush administration enacted policies that effectively realised those dreams.  
This is not, however, to suggest causality: the films which played before did not 
cause the official response to those events, but instead legitimised such violence 
(and ultimately de-legitimised it as well).  This is the function of cultural violence as 
defined by Galtung, and it is a key to broadening the scope of the methodology to 
address the second task of this thesis.   
 
Figure 29 - Tripartite Violence redux 
 
Galtung argues that tripartite violence essentially regenerates itself.  If a system 
lacks one or two forms of violence, the presence of at least one other form of 
violence will eventually cause the absent forms to remanifest themselves.  For 
example, if direct violence and structural violence are not present, but cultural 
violence is, Galtung claims that eventually direct and/or structural violence will 
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emerge, as shown in Figure 29.  This is important because in the wake of the Cold 
War, there was an apparent absence of violence that had been previously pervasive 
in the United States, specifically violence directed toward the Soviet Other.  The 
disappearance of the macro-level violence that helped to define the US Self 
resulted in the dissolution of unity.  As Galtung observes of state systems, the less 
unified the national Self is, the weaker its capacity to build internal peace (Peace 
65).  The result was increasing attention paid to violence within the United States 
itself.  Yet even as these domestic anxieties were “tapped into” by popular media—
Independence Day, for instance, addresses issues of ethnicity—the films themselves 
had grander dreams, and continually articulated violence on the macro-level that 
had once existed between the United States and the Soviet Union.  Although there 
were numerous changes to the way in which the Other was represented, it always 
manifested itself as a force that rivalled the Self, but never defeated it.  In this way, 
although the broad-scale structural and direct violence that defined the Cold War 
had disappeared in the 1990s, it persisted in the cultural sphere.  Otherwise stated, 
even though a global superpower that could be defined as an Other against the 
United States no longer existed, since the United States was the only superpower, 
films continued to dream of such an enemy.     
Returning to the notion of violence remanifesting itself, then, the persistence of 
cultural violence in this fashion legitimises its structural and direct counterparts, 
and, Galtung would contend, will ultimately “breed violence.”  By aligning the 
viewers with the Self, then, the films also manage to align them with a network of 
representations that effectively legitimise—explicitly or otherwise—structural and 
even direct violence.  Although many of these legitimisations do not necessarily 
deal with realistic situations—the aliens of Independence Day and The Phantom 
Menace, for instance, are clearly fictional—the violence that informs such aspects 
of the films under investigation adheres to generic practices of prejudice and 
discrimination.  Thus, it is in keeping with the theories of peace and violence 
advanced by Galtung that the legitimisation of violence at the cultural level 
manifested itself within a different sphere of society with the films essentially 
“dreaming” of the violence that was ultimately carried out by the Bush 
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administration in the post-9/11 period.  If the methodology were to work beyond 
the realm of 9/11, then, it would reveal similar connections.  It would show how 
blockbuster cinematic violence routinely “taps into” the anxieties of any period 
(Kellner Media 105).  To that end, it is useful to briefly explore the period of US 
history that exists after the Iraq invasion.   
The events of 9/11 greatly affected the domestic landscape, and opened the door 
to a return to the past, which was clear in the ways the Bush administration sought 
to align itself with a mythic American history.  However, with the domestic 
landscape changed and the United States increasingly embroiled in a “crusade,” the 
dreams of the films changed from dreaming for a return to the past and a unified 
Self to seeing the ultimate victory of the Self through the purging of the Other.  As 
Jim A. Kuypers argues, “it is clear that no metanarrative on the War on Terror 
evolved” (152).  The result was “a fractured and confused” understanding of the 
War on Terror in the media (152).  As a result, the frame of the War on Terror was 
not one which could be supported for a long period of time.  The appearance of 
Bush on the USS Abraham Lincoln with the “Mission Accomplished” banner behind 
him became emblematic of this failure to meet the dreams articulated by the films 
from 2001 to 2003.  This post-“mission accomplished” period, then, is different 
from the immediate response to 9/11.  An application of the methodology to this 
period should provide an indication of its functionality outside of the scope of this 
thesis.  While a new study would need to be conducted to fully analyse the 
blockbuster cinema after 2003, even a brief investigation produces interesting 
findings.  Specifically, it shows that the dreams in pre-9/11 films were following a 
trajectory that, like many things, was disrupted by 9/11.  While that disruption was 
essentially a dream come true given the fact that it enabled the Bush 
administration to rearticulate the national Self in a way that closely paralleled the 
dreams of those films, the fact that there were signs of a move towards peace in 
blockbuster cinematic violence in 2000 cannot be discounted. 
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Blockbuster Cinematic Violence Beyond 9/11 
At the turn of the millennium, the precise nature of the relationship between Self 
and Other seemed to change with The Grinch.  While the relationship remained a 
negative one in terms of violence, the film incorporated a sense of mobility in the 
Self and Other that the previously analysed films did not.  Again, both sides of the 
binary were heavily grounded by structural violence, particularly in the form of 
class- and ethnicity-based stereotypes and prejudices, but the fact that there was a 
shift at all suggests a change that may ultimately have led towards the 
development of a Self/Other binary that in turn ultimately legitimised structural 
peace rather than violence.  This is suggested by the fact that the highest grossing 
film of 2001 that debuted and earned the majority of its total box-office take before 
9/11, was Shrek.  Shrek told the story of an ogre who interacts with the human 
world, ultimately rescuing a human princess who, in a happy ending, becomes an 
ogre.  In other words, the Other is positioned as the Self, and the apparent Self 
becomes the Other.  Of course there are a number of factors which mitigate the 
radical nature of this plot.  For one, the film once again uses green as a coded 
ethnicity such that the characters of Shrek, and (eventually) his ogre-bride, Fiona, 
do not have direct real-world corollaries.  Additionally, Shrek and Fiona are both 
voiced by prominent white actors, Mike Myers and Cameron Diaz respectively.  
Thus, like Jim Carrey in The Grinch, Shrek and Fiona can be read as animated 
characters in “greenface.”  What is more, much of the film is predicated upon Shrek 
excelling at direct violence.  Even so, the very fact that Fiona turns into an ogre at 
the end of the film shows that the changes suggested by the violence of The Grinch 
may very well have developed into a more peaceful series of dreams.  Ultimately 
Shrek became the third highest-grossing film of the year, behind The Sorcerer’s 
Stone and The Lord of the Rings: The Fellowship of the Ring, both of which were 
released after the events of 9/11, and both of which “tapped into” the anxieties of 
that period.  While it is not unusual for films that do not become the highest-
grossing film of the year to articulate more diverse relationships between the Self 
and the Other—which are also potentially more peaceful—what makes Shrek 
noteworthy is that in 2004, as the dreaming of victory in the War on Terror was 
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turning into a nightmare with the mission continually going “unaccomplished,” the 
highest grossing film of the year was the sequel to Shrek. 
Unlike the first Shrek film, which tells the story of the transformation of the Self into 
Other, Shrek 2 begins with the Self as Other.  What is more, the central plot of the 
film involves attempting to have a traditional Self—represented here as a white, 
upper class, heterosexual couple, the king and queen of Far Far Away—to accept 
them as they are.  Again, the film is predicated upon a resolution of direct violence, 
and there are still overt structures of violence implied through the articulation of 
both the Self and the Other.  The most obvious, for instance, involves the central 
plot of the film where Shrek embarks on a quest to become white in an effort to be 
the man he thinks Fiona wants.  What is more, he succeeds in becoming white 
before ultimately realising that being white will make neither him nor Fiona happy.  
Amongst other issues with the storyline is the implication that in his true form, 
Shrek is white, a fact which serves as an impediment to his positioning as a non-
white character.  Despite such problematic racial depictions, though, it is clear that 
the film seems not only to continue the development of the Self and Other found in 
the post-9/11 films analysed in this thesis, but also appears to refocus that change 
within the pre-9/11, post-millennial context of the first Shrek film.  Thus the more 
overt structures of violence found in a film like The Return of the King, which 
privileged whiteness and masculinity over all while denigrating non-white 
ethnicities, were suggested to be faulty by Shrek 2.  For instance, the conflict in the 
film erupts because Shrek believes he needs to adhere to an ideal of whiteness for 
Fiona.  In that way, the film engages with issues of race in a way that is not seen in 
the films analysed thus far.  The end of the film does present some problematic 
racial issues—Shrek and Fiona return to live in the swamp, effectively the poor part 
of the kingdom—but again the contention that the Self might not be a privileged 
upper-middle class person remains present throughout the film.  Ultimately, 
though, the Self/Other binary of the film destabilises the boundary between the 
two.   
While Return of the King presented a Self that emulated the behaviour of an Other, 
the Self of Shrek 2 broke down the traditional Self/Other binary by effectively—
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albeit guardedly—integrating the traditional Self and Other.  The result is that the 
actual Other of the film is one that reinforces structures of violence and deploys 
direct violence to do so.  This again plays into the concept of reactive violence that 
Tom Engelhardt argues is crucial to the “American war story” (5).  It is also 
necessary to note that the Other is even further marked via stereotypes as one of 
the primary villains of the film, Prince Charming, is depicted as an effeminate if not 
homosexual figure, so much so that he is even voiced by Rupert Everett, who is 
openly gay.  Despite that regressive side of Shrek 2, I contend that the film is not 
entirely without progressive elements since those which would normally be 
privileged—whiteness—are ultimately dissociated from the Self, with other 
qualities—non-white ethnicities—being used to visually define the characters.  
While this still does place a strong emphasis on the visual qualities, especially since, 
as noted above, both characters are voiced by white actors, it still represents a 
dramatic shift from the white-dominated films analysed.  What is more, the shift 
away from traditional protagonists and a critique of the traditional qualities 
associated with the Self continues in subsequent years. 
In 2005, the highest grossing film of the year was Star Wars: Episode V – Revenge of 
the Sith.  The film was the second sequel to The Phantom Menace, and represents a 
dramatically different type of Self/Other binary than the first film.  While The 
Phantom Menace presented a discrete boundary between the Self and the Other, 
Revenge of the Sith breaks down that distinction with the primary Self of the film 
not simply emulating the behaviour of the Other, as was the case in Return of the 
King, but becoming the Other through acts of violence.  The film, of course, still 
maintained structures of violence—the previously warrior-like Padme (Natalie 
Portman) is domesticated via pregnancy, essentially losing all narrative agency.  
However, it also provided a thinly veiled critique of the contemporary historical 
moment into which it was released.  For instance, at one point in the film a 
character remarks, “If you’re not with me, then you’re my enemy,” a clear allusion 
to the divisive rhetoric of Bush and others such as Hillary Clinton.  While the 
versions uttered in the immediate aftermath of the attacks of 9/11 were met with 
great praise, the Revenge of the Sith iteration was presented after the Iraq invasion 
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with death tolls rising, and increasing public outcry against the invasion-cum-
occupation.  Accordingly, it was framed as a critique of the Bush administration.  
The ideology that defined the Self in 2001, then, and indeed in nearly all of the pre-
9/11 films analysed, was that which identified the Other in 2005. 
This formation illustrates two clear points.  The first is that the violence in the films 
after 2003 suggests another change in the dreams of the films.  Specifically, they 
develop the movement of the Self into a full-fledged crisis of the Self.  A more 
detailed study would be needed to determine if this crisis is a delayed 
manifestation of the identity issues which plagued the United States in the 1990s 
after the Cold War or if it is the logical extension of the crusader mindset.  Yet 
regardless of the motivation, the boundary between the Self and the Other is no 
longer discrete.  That having been said, there still remain clear cases of good 
behaviour and bad behaviour which are definitely informed by structures of 
violence.  For instance, in Revenge of the Sith it is acceptable for Anakin Skywalker 
(Hayden Christiansen) to kill certain characters at the beginning of the film, but as 
he transforms from Self to Other it becomes unacceptable.  Killing, then, is 
sometimes legitimate for the characters in the film, but without a detailed analysis 
of the violence, the precise structures that determine that cannot be accurately 
determined.  The second point the post-Iraq invasion films support, and something 
which is evidenced throughout this thesis, is that the construction of the Self and 
Other in films is continually changing, but that continuous process seems to also 
form larger phases.  Most importantly, though, even the observations from this 
cursory analysis suggest that the violence-calibrated diagnostic critique functions as 
a general methodology for analysing the relationship between blockbuster 
cinematic violence and its historical moment. 
Past & Future 
The analysis in this thesis has dealt explicitly with two periods in American history, 
the span from 1996 to 2001 which involved the second term of President Clinton 
and the first year in office of President Bush, and the period from 2001 to 2003, 
which began with the attacks on September 11, 2001, and lasted beyond the end of 
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major combat operations in Iraq.  Although there could certainly be further 
subdivisions, it was within those time frames that the major trends in cinematic 
violence emerged, trends which informed the trajectory of the Self and Other as 
discussed throughout this thesis.  As briefly detailed above, 2004 seemed to mark a 
new phase in the development of cinematic violence.  It continued the 
transformation of the Self and Other that had begun in earnest after the events of 
9/11, but it included a framing of the relationship between the two that suggested 
a move beyond the diametric opposition that was dominant in pre-9/11 cinema 
and, to a lesser extent, post-9/11 cinema.  What these shifts indicate is a need to 
more closely examine the violence in films using the methodology synthesised for 
this thesis.  There are two primary ways that the work could be extended, in terms 
of the length of the period being studied, and in terms of the number of films per 
year.  In the first case, as I have shown above, new trends can be found, and even a 
brief look beyond 2005 reveals a further change in the nature of the violence in the 
highest-grossing cinema in the United States.   
The top movies in the three years after Revenge of the Sith were Pirates of the 
Caribbean: Dead Man’s Chest (2006), Spider-Man 3 (2007), and The Dark Knight 
(2008).  In Dead Man’s Chest, the plot focuses heavily on Captain Jack Sparrow 
(Johnny Depp), a character which thrives on its ambiguous sexuality—some 
commentators labelled the pirate Sparrow a “swishbuckler” as a result.  
Additionally, the plot involves gender passing, with Elizabeth Swann (Keira Knightly) 
pretending to be a man for much of the film.  Additionally, one of the primary 
villains of the film, Lord Cutler Beckett (Tom Hollander), seems to be characterised 
in terms of a homosexual stereotype.  At the same time, the minorities presented 
onscreen, particularly Tia Dalma (Naomie Harris), adhere to gross stereotypes that 
activate structures of violence which privilege whiteness.  While this is indeed a 
step backward, the film represents a much more progressive view of sexuality and 
sexual orientation than the films which preceded it did.  Spider-Man 3 also explored 
the nature of the Self by having Peter Parker/Spider-Man (Tobey Maguire) become 
corrupted by an alien life form.  The fact that the creature is black and Parker is 
white raises any number of issues regarding ethnicity-based structural violence, but 
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again the Self is destabilised.  However, the return to prominence of Spider-Man 
suggests a desire for a return to more traditional masculinities.  Indeed, the return 
to hard-bodied masculinity can clearly be seen in The Dark Knight, in which the 
vigilante justice that Batman/Bruce Wayne (Christian Bale) embodies is denigrated 
even as it is ultimately praised.  While a more detailed analysis of the film is needed 
to reach any substantive conclusion, even a cursory look at the film reveals a heavy 
endorsement of vigilante justice, something which is ultimately in line with the 
Bush Doctrine as defined by Charles Krauthammer, particularly in terms of its 
unilateralism (n. pag.).  What is more, that trend seems to have been continued in 
the top film of 2010, and indeed of all-time at the US box-office, Avatar.  It is worth 
considering that this shift roughly adheres to the major political changes going on in 
the United States, and the world, at that time.  For instance, in 2004 and 2005, the 
dissent against the Iraq War intensified to such a level that in 2006 the Republicans 
lost control of the US Congress, and in 2008, Barack Obama was elected as 
President of the United States.  At the same time, the bubble economy that had 
been growing in the US burst, and a major crash ensued.  The point of this 
discussion is not to analyse these films in any great detail, nor is it to suggest 
definite connections between the social horizon outlined above and the violence of 
the film, particularly in the way it articulates the relationship between the Self and 
the Other.  Instead it is to contend that, based on the analysis conducted in this 
thesis, the methodology could in fact be expanded to look in greater detail at 
blockbuster cinematic violence beyond the 9/11 period.  This could be 
accomplished by expanding the scope of this research to include a more 
longitudinal study sample could reveal much about the expansive relationship 
between cinema in the United States and the contemporary historical moments 
into which they were released.  As mentioned above, though, a deeper sample 
could also be useful. 
In 2010, the top five films were Toy Story 3, Alice in Wonderland, Iron Man 2, The 
Twilight Saga: Eclipse, and Harry Potter and the Deathly Hallows, Part I.  A full 
analysis of the violence in each of these films will reveal the diverse ways in which 
cinema, to borrow from Kellner in his discussion of the diagnostic critique, “*taps+ 
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into existing fears, hopes, fantasies, and other concerns of the day” (Media 105).  
For instance, Alice in Wonderland articulates, very broadly, a story of nostalgia and 
coming of age, while Iron Man 2, is about wealth, and masculinity.  These films all 
came out during the same time conservative parties retook the House of 
Representatives in a mid-term election, largely driven by the rise of the Tea Party 
movement.  By extending the sample selection in each year, a more complete 
picture of the United States and the violence that cultural artefacts legitimise could 
be determined.  While this would offer a much greater sense of the textures the 
phases of cultural violence contain, the actual phases would be harder to determine 
given the lack of broad time frame.  Ideally, then, future studies would find a way to 
marry length with depth.  In both approaches, however, there are limitations, and 
they must be made clear. 
In the analysis conducted in this thesis, violence is continually read in terms of the 
historical developments in the United States.  However, there is again no clear 
causal link between cinema and history in terms of violence.  For example, although 
audiences flocked to The Sorcerer’s Stone after the events of 9/11, the film was 
planned, marketed, and virtually completed well before that point.  Additionally, 
the conclusion that the pre-9/11 films which “dreamed” of 9/11 does not imply that 
such films brought the event to pass.  What it does instead is suggest that the types 
of violence that will be accepted by a certain population—the US population in this 
case—can be inferred from its popular cinema.  Thus, the fact that US audiences 
embraced not only The Sorcerer’s Stone in the wake of 9/11, but also all of the films 
discussed in the pre-9/11 period, helps to explain why the American people did not 
immediately react negatively to paranoia-driven violence in the United States, such 
as the domestic wiretapping, in the wake of 9/11.  In short, the violence in cinema 
indicates types of violence that audiences will accept, which is precisely the theory 
that underpins tripartite violence.  As the attacks of 9/11 show, although seemingly 
shocking changes can result from historical events, a closer examination of cultural 
artefacts, particularly from the vantage point of the violence articulated therein, 
reveals that such changes are not at all surprising. 
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American blockbuster cinema is culturally violent.  It legitimises direct violence, but 
it does so by presenting structures of violence.  While some of these structures are 
explicitly detailed by the films, others are implicit.  The end result is that the dreams 
of the film continually involve the resolution of all conflicts with violence.  Thus, 
what this thesis ultimately reveals is the fact that, in terms of cultural consumption, 
the United States embraces violence, particularly when it privileges a noble Self.  As 
a result, peace is hard to find.  This is not to say that peace is absent from cinema, 
even from blockbuster cinema.  Toy Story 3, for instance, the highest grossing film 
of 2010, does have messages of inclusiveness and acceptance, but it is haunted by 
structures of violence, particularly surrounding ethnicity.  Peace, then, only seems 
to be accepted when integrated into a larger framework of violence.  Part of this 
has to do with the blockbuster aesthetic, which engenders violence and conflict, 
but it also evokes the question posed by title of the second album released by the 
heavy metal band, Megadeth, “Peace sells…but who’s buying?”  Certainly not the 
American cinema-goer and that is cause for concern. 
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Appendix 
Below are the box office figures for the top five films in each year from 1996 to 
2003.  All figures from Box Office Mojo. 
Rank Title 
Gross  
(in millions USD) 
1 Independence Day 306 
2 Twister 241 
3 Mission: Impossible 180 
4 Jerry Maguire 153 
5 Ransom 136 
 
Table 7 - Highest grossing films in the US in 1996 
 
Rank Title 
Gross  
(in millions USD) 
1 Titanic 600 
2 Men in Black 250 
3 The Lost World: Jurassic Park 229 
4 Liar Liar 181 
5 Air Force One 172 
 
Table 8 - Highest grossing films in the US in 1997 
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Rank Title 
Gross  
(in millions USD) 
1 Saving Private Ryan 216 
2 Armageddon 201 
3 
There’s Something About 
Mary 
176 
4 A Bug’s Life 162 
5 The Waterboy 161 
 
Table 9 - Highest grossing films in the US in 1998 
 
 
Rank Title 
Gross  
(in millions USD) 
1 
Star Wars: Episode I – The 
Phantom Menace 
431 
2 The Sixth Sense 293 
3 Toy Story 2 245 
4 
Austin Powers: The Spy Who 
Shagged Me 
206 
5 The Matrix 171 
 
Table 10 - Highest grossing films in the US in 1999 
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Rank Title 
Gross  
(in millions USD) 
1 
Dr. Seuss’ How the Grinch Stole 
Christmas 
260 
2 Cast Away 233 
3 Mission: Impossible II 215 
4 Gladiator 187 
5 What Women Want 182 
 
Table 11 - Highest grossing films in the US in 2000 
 
 
Rank Title 
Gross  
(in millions USD) 
1 
Harry Potter and the Sorcerer’s 
Stone 
317 
2 
The Lord of the Rings: The 
Fellowship of the Ring 
313 
3 Shrek 267 
4 Monsters, Inc. 255 
5 Rush Hour 2 226 
 
Table 12 - Highest grossing films in the US in 2001 
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Rank Title 
Gross  
(in millions USD) 
1 Spider-Man 403 
2 
The Lord of the Rings: The Two 
Towers 
339 
3 
Star Wars: Episode II – Attack 
of the Clones 
302 
4 
Harry Potter and the Chamber 
of Secrets 
261 
5 My Big Fat Greek Wedding 241 
 
Table 13 - Highest grossing films in the US in 2002 
 
  
Rank Title 
Gross  
(in millions USD) 
1 
The Lord of the Rings: The 
Return of the King 
377 
2 Finding Nemo 339 
3 
Pirates of the Caribbean: The 
Curse of the Black Pearl 
305 
4 The Matrix Reloaded 281 
5 Bruce Almighty 242 
 
Table 14 - Highest grossing films in the US in 2003 
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